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Recidivism: A Multi-Level Explanation
Dissertation Abstract
Brian E. Oliver
Numerous studies have shown that several characteristics of offenders are
related to their likelihood of recidivism after release from prison. Nearly all of
these studies, however, have focused on offenders from just one state. Few studies
have examined recidivism rates controlling for the characteristics of offenders
from multiple states, and virtually none have examined recidivism rates
controlling for characteristics of offenders from multiple states during different
periods of time. Additionally, few studies have explored different types of
recidivism across multiple jurisdictions to determine whether the same individual
level factors explain variations in rearrest, reconviction, reimprisonment, and
parole violations.
To address these shortcomings, this dissertation applied logistic regression
models to data from the publicly available Prisoners Released in 1994 dataset to
investigate the extent to which nine individual level factors explain variation in
recidivism rates within three years of release from prison across 15 states. The
nine factors are: 1) gender, 2) age at first arrest, 3) race, 4) age at release, 5)
number of prior arrests, 6) type of current offense, 7) time served, 8) admission
type and 9) release type. Eight forms of recidivism were examined: 1) rearrest for
any offense, 2) rearrest for a new violent offense, 3) rearrest for a new property
offense, 4) rearrest for a new drug offense, 5) rearrest for a new public order
offense, 6) reconviction probability if rearrested, 7) reimprisonment probability if
reconvicted, and 8) parole violations. The dissertation investigated differences in
the effects of the individual level factors on each form of recidivism.
To investigate the effects of criminal justice policies and practices on state
differences in recidivism rates, multilevel models were estimated that include
three contextual variables, in addition to the nine individual factors. The statelevel contextual variables are: 1) drug arrests per 100,000 residents, 2) police
officers per 1,000 residents and 3) the arrest-offense ratio. In a final analysis,
regression analyses were conducted to determine the extent to which the nine
individual factors explain the increase in the three-year rearrest rates among
persons released from prison in 1983 and 1994.
The findings reveal that differences in individual level characteristics help
to explain the variation across states for some, but not all, forms of recidivism.
The findings related to rearrest for a new violent offense, reconviction probability,
and parole violations were not conclusive. Results from the multilevel models
indicate that the contextual factor of police officers per 1,000 has a significant
impact on property rearrests and a marginal impact on drug rearrests and
reconviction probability. The analysis of rearrests during two separate time
periods revealed that changes in contextual factors, as opposed to individual level
characteristics, were responsible for the increase in rearrest rates which occurred
between 1983 and 1994.
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This study provides evidence that both individual level and contextual
factors play a role in recidivism and need to be taken into consideration in
implementing policy and designing programming. Two conclusions consistent
with the findings are that treatment services need to be based on offender need
and risk level and that states should consider reinstating discretionary parole. It
would be beneficial for future research to examine the effect of additional
individual and contextual variables on recidivism rates, particularly if a multistate dataset, similar to the one used in this study, becomes available in which
county of release is specified.
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CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION

1.1: Introduction
Much attention has been drawn to the fact that the United States has the
highest incarceration rate in the world. The prison and jail incarceration rate at
yearend 2008 was 754 inmates per 100,000 U.S. residents (Sabol, West and
Cooper, 2009). Although this represented a slight decline over the 2007 rate, it is
nevertheless five to twelve times the average incarceration rate in most European
countries (Tonry, 2004). Also, given that at least 95 percent of all U.S. prisoners
will be released at some time (Hughes and Wilson, 2002), an unprecedented
number of people are being released from prison in the United States. In 2008,
735,454 inmates were released to the community after serving time in prison
(Sabol et al., 2009).
Unfortunately, many of the people who leave prison end up back in prison.
Langan and Levin (2002) found that, within three years of their release, 67.5
percent of state prisoners released in 1994 were rearrested, 46.9 percent were
reconvicted and 51.8 percent were back in prison, serving time for a new prison
sentence or for a technical violation of the conditions of their release. Hughes and
Wilson (2002) similarly found that 42 percent of those released on parole were
returned to prison or jail and another nine percent absconded. What these numbers
indicate is that less than half of the people released from prison are successfully
reintegrated back into society. Meanwhile, the hundreds of thousands of offenders
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on parole or conditional release who return to prison each year end up costing
states billions of dollars (Petersilia, 2001).
In light of the high level of recidivism in the United States, it is not
surprising that much research has been done on why it occurs. The preponderance
of the research over the past 25 years has focused on the effects that individual
level characteristics, such as age, gender and race, have on recidivism. While such
studies can be extremely enlightening in determining policies and programming,
their ability to provide broadly applicable conclusions is limited in that very few
address variations that exist either from state to state or during different periods of
time. If offenders released from prison in Delaware have twice the rearrest rate as
offenders released from prison in Michigan, for example, is this because the
offenders in Delaware have a higher number of traits that are associated with
reoffending, or does it have to do with differing state policies? Similarly, if
national recidivism rates go up over a period of ten or eleven years, is it because
the release cohorts are different – or is it because there have been changes in
rehabilitative services offered to offenders released, because police have become
more proactive in their response to crime or because of some other macro-level
change?
Given the high human and monetary costs of recidivism and the complex
interplay between state and federal systems, these are not idle questions. Even
small statistical differences can tip decisions impacting thousands of lives and
millions of dollars. Finding answers to these questions is, moreover, no easy task.
A possible method, comparing recidivism rates across studies, may seem
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appealing, but would, unfortunately, not lead to scientifically valid results. Beck
(2001) pointed out three major problems in this approach. One is that what is
counted as recidivism in one jurisdiction or study may not be counted as
recidivism in a second jurisdiction or study (some states include technical
violators as recidivists while others don’t). A second problem is that different
jurisdictions and studies utilized different time frames. A third problem is that
many studies do not include sufficient information to control for variables which
would affect recidivism rates. These three problems make the idea of comparing
recidivism rates across dissimilar studies an unwise proposition.
Instead of comparing previous studies, this dissertation draws its material
on the effect of nine individual-level characteristics on recidivism directly from
two multi-state data sets. Primary of these is the Recidivism of Prisoners Released
in 1994 dataset (United States Department of Justice, 2009a), from which
262,529 of the 302,309 prisoners’ cases were used. Data on 108,580 prisoners
from the Prisoners Released in 1983 dataset (United States Department of
Justice, 2004) are also brought into discussion of changes over time. From these
two datasets, nine individual-level characteristics were extracted. These nine
individual-level characteristics include gender, age at release, race, age at first
arrest, number of prior arrests, current offense type, time served, type of
admission, and type of release. These nine specific individual-level characteristics
were chosen because data on these nine specific variables were included for all or
most of the offenders in both the 1994 and 1983 Prisoners Released datasets.
Although data was also included in both datasets regarding Hispanic origin, it was
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not included as an individual-level characteristic in this dissertation because of the
large amount of missing data on this indicator (over 19 percent of cases from the
1994 dataset and over 33 percent of cases from the 1983 dataset).
In addition, data on three state-level contextual variables – drug arrest
rates, police per 1,000 residents and arrest-offense ratio – were gathered from
several issues of Crime in the United States (Federal Bureau of Investigation,
1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998), from the Uniform Crime Reporting Program Data
[United States]: 1975-1997 dataset (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2000) and
from information provided by the Florida Department of Law Enforcement, the
Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority and the Delaware State Police. It
is noteworthy that very little past research has looked specifically at the role of
contextual variables and recidivism (Fischer, 2007). In producing this dissertation,
there were no problems locating published studies that explore the relationship
between drug arrest rates and crime rates (e.g., Benson, Kim, Rasmussen, and
Zuehlke, 1992; Benson, Rasmussen, and Sollars, 1995; Mendes, 2000; Shepard
and Blackley, 2005). Also found were recent studies which explore the
relationship between either police per capita or arrest-offense ratio and crime rates
(Sampson and Cohen, 1988, Marvell and Moody, 1996; Weiss and Freels, 1996;
Levitt, 1997; MacDonald, 2002). There were no published studies found,
however, that looked directly at the relationship between these three contextual
variables and any form of recidivism. This dissertation will thus provide
information in an area which, to date, has been ignored by the research
community.
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Eight measures of recidivism are examined in this dissertation: 1) rearrest
for any offense, 2) rearrest for a violent offense, 3) rearrest for a property offense,
4) rearrest for a drug offense, 5) rearrest for a public order offense (other than a
parole violation), 6) reconviction following arrest for a new offense, 7)
reimprisonment following conviction for a new offense, and 8) parole violations.
Because parole violations result from either a new arrest or a technical violation
without an accompanying arrest, a somewhat more detailed analysis of parole
violations is undertaken. The use of multiple measures of recidivism allows for
distinctions to be made regarding whether certain individual-level characteristics
are equally effective in predicting variation in different measures of recidivism or
if they have differing effects based on either the type of offense or the measure of
recidivism used. All eight measures of recidivism came from variables included in
the two datasets on prisoners released earlier described.
Three primary research questions are addressed in this dissertation: 1) To
what extent can the variation in recidivism rates across space be explained by
variations in the individual-level characteristics of offenders released from
prison? 2) Can the addition of state-level contextual characteristics of police per
1,000 residents, arrest-offense ratio and state-level drug arrest rates help explain
the variation in prevalence of recidivism across space that is not explained by the
individual-level factors? 3) To what extent can the variation in rearrest rates over
time be explained by variations in the individual-level characteristics of offenders
released from prison and are there any state-level contextual variables which
might help improve the explanation?
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1.2: Research Question 1: To what extent can the variation in recidivism
rates across space be explained by variations in the individual-level
characteristics of offenders released from prison?
Although a widely cited statistic in the criminological literature is that, on
average, two-thirds of offenders released from prison end up rearrested for a new
crime (see, for example, Petersilia, 2001; Solomon, Johnson, Travis, and
McBride, 2004), this is a national average that does not persist on a state-level
basis. When three year state-level rearrest for a new offense percentages are
computed for offenders released from prisons in 15 states in 1994, it is clear that
there is a wide degree of variation – with a low of 43.7 percent reported for
Michigan and a high of 86.2 percent reported for Delaware (see Figure 1). As is
shown later in this dissertation, there is similarly a wide degree of variation
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between states in rearrest rates for drug and public order offenses and violations
of parole, as well as a lesser degree of variation between states in rearrest rates for
violent and property offenses. There is also a wide degree of variation between
states in the reconviction rate of rearrested offenders and the reimprisonment rate
of reconvicted offenders.
What this information does not reveal, however, and what the current
research addresses, is to what extent the variation in prevalence of various forms
of recidivism across states can be explained by differences in the individual-level
characteristics of the state-level release cohorts. Knowing this will help in
understanding the degree to which differences in recidivism are the result of
variations in the characteristics of prisoner populations and the degree to which
differences are related to variations in policy and programming in different states.

1.3: Research Question 2: Can the addition of state-level contextual
characteristics of police per capita, arrest-offense ratio and state-level drug
arrest rates help explain the variation in prevalence of recidivism across
space that is not explained by the individual-level factors?
The second research question is geared towards identifying if and to what
extent the addition of three contextual factors – police per capita, arrest-offense
ratio, and state-level drug arrest rates – can be used to explain some of the
remaining variation that exists in recidivism probabilities across space. While
differences in the previously described individual-level characteristics may very
well explain a great deal of variation, there are also other variables that may
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explain differences in recidivism probabilities. Although no research to date has
directly examined the relationship that exists between either police-strength or
arrest-offense ratio and recidivism, some prior research has found that crime rates
may be influenced by police strength and arrest-offense ratio (Tittle and Rowe,
1974; Wilson and Boland, 1978; Sampson and Cohen, 1988, Marvell and Moody,
1996, Levitt, 1997, MacDonald, 2002 - although it should noted that some studies
have found no relationship – i.e., see Decker and Kohlfield, 1985; Weiss and
Freels, 1996). Therefore, it would seem useful to test if these contextual factors
could help explain variation in recidivism rates across space. Additionally, it
would help to examine if variations in state-level drug arrest rates help explain
variation in recidivism across space. This is an important factor to look at
because, although it has commonly been stated that America has been fighting a
War on Drugs since at least the early 1980s, research has found that, during this
time, some states were more aggressive than others in targeting drug offenders
(Mast, Benson, and Rasmussen, 2000; Benson, 2009).

1.4: Research Question 3: To what extent can the variation in rearrest rates
over time be explained by variations in the individual-level characteristics of
offenders released from prison and are there any state-level contextual
variables which might help improve the explanation?
The third research question is very much like the first. To what extent can
individual-level factors help explain the difference in three-year prevalence of
rearrest for a new offense between the 1983 cohort and the 1994 cohort? To
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answer this question, the analysis will compare the rearrest rates from the 1983
cohort with those from the 1994 cohort. This section will additionally explore
possible changes in criminal justice policy that led to the changes in national
rearrest rates. It should be noted that while the section exploring recidivism
variation across space includes eight different measures of recidivism, for
recidivism over time, the only measure of recidivism used is rearrest for a new
offense. This measure was chosen for the temporal analysis because arrests
initiate reconviction and reimprisonment. It’s the first link in the recidivism chain.

1.5: Chapter Overview
Chapter Two discusses the data, measures and analytic strategy for the full
dissertation. This includes reviewing the sources of the data and explaining how
missing or improperly entered data is dealt with. The eight separate outcome
measures are defined. A discussion also describes additional steps taken to
formulate the reconviction and reimprisonment outcomes. The chapter then closes
with a discussion of the three sets of analyses to be conducted in the dissertation.
Chapter Three provides a review of prior research findings related to the
nine individual-level characteristics to be analyzed in the dissertation and
summaries of the state averages for the 1994 dataset. Logistic regressions were
also run for each individual level characteristics for the recidivism measures of
rearrest for a new offense, rearrest for a violent offense, rearrest for a property
offense, rearrest for a drug offense and rearrest for a public order offense. Where
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possible, theoretical explanations were further given explaining why people with
specific characteristics were at greater risk of offending than others.
Chapter Four explores whether the inclusion of the nine individual-level
characteristics helps explain variation between states in the overall rearrest rates
and rearrests for specific types of offenses. The offense types include violent
offenses, property offenses, drug offenses and public order offenses (excluding
parole violations). Along with the calculations, there is a discussion of the
theoretical perspectives related to the findings.
Chapter Five examines the helpfulness of the nine individual-level
characteristics in explaining variation between states for other forms of
recidivism. These include reconviction probability, reimprisonment probability
and parole violations. Parole violations are analyzed separately from public order
offenses because they may result from either a criminal charge accompanied by
an arrest or a non-criminal technical violation that does not involve an arrest.
Chapter Six uses Hierarchical Linear Modeling to explore whether three
state-level criminal justice factors help improve on the explanation of variation in
recidivism between states. Once again, a discussion of the theoretical perspectives
related to the findings accompanies the results.
Chapter Seven looks at recidivism over time to see to what extent
individual-level factors can help explain variations in the three-year prevalence of
rearrest that exists between the 1983 cohort and the 1994 cohort. After this
analysis, possible alternative explanations will be discussed, though formal tests
of these alternative hypotheses will not be conducted.
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Chapter Eight concludes with policy implications and suggestions that
stem from the findings presented in the previous chapters and offers suggestions
for future research.
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CHAPTER 2 – DATA, MEASURES AND ANALYTIC STRATEGY

2.1: Introduction
This chapter first provides details about the primary sources of data used
in analyses that seek to answer the three research questions that were raised in
chapter one. It next explains how the constructs for both the individual-level
(level-one) and state-level (level-two) variables were operationalized for use in
several quantitative analyses. It concludes with a discussion of the three analytic
strategies that were used to answer the three research questions previously raised.

2.2: Data
The first step in gathering data for the dissertation involved accessing two
large Bureau of Justice Statistics datasets containing information on prisoners
released from state prisons in 1983 and 1994 and determining which of the cases
therein were usable. The data sets are available from the Interuniversity
Consortium

for

Political

and

Social

Research

(ICPSR)

website

(http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/). The Recidivism of Prisoners Released in 1994
dataset consists of 38,624 cases representative of 302,309 offenders released from
15 states in 1994. The 15 states include Arizona, California, Delaware, Florida,
Illinois, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina,
Ohio, Oregon, Texas and Virginia. In line with Langan and Levin’s (2002)
analysis of the 1994 dataset, offenders were not included in this dissertation
unless 1) a RAP sheet on the prisoner was found in the State criminal history
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repository, 2) the released prisoner was alive through the three-year follow-up
period, 3) the prisoner's sentence was one year or longer, and 4) the prisoner's
release was not recorded as release to custody/detainer/warrant, absent without
leave, escape, transfer, administrative release, or release on appeal (Langan and
Levin, 2002). This left a total sample of 33,625 cases representative of 271,669
offenders released in 1994.
The Recidivism of Prisoners Released in 1983 dataset consists of 16,355
cases representative of 108,580 offenders released from California, Florida,
Illinois, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio,
Oregon and Texas. The dataset is based on an original sample of 18,374 cases;
however, 2,019 were not included in the final sample because their sentence was
less than one year, they died during the follow-up period or their release was
classified as administrative release, absent without leave (AWOL), escape,
transfer, or release on appeal or death (Beck and Shipley, 1989).
The next step involved determining how to deal with missing, incorrectly
entered or otherwise errant data in the analysis. Data were classified as errant
under one of three scenarios: 1) the offender’s date of birth and date of release
from prison had him or her recorded as being released from prison prior to age 13
(see Beck and Shipley, 1989; Langan and Levin, 2002); 2) the record indicated
that an offender was released from prison for the current offense prior to the date
he or she entered prison for the current offense, or 3) the offender’s date of birth
and date of first arrest had his or her first arrest occurring prior to the age of ten.
This last exclusion was taken because the youngest person charged as an adult in
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America in recent history was nine-years-old (see Quindlen, 1990) and the 1983
and 1994 data files only contain arrest information of juveniles charged as adults
(Beck and Shipley, 1989; Langan and Levin, 2002). Further, to deal with the issue
of missing data, cases were also excluded 1) if the offender’s gender was recorded
as missing, 2) if the offender’s age at first arrest was unknown (either because
arrest cycle one was blank or because the offender had arrests recorded for all 99
arrest cycles, meaning he or she had over 99 arrests and making his or her first
arrest date impossible to determine), 3) if the offender’s race was classified as
missing, 4) if the offender’s age of release was unknown, 5) if the type of current
offense was unknown, 6) if the amount of time served on the offender’s current
sentence was unknown or 7) if the offender’s type of release was calculated as
missing. Cases where the offender’s type of admission was missing were kept in
the dataset due to the relatively large number of cases that would have had to be
eliminated if these cases were taken out. After these steps were taken, the 1994
dataset contained 32,732 cases representative of 262,530 offenders released from
prison in 1994 and the 1983 dataset contained 15,223 cases representative of
99,681 offenders released from prison in 1983. The analysis of recidivism across
space only involved offenders from this revised 1994 dataset.
A second file, merging prisoners released from the same 11 states in either
1983 or 1994, was then created to look at rearrest over time. Before this file was
created, prisoners released in 1994 from Arizona, Delaware, Maryland and
Virginia were eliminated, as data from these states were not also collected for
1983. Following this, the two datasets were merged. The merged file contained
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42,301 cases representing 342,602 offenders released from 11 states in either
1983 or 1994. The analysis of recidivism over time proceeded from the merged
dataset containing these cases.
The three state level contextual variables used in the examination of
recidivism across space are: 1) police per 1,000 residents, 2) arrest-offense ratio
and 3) rate of drug arrests per 100,000 people. Data on police per 1,000 residents
for the years 1993 to 1996 came from issues of Crime in the United States
(Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997). Data on arrest-offense
ratio for 13 of the 15 states came from the Uniform Crime Reporting Program
Data [United States]: 1975-1997 dataset (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2000).
This data set is available from the Interuniversity Consortium for Political and
Social Research (ICPSR) website (http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/). Because
complete data was not available for this variable for two states, the Florida
Department of Law Enforcement and the Illinois Criminal Justice Information
Authority provided additional data for this variable for their respective states.
Drug arrests per 100,000 residents for the years 1994 to 1997 came from issues of
Crime in the United States (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1995, 1996, 1997,
1998). Because complete data was not available for this variable for three states,
the Delaware State Police, the Florida Department of Law Enforcement and the
Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority provided additional data for this
variable for their respective states.
Before proceeding on to the next section, it is important to explain why
data for police per 1,000 residents came from different volumes of Crime in the

16
United States than data on drug arrests per 100,000 residents. Some researchers
have found that using police strength as a measurement of crime control is
potentially problematic. Kane (2006) wrote “because increases in crime rates
often lead to increases in police deployment, it is often difficult to determine
whether police deployment reduces crime, or whether crime increases lead to
elevated levels of police deployment” (pp. 191-192). Kovandzic and Sloan (2002)
also stated that “it was unlikely that police levels and crime impacted each other
simultaneously because it took time for governments to hire and train new officers
when confronted with higher crime rates. It was also reasonable to assume that
offenders did not immediately respond to increased levels and the potentially
increased likelihood of apprehension, until word got out that more officers were
on the street” (p. 70).
The number of law enforcement employees reported in Crime in the
United States allows for a way to address this issue. For each year, a section of the
report gives totals for the number of full time state and local law enforcement
employees who were employed on October 31 of that year. Thus, for the Crime in
the United States, 1993 report (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1994), the
number of police employees calculated would be the number employed on
October 31, 1993. Using this date as the first date where police size is measured
thus produces a minimum two-month lag between when the police are on the
street and when prisoners from the datasets are released in 1994. While most
research studies use a one or two year lag between police levels and subsequent
crime measurement (Kane, 2006), Chamlin, Grasmick, Bursik and Cochran
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(1992) presented evidence that it may actually take much less time for changes in
police levels or arrest rates to have a deterrent effect on would be criminals. They
further argued that using one-year time lags might be too long to uncover
deterrent effects. On this basis, it is felt that the two month lag between police
levels that exist on October 31 and the release of prisoners starting on January 1
of the following year provides enough time to address the concerns raised by prior
researchers. It is for this reason that data on police per 1,000 residents came from
the 1993 to 1996 Crime in the United States reports (Federal Bureau of
Investigation, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997), while data on drug arrests per 100,000
residents came from the 1994 to 1997 Crime in the United States reports (Federal
Bureau of Investigation, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998).

2.3: Measures
There are a total of eight outcome measures used in this dissertation: 1)
Rearrest for a New Offense, 2) Rearrest for a Violent Offense, 3) Rearrest for a
Property Offense, 4) Rearrest for a Drug Offense, 5) Rearrest for a Public Order
Offense (other than a Parole Violation), 6) Reconviction for a New Offense, 7)
Reimprisonment for a New Offense and 8) Parole Violations. Rearrest for a New
Offense is defined as whether an offender was arrested for any new offense within
three years of his or her release from prison in either 1983 or 1994. Rearrest for a
Violent Offense is defined as whether an offender was arrested for a new violent
offense within three years of his or her release from prison in either 1983 or 1994.
Rearrest for a Property Offense is defined as whether an offender was arrested for
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a new property offense within three years of his or her release from prison in
either 1983 or 1994. Rearrest for a Drug Offense is defined as whether an
offender was arrested for a new drug offense within three years of his or her
release from prison in either 1983 or 1994. Rearrest for a Public Order Offense
(other than a Parole Violation) is defined as whether an offender was arrested for
a public order offense, other than a parole violation, within three years of his or
her release from prison in either 1983 or 1994. Parole Violations were defined
and analyzed in two separate manners. The first involved analyzing all the
offenders who were rearrested on a new charge of violating parole within three
years of their release from prison along with those sent back to prison within three
years of their release on a technical violation of parole. The second involved
analyzing those resentenced to prison on a new conviction for a criminal charge
of parole violation along with those sent back to prison within three years of their
release on a technical violation of parole. This two-phase analysis helps in
differentiating the use of parole violations by parole officers compared to
prosecuting attorneys.
The regression equations used in this dissertation all include individual level
variables that have consistently been shown to be associated with offender
recidivism. These variables include gender, age at release, race, age at first arrest,
number of prior arrests, time served, current offense type, type of admission and
type of release. For the first two regression models, state of release is also included
in the regression equation. For the third regression model, police per 1,000
residents, arrest-offense ratio and drug arrests per 100,000 residents are entered
separately into the regression equation. For the fourth regression model, state of
release and year of release are both included in the regression equation
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Modifications were made to the model structure for reconvictions and
reimprisonment for a new offense. The problem that existed with using the same
formula for reconvictions and reimprisonment as had been used for rearrest has to
do with the relationship that exists between rearrest for a new offense,
reconviction for a new offense and reimprisonment for a new offense. Because a
prerequisite of being reconvicted of a new offense is that one must first be
rearrested for a new offense and because a prerequisite of being reimprisoned for
a new conviction is that one must be reconvicted for a new offense, classes of
offenders with higher rearrest rates will, by default, have higher reconviction rates
because a prerequisite of being reconvicted is that one must first be rearrested.
Similarly, classes of offenders with higher reconviction rates will, by default,
have higher reimprisonment rates because a prerequisite of being reimprisoned for
a new offense is that one must first be reconvicted for a new offense. Therefore,
as males, blacks and younger offenders are rearrested at higher rates than females,
non-blacks and older offenders, these groups would almost certainly have higher
reconviction rates and higher reimprisonment rates. This would create a problem
in that the results of the regression model would be biased by arrest rates and
conviction rates.
To control for this potential problem, the samples for two of the analyses
include offenders only if they met specific conditions. First, the between state
reconviction analyses were limited exclusively to offenders who had been
rearrested. Second, the between state reimprisonment for a new offense analyses
were limited exclusively to offenders who had been reconvicted. Limiting the
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offenders in this way produced reconviction and reimprisonment probability
results that were more meaningful. The two research questions these areas address
are, specifically: 1) For rearrested offenders, what is the probability of being
reconvicted for a new offense and what individual and contextual level factors are
related to this probability? 2) For reconvicted offenders, what is the probability of
being reimprisoned for the new conviction and what individual and contextual
level factors are related to this probability?
The predictor of primary interest for the first two research questions,
which deal with recidivism across space, is State of Release – defined as being
Arizona, California, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota,
New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Texas and Virginia. For
the research question dealing with recidivism over space and whether individual
level characteristics help explain variations in recidivism across space, there were
two separate sets of logistic regression models used. One of these models
compared each state with a single contrast – an approach commonly referred to as
a “fixed effects” approach (details of this approach are provided in Chapter 4). In
this model, the state with the lowest recidivism rate for the recidivism measure
under consideration served as the reference category (except for the recidivism
measure of reimprisonment probability, which used the state with second lowest
recidivism rate) and the predictor of State of Release was entered into the analysis
as a series of dichotomous variables. The second model involved a series of stateby-state comparisons. For the research question dealing with recidivism over
space and whether the addition of contextual variables helped explain variations
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above and beyond individual level characteristics, the predictor of State of
Release was entered into the analysis as a series of dichotomous variables with
the state with the lowest recidivism rate for the recidivism measure under
consideration serving as the reference category (except for the recidivism measure
of reimprisonment probability, which used the state with second lowest
recidivism rate). For the research question dealing with recidivism over time, a
second predictor of primary interest is Year of Release – 1983 or 1994. This
variable was binary coded with 1983 as the omitted contrast. For the combined
dataset containing 1983 and 1994 data, State of Release was further modified with
Arizona, Delaware, Maryland and Virginia removed.
This analysis also includes important individual-level predictors of
recidivism. For the purpose of analysis the variables were coded in the following
manner. Gender was coded as one for males and zero for females. Age at Release
is the age of the prisoner at the time of release from confinement and is coded as a
continuous measure. Race consists of three categories: white, black and other.
Race was entered into the models as a series of dichotomous variables with
“white” serving as the reference category.
Age at First Arrest reflects the age of the offender at the time of his or her
first arrest and was coded as a continuous measure. Number of Prior Arrests
reflects each released prisoner’s arrest history, not including the arrest leading to
the current incarceration, and was coded as a continuous measure. Current
Offense Type consists of five categories of offenders: violent, property, drugs,
public order or other. Current Offense Type was entered into the models as a
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series of dichotomous variables with “property offense” serving as the reference
category. Time Served was coded as a continuous variable representing the
number of months served in prison during the current incarceration. Type of
Admission consists of five categories: new court commitment, parole revocation,
probation revocation, other, and unknown. Type of Admission was entered into the
models as a series of dichotomous variables with “new court commitment”
serving as the reference category. Type of Release consists of four categories:
discretionary parole, mandatory supervised release, expiration of sentence, and
other. Type of Release was entered into the models as a series of dichotomous
variables with “discretionary parole” serving as the reference category. A detailed
description of how each of these measures was created from the merged data is
described in the Appendix A.
The state level variables used in this dissertation were entered into
equations known as multilevel models. Multilevel models are statistical models
that are structured with variables measured at two or more levels. In such models
variables in one level are nested within another level. Examples of multilevel
models include: students nested within classes, patients nested within hospitals
and, in the current analysis, individuals released from prison nested within
individual states. In the current model, the impact of the state-level variables is
tempered by the effect of the individual-level variables. In such situations the
latter variables are referred to as level-one variables and they are nested in larger
groups referred to as level-two variables (Raudensush and Bryk, 2002).
To estimate the effect of the state level variables on various forms of
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recidivism, three multilevel models were created. In each of these models, the
level-one data consisted of the nine individual level variables previously
described. The state level variable of Police per 1,000 Residents was entered into
the first multilevel model as a rate per capita derived by taking the 1993 to 1996
average for the number of law enforcement personnel employed by a state divided
by the four year average of each state’s population for the same time period and
multiplying this result by 1,000. The state level variable of Arrest-Offense Ratio
was entered into a separate multilevel model as a proportion derived by taking the
1994 to 1997 year average of arrests for Index I crimes (murder, rape, robbery,
aggravated assault, burglary, larceny and motor vehicle theft) for each state
divided by the four year average of Index I crimes for each state for the same time
period. The state level variable of Drug Arrests per 100,000 Residents was
entered into a third multilevel model as a rate per capita derived by taking the
1994 to 1997 year average of the number of drug arrests in a state divided by the
four year average of each state’s population for the same time period and
multiplying this result by 100,000.

2.4: Analytic Strategy
As the outcome measures are all dichotomous (rearrested/not rearrested,
reconvicted/not reconvicted, etc.), logistic regressions were used in each of the
multivariate analyses. In the dissertation, there are three separate sets of analyses.
The first set of analyses explores the differences in recidivism probabilities that
exist between individual states for the 1994 cohort and the extent to which the

24
inclusion of individual level characteristics helps explain these differences. The
second set of analyses uses Hierarchical Linear Modeling to help determine if and
to what degree the addition of the three state level contextual factors to the models
of individual level factors helps explain differences across states in various forms
of recidivism. The third set of analyses explores the differences in rearrest
probabilities that exist over time (between the 1983 and 1994 cohorts) and to what
extent the inclusion of individual level characteristics helps explain these
differences. The first and third sets of models in this dissertation were estimated
using STATA, version 10.0 (StataCorp, 2007) or 11.0 (StataCorp, 2009) and the
second set of models was estimated using HLM 6.0 (Raudenbush, Bryk and
Congdon, 2004).
In the first set of analyses, logistic regressions were run for each
combination of states from the 1994 cohort. These involved two separate sets of
analysis. The first involved a model with a single contrast state omitted. The
second involved a series of state-by-state logistic regressions comparing the
recidivism probabilities of those released, for example, from California in 1994
with those released from Florida in 1994. For the second model, this process was
repeated until every possible state by state combination had been estimated. After
these initial regressions were computed, a second set of models was run which
added the nine individual level characteristics to the models. Both models were
repeated for 1) rearrest for any offense, 2) rearrest for a violent offense, 3) rearrest
for a property offense, 4) rearrest for a drug offense, 5) rearrest for a public order
offense (other than a parole violation), 6) reconviction for a new offense for
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rearrested offenders, 7) reimprisonment following conviction for a new offense,
and 8) violation of parole. The results present preliminary evidence as to what
extent individual level characteristics help explain variation in rearrest,
reconviction, reimprisonment and parole violation probabilities across space.
In the second set of analyses, Hierarchical Linear Modeling was
conducted, with the individual level factors entered in as Level 1 predictors and
the state level contextual factors entered in as Level 2 predictors This process was
repeated for 1) rearrest for a new offense, 2) rearrest for a violent offense, 3)
rearrest for a property offense, 4) rearrest for a drug offense, 5) rearrest for a
public order offense (other than a parole violation), 6) reconviction for a new
offense for rearrested offenders and 7) reimprisonment following conviction for a
new offense. Because of the limited degrees of freedom that resulted from the
sample consisting of only 15 states, models were constructed using only one of
the three contextual variables at a time. The results of these models indicate if the
three contextual variables help explain variation in recidivism across space.
In the third set of analyses, a preliminary regression was first run with year
of release the only variable entered into the model. Following this, a second
regression was run adding all of the individual level characteristics to the first
model. The resulting coefficients and odds ratios present preliminary evidence as
to what extent individual level characteristics help explain variation in rearrest
probabilities over time. A final regression was then run with state of release added
to the equation. The third set of analyses concludes with a discussion of
contextual factors that may have contributed to the findings.
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CHAPTER 3
EXPLORING THE IMPACT OF INDIVIDUAL LEVEL COVARIATES

3.1: Introduction
To accurately compare prevalence of recidivism over time and across
space, it is first necessary to control for individual-level variables that have been
shown to have an influence on both the likelihood of offending and likelihood of
recidivism. Research has found that certain groups of individuals are more likely
to be involved in crime than others and, to accurately compare recidivism rates
between different groups, these differences need to be taken into account. For the
purpose of this research, nine individual-level factors are examined: 1) gender, 2)
age at release, 3) race, 4) age at first arrest, 5) number of prior arrests, 6) current
offense type, 7) time served, 8) type of admission, and 9) type of release.
To provide a better understanding of why these nine variables were chosen
for use in this research and why they might be expected to have an influence on
prevalence of rearrest, what follows is a review of the literature for each variable.
When possible, this review also includes theoretical explanations about why each
variable might have the effect it does on recidivism. Following each review,
logistic regressions testing for significance are run on 32,732 cases representing
262,530 offenders from the Prisoners Released in 1994 dataset. These logistic
regressions include models for overall rearrests, violent rearrests, property
rearrests, drug rearrests and public order rearrests.
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Models are not estimated for reconvictions or reimprisonments in this
chapter because those analyses must await the results of the rearrest models.
Because certain groups of offenders are more likely to be rearrested than others,
this fact will, by default, make certain types of offenders more likely to
reconvicted and reimprisoned simply because they are more likely to be
rearrested. The appropriate line of questioning for reconviction is: What are the
chances of a certain group being reconvicted provided the analysis consists solely
of those who have been rearrested? Similarly, a more appropriate line of
questioning for reimprisonment is: What are the chances of a certain group being
reimprisoned provided the analysis consists solely of those who have been
reconvicted. Because the dataset must be modified to correctly conduct these
analyses, these outcomes are addressed in chapter 5.
These regressions allow tests for statistical significance to be conducted
for each of the individual level variables, both individually and when all nine
variables are included in the model. Table 1 at the end of the chapter lists the
models for the outcomes of rearrest for any offense, rearrest for a violent offense,
rearrest for a property offense, rearrest for a drug offense and rearrest for a public
order offense with all the individual level characteristics entered into the models.
The measures reported for each outcome include the odds ratio, standard error and
level of significance for each variable in each of the five models. The end of the
chapter also includes a discussion of a correlation matrix of the nine predictors to
help detect for potential problems with multicollinearity.
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3.2: Gender
One universally accepted fact in criminology is that males are more likely
than females to commit acts which are defined as criminal and subject to
imprisonment. This is evident in government reports highlighting that over 90
percent of people in prison in the United States are male (Sabol et al., 2009), that
over 70 percent of people on probation in the United States are male (Glaze and
Bonczar, 2009) and that over 70 percent of people arrested in the United States
are male (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2009). It is also evident in several selfreport studies in which males admit to higher rates of criminal behavior than
females (Graham and Bowling, 1995; Flood-Page, Campbell, Harrington, and
Miller, 2000; Ferguson and Horwood, 2002) as well as in the National Crime
Victimization Survey (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2008) in which the majority of
crime victims report that the perpetrator was male.
Another widely reported fact is that for males and females who have
begun engaging in criminal behavior, males are statistically more likely to
continue offending, even if they have been caught and subject to sanctions. This
was the finding in reports by Beck and Shipley (1989) (which analyzed data from
the Prisoners Released in 1983 dataset), by Langan and Levin (2002) and
Rosenfeld et al. (2005) (both which analyzed data from the Prisoners Released in
1994 dataset) and by a meta-analysis of 131 studies by Gendreau, Little and
Goggin (1996). While the vast majority of evidence has found that males are more
likely to recidivate than females, a few studies have found that no sex difference
in the likelihood of reoffending. One such finding came from a report issued by
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Harer (1994). Examining the recidivism rates of offenders released from federal
prisons in 1987 (with recidivism being defined as being rearrested for a new
offense or having parole revoked), Harer found that there was no statistical
difference in the recidivism rates of male (40.9 percent) and female (39.7 percent)
offenders. Unfortunately, Harer was unable to provide any explanation for why,
unlike other studies, gender was not a significant predictor of recidivism in his
research.
One theoretical explanation of why males have higher recidivism rates
than females is differential association (Sutherland, 1947). This theory locates the
source of criminal behavior as existing within the intimate social networks of
individuals and further states that those who are exposed to social networks that
include delinquent associates are themselves likely to become delinquent. In
support of this theoretical explanation, Steffensmeier (1983) pointed out that the
criminal underworld is a highly segregated arena, which is almost exclusively
controlled by men and largely excludes women. In her study of male and female
heroin users, Covington (1985) found that while female users were often shunned
by male criminals and were more likely to commit offenses such as prostitution,
drug dealing or theft independent of other people, male users who were
differentially associated with other criminals tended to have higher crime rates.
Steffensmeier and Allan (1996) additionally pointed out that case studies and
interviews of female offenders reveal that, even among serious female offenders,
there exists no strong commitment to criminal behavior. “This,” they added,
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“stands in sharp contrast to the commitment and self-identification with crime and
the criminal lifestyle that is often found among male offenders” (p. 464).
Logistic regressions confirm that male offenders in the sample have
statistically higher prevalence of rearrest than female offenders. While 68.70
percent of male offenders released in 1994 were rearrested for a new crime within
three years of their release, only 57.53 percent of female offenders were
rearrested. This difference is statistically significant both alone (O.R.=1.620,
p<.001) and when the other eight individual level characteristics are included in
the model (O.R.=1.601, p<.001).
Interestingly, however, while male offenders in the sample are
significantly more likely to be rearrested for a violent offense (O.R.=2.474,
p<.001), a property offense (O.R.=1.183, p<.05) and a public order offense
(O.R.=1.389, p<.001), they are not more likely to be rearrested for a drug offense
(O.R.=1.121, n.s.). This would appear to offer some support to the ideas that
police efforts to crack down on drug offenses in the mid 1990s were gender
neutral and that, unlike other crimes, female offenders were more likely to
become involved in either possession or sales of drugs. When the other eight
individual level characteristics are included in the model, however, while males
remain significantly more likely to be rearrested for a violent offense
(O.R.=2.170, p<.001), a property offense (O.R.=1.189, p<.05) and a public order
offense (O.R.=1.290, p<.01), they also become significantly more likely to be
rearrested for a drug offense (O.R.=1.196, p<.05). This significant finding (with
the other eight characteristics held constant) may be because female offenders, as
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a whole, possess fewer characteristics associated with increased odds of
recidivism than male offenders.
It is also worth noting that the odds ratio is quite a bit larger for violent
rearrests than for other types of rearrests when comparing male and female
offenders. This finding is in line with previous research, which has found that
female offenders’ contribution to violent crime is minor compared to males
(Steffensmeier and Allan, 1996; Chesney-Lind and Pasko, 2004).

3.3: Age at First Arrest
A second variable which research has found to be related to recidivism
risk is age at first arrest, with offenders who experience their first arrest at a
younger age more at risk for future offending than those who are first arrested at
an older age. In a review of seventy-one studies involving 177 independent
samples of offenders, Pritchard (1979) found that offenders who had a first arrest
prior to age 18 had an increased risk of recidivism and those whose first arrest
didn’t occur until at least age 22 were consistently found to have a decreased risk
of recidivism. Similarly, in Beck and Shipley’s (1989) report on prisoners
released in 1983, they found that the “age at which a released prisoner was first
arrested and charged as an adult was inversely related to recidivism: the younger
the age at first arrest, the higher the rate of recidivism” (p. 8, Table 15).
Theoretically, there are several possible explanations for why age at first
arrest would be a risk factor for future criminal behavior. One set of theories is the
“state dependence interpretation” which states that “past criminal involvement
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reduces internal inhibitions or external constraints to future crime or increases the
motivation to commit crime” (Nagino and Farrington, 1992, p. 503). This
explanation is consistent with social learning (Akers, 1985), social bonding and
control (Hirschi, 1969) and differential association (Sutherland, 1947) theories.
Such theories hold that some children learn to engage in delinquent behavior
because of their early relationships with family members who are involved in
crime. Under these theories, if such learning takes place at a very young age (i.e.,
prior to age ten), such behavior is more likely to persist because there exist few
learned inhibitions or constraints to prevent future involvement in crime. A
second theory that can be used is that put forth by Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990)
that postulates that early onset of criminal behavioral is the result of low selfcontrol, which develops in some children at an early age and persists into
adulthood.
In the present analysis, age at first arrest is found to be a significant
predictor of rearrest for any offense by itself (O.R.=0.935, p<.001) as well as a
significant predictor of rearrest for a violent offense (O.R.=0.919, p<.001),
rearrest for a property offense (O.R.=0.950, p<.001), rearrest for a drug offense
(O.R.=0.960, p<.001) and rearrest for a public order offense (O.R.=0.943,
p<.001). When the other eight individual level factors are included in the model, it
is no longer a significant predictor for rearrest for any offense (O.R.=1.006, n.s.),
rearrest for a property offense (O.R.=1.003, n.s.), rearrest for a drug offense
(O.R.=1.000, n.s.) and rearrest for a public order offense (O.R.=0.991, n.s.),
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although it remains a significant predictor for violent rearrest (O.R.=0.965,
p<.001).
It is also worth noting that the odds ratio is quite a bit smaller for violent
rearrests than for other types of rearrests when looking at the age of first arrest.
This finding suggests that violent offenders begin engaging in criminal behavior
that results in adult arrests at a younger age than other types of offenders. There
are at least two possible explanations for this finding. The first is that since
society views violent crime as more serious than non-violent crime, those who
have a history of committing violent offenses will be handled by the adult court
system at a younger age, even though there is no actual age difference between
when violent and non-violent offenders first begin offending. The second possible
explanation is that violent offenders begin their criminal careers at a younger age
than non-violent offenders.

3.4: Race
A third common finding in criminology in the United States is that African
Americans are more likely to be involved as defendants in the criminal justice
system than whites. While the actual number of white inmates is nearly identical
to the number of inmates who are African American, the rate of incarceration is
six and a half times greater for African American males compared to white males
and three times greater for African American females compared to white females
(Sabol et al., 2009). Similarly, while whites represented 56 percent of
probationers in 2008, compared with 29 percent for African Americans (Glaze
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and Bonzcar, 2009), the 2000 Census reported that 75.1 percent of the U.S.
population was white while only 12.3 percent was black (United States Census
Bureau, 2000). This indicates that blacks are also overrepresented compared to
whites among those found guilty of committing crimes and sentenced to
probation. In addition to their being overrepresented in the criminal justice
system, the evidence is consistent in finding that African Americans have higher
recidivism rates than whites (Beck and Shipley, 1989; Gendreau et al., 1996;
Harer, 1994; Kubrin and Stewart, 2006; Langan and Levin, 2002; Rosenfeld et al.,
2005).
One theory that may be able to explain why African Americans have
higher recidivism rates than whites is the social disorganization theory first
proposed by Shaw and McKay (1969 [1942]) and later modified by Kornhauser
(1978), Stark (1987), Bursik (1988), Sampson and Groves (1989), and Bursik and
Grasmick (1993). Research by Harer (1994) found that poverty is associated with
recidivism and more recent research by Kubrin and Stewart (2006) found that
individuals “who return to disadvantaged neighborhoods recidivate at a greater
rate while those who return to resource rich or affluent communities recidivate at
a lesser rate” (p. 165). As the United States Census Bureau (n.d.) reports that U.S.
citizens who are African American have much higher poverty rates than whites, it
is quite plausible that one reason why African Americans recidivate at higher
rates than whites has to do with the poverty levels and lack of resources in
communities to which African American offenders released from prison return.
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In the present analysis, African American offenders had a three-year
prevalence of rearrest for any offense (73.04%) that was 10.24 percentage points
higher than that of white offenders (62.80%). Logistic regressions performed on
the dataset reveal that, when no other characteristics are included in the model,
African Americans have a significantly higher prevalence of rearrest than whites
for all offenses (O.R.=1.605, p<.001), for violent offenses (O.R.=1.664, p<.001),
for property offenses (O.R.=1.248, p<.001) and for drug offenses (O.R.=1.454,
p<.001) but not for public order offenses (O.R.=1.065, n.s.). When the other eight
individual level characteristics are included in the model, African Americans
continue to exhibit a significantly higher prevalence of rearrest than whites for all
offenses (O.R.=1.657, p<.001), for violent offenses (O.R.=1.678, p<.001), for
property offenses (O.R.=1.346, p<.001) and for drug offenses (O.R.=1.364,
p<.001) but the difference remains non-significant for public order offenses
(O.R.=1.008, n.s.).

3.5: Age at Release
A fourth common finding of criminology is that street crime is a young
person’s activity and that, following adolescence, the older a person gets, the less
likely he or she is to be involved in crime. While there have been many who have
agreed with this assessment wholeheartedly (Hirschi and Gottfredson, 1983;
Gove, 1985), others have pointed out that the age-crime curve is not necessarily
as invariant as once thought, as criminals who get older may become involved in
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different types of crime that are less likely to be reported to the authorities (Cline,
1980; Steffensmeier, Allan, Harer, and Streifal, 1989).
Despite the debate over whether offenders desist as they age or simply
change the crimes they commit, studies reflecting crime and recidivism are
unanimous that the older an offender is when released from prison, the less likely
he or she is to be rearrested (Beck and Shipley, 1989; Gendreau et al., 1996;
Harer, 1994; Langan and Levin, 2002; Rosenfeld et al., 2005). Farrington (1986)
points out that a variety of theoretical perspectives help explain the relationship
between age and crime. One theoretical explanation is biological in nature with
offending related to physical factors, such as the levels of testosterone in males
and physical agility for both males and females (both of which peak during
adolescence and decline with age). A second set of theories which help explain
the age crime curve are differential association (Sutherland, 1947) and social
bonding and control (Hirschi, 1969). Under the theory of differential association,
adolescents become involved in offending (and continue offending during their
teen years) because they break away from the protective influence of parents and
begin bonding, instead, with delinquent peers. As a person reaches his or her 20s
and 30s, however, offending declines as the bonding shifts away from peers and is
replaced by family (or, more specifically, spouses and/or children). Another
important social bond in the desistance process that occurs when a person reaches
adulthood is steady employment.
Logistic regressions performed on the dataset confirm that age at release is
one of the strongest predictors of recidivism, and that the younger an offender is
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when released, the more likely he or she is to be rearrested. Age at release is a
highly significant predictor of rearrest for any offense by itself (O.R.=0.959,
p<.001) as well as a significant predictor of rearrest for a violent offense
(O.R.=0.959, p<.001), rearrest for a property offense (O.R.=0.981, p<.001),
rearrest for a drug offense (O.R.=0.982, p<.001) and rearrest for a public order
offense (O.R.=0.964, p<.001). When the other eight individual level
characteristics are included in the model, age at release remains a highly
significant predictor of rearrest for any offense (O.R.=0.938, p<.001) as well as a
significant predictor of rearrest for a violent offense (O.R.=0.957, p<.001),
rearrest for a property offense (O.R.=0.961, p<.001), rearrest for a drug offense
(O.R.=0.964, p<.001) and rearrest for a public order offense (O.R.=0.950,
p<.001).

3.6: Number of Prior Arrests
One of the strongest predictors of future criminal behavior is past criminal
behavior. In other words, a person who has been arrested more frequently in the
past is more likely to be arrested again in the future. This result was found in
research conducted by Beck and Shipley (1989), Gendreau et al. (1996), Kubrin
and Stewart (2006), Langan and Levin (2002) and Rosenfeld et al. (2005).
Theoretically, two reasons that might help explain why those with more
prior arrests are more likely to be rearrested are differential association
(Sutherland, 1947) – defined previously in the discussion on gender – and social
learning theory (Akers, 1985). Social learning theory assumes that criminal
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behavior is a learned behavior with some people learning how to be delinquent by
associating with and imitating the actions of the peers they associate with. Under
these theories, offenders with more prior arrests would be more likely to revert
back to crime because, by being deeply involved within antisocial groups, this
association would increase the likelihood of returning to crime. Similarly, since
offenders with many prior arrests may only know how to survive financially
through criminal behavior and may, in fact, have developed a form of selfidentification related to crime (Steffensmeier and Allan, 1996), they are much
more likely to return to crime than those with few arrests.
Logistic regressions performed on the dataset confirm that the number of
prior arrests is one of the strongest predictors of recidivism, and that offenders
with more prior arrests are more likely to be rearrested. Number of prior arrests is
a highly significant predictor of rearrest for any offense by itself (O.R.=1.075,
p<.001) as well as a significant predictor of rearrest for a violent offense
(O.R.=1.023, p<.001), rearrest for a property offense (O.R.=1.052, p<.001),
rearrest for a drug offense (O.R.=1.044, p<.001) and rearrest for a public order
offense (O.R.=1.028, p<.001). When the other eight individual level
characteristics are included in the model, number of prior arrests remains a highly
significant predictor of rearrest for any offense (O.R.=1.086, p<.001) as well as a
significant predictor of rearrest for a violent offense (O.R.=1.028, p<.001),
rearrest for a property offense (O.R.=1.058, p<.001), rearrest for a drug offense
(O.R.=1.051, p<.001) and rearrest for a public order offense (O.R.=1.041,
p<.001).
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It is also worth noting that the odds ratio is quite a bit smaller for violent
rearrests than for other types of rearrests when looking at the number of prior
arrests. There are two plausible explanations for this finding. The first explanation
is that the finding may indicate that violent recidivism is less likely than other
forms of crime for offenders who have heavy previous involvement in the
criminal justice system because chronic offenders are rational beings (Cornish and
Clarke, 1986) who realize the risks inherent in engaging in acts of criminal
violence. The second explanation is that chronic offenders who are prone to use
violence are better screened for release and more closely monitored after release
than chronic offenders who are not prone to use violence.

3.7: Current Offense Type
Both Beck and Shipley (1989) and Langan and Levin (2002) found that
property offenders were more likely to be rearrested for a new crime within three
years of their release from prison than violent offenders, drug offenders and
public order offenders. In the present analysis, property offenders had a three-year
prevalence of rearrest (74.04%) that was at least seven percentage points higher
than that of drug offenders (66.77%), violent offenders (62.12%) and public order
offenders (62.15%).
Logistic regressions on the dataset confirm that violent offenders
(O.R.=0.616, p<.001), drug offenders (O.R.=0.734, p<.001) and public order
offenders (O.R.=0.572, p<.001) all had significantly lower prevalence of rearrest
than property offenders when type of offense was examined individually. When
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the other eight individual level characteristics were controlled, violent offenders
(O.R.=0.710, p<.001), drug offenders (O.R.=0.751, p<.001) and public order
offenders (O.R.=0.762, p<.001) remained significantly less likely to be rearrested
when compared to property offenders.
This finding did not persist when examining arrests for specific offenses,
however. Based on the idea of offense specialization – namely that an offender
who commits one type of offense is more likely to be rearrested for that same type
of offense than is one who has committed a different type of offense – the
standard regression model with property offenders serving as the omitted contrast
variable were not run. Instead, the omitted contrast used in the model matched the
rearrest offense type under examination. For rearrests for violent offenses, the
omitted contrast was violent offender; for rearrests for property offenses, the
omitted contrast was property offender; for rearrests for drug offenses, the omitted
contrast was drug offender; and for rearrests for public order offenses, the omitted
contrast was public order offender. This method allowed the models to clearly
show if offenders who had been released for a specific offense type were more
likely to be rearrested for the same offense type than other types of offenders.
The results of these regressions reveal evidence in support of offense
specialization. These equations revealed that violent offenders were significantly
more likely to be rearrested for a violent offense than property offenders
(O.R.=0.723, p<.001), drug offenders (O.R.=0.585, p<.001) or public order
offenders (O.R.=0.585, p<.001); that property offenders were significantly more
likely to be rearrested for a property offense than violent offenders (O.R.=0.398,
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p<.001), drug offenders (O.R.=0.363, p<.001) or public order offenders
(O.R.=0.345, p<.001); that drug offenders were significantly more likely to be
rearrested for a drug offense than violent offenders (O.R.=0.420, p<.001),
property offenders (O.R.=0.535, p<.001) or public order offenders (O.R.=0.405,
p<.001); and that public order offenders were significantly more likely to be
rearrested for a public order offense than either violent offenders (O.R.=0.810,
p<.01) or drug offenders (O.R.=0.826, p<.001). The only non-significant finding
is that public order offenders were not significantly more likely to be rearrested
for a public order offense than property offenders (O.R.=0.885, n.s.).
When the other eight individual level characteristics are included in the
model, violent offenders remained significantly more likely to be rearrested for a
violent offense than property offenders (O.R.=0.658, p<.001), drug offenders
(O.R.=0.543, p<.001) and public order offenders (O.R.=0.636, p<.001); property
offenders remained significantly more likely to be rearrested for a property
offense than violent offenders (O.R.=0.460, p<.001), drug offenders (O.R.=0.366,
p<.001) and public order offenders (O.R.=0.396, p<.001); drug offenders
remained significantly more likely to be rearrested for a drug offense than violent
offenders (O.R.=0.459, p<.001), property offenders (O.R.=0.481, p<.001) and
public order offenders (O.R.=0.441, p<.001); and public order offenders remained
significantly more likely to be rearrested for a public order offense than either
violent offenders (O.R.=0.750, p<.001) or drug offenders (O.R.=0.736, p<.001).
Additionally, with the other variables entered into the model public order
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offenders became significantly more likely to be rearrested for a public order
offense than property offenders (O.R.=0.720, p<.001).

3.8: Time Served
The findings regarding whether or not the amount of time an offender
serves in prison affects recidivism are mixed. In one study, Gendreau, Goggin and
Cullen (1999) looked at 50 studies to see if prison vs. probation and if more time
vs. less time increased or decreased recidivism rates. Among the studies analyzed,
23 studies involving 68,248 offenders looked at whether people who spent more
time or less time in prison had higher recidivism rates. They found that offenders
who spent more time in prison had the equivalent of a three percent increase in
recidivism and they stated that on “the basis of the results, we can put forth one
conclusion with a good deal of confidence. None of the analyses conducted
produced any evidence that prison sentences reduce recidivism” (p. 18).
Evidence by Beck and Shipley (1989) and by Langan and Levin (2002)
does not support the conclusion of Gendreau et al. (1999). Instead, both studies
found that the amount of time served was not associated with an increased rate of
recidivism for offenders who served 60 months or less in prison. Additionally,
both studies found that offenders who served 61 months or more had significantly
lower recidivism rates than those who served 60 months or less.
While it is beyond the scope of this dissertation to do a detailed analysis
exploring the differences in findings, there is one highly plausible explanation for
the differences in findings between Gendreau et al.’s (1999) study and the others.
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This difference relates to the time period when the offenders involved in the
studies were released from prison. While Beck and Shipley’s (1989) study related
to prisoners released in 1983 and Langan and Levin’s (2002) study related to
prisoners released in the 1994, Gendreau et al. (1999) noted that 86 percent of the
studies they analyzed (related to the effect the amount of time spent in prison had
on recidivism) were conducted in the 1970s. The differences in what time period
the offenders served their sentences may have had an impact on what the
characteristics of inmates who served longer sentences were like. This is
particularly relevant given the implementation of many tough-on-crime policies in
America that took place in the 1980s and 1990s. With both parole board and
judicial discretion more widely used in the 1970s than in the 1980s or 1990s, it is
quite likely that these factors allowed lower risk offenders to be released more
quickly in the 1970s than in the 1980s or 1990s. If this was, in fact, the case -- and
it again needs to be emphasized that it is beyond the scope of this dissertation to
do an in depth analysis of the validity of this hypothesis -- then this could very
well explain the conflicting findings.
Theoretically, the finding that increased prison length is associated with
lower recidivism rates is rooted in the simple specific deterrence theory
(Andenaes, 1968). This theory holds that, in most cases, when individuals
experience a more severe sanction, they are more likely to have a future reduction
in criminal activity. The reasoning behind this is that as punishment increases, the
costs associated with crime increase and a rational being would be less likely to
repeat the behavior that led to the unpleasant result.
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According to Gendreau et al. (1999) the belief that incarceration is related
to higher recidivism rates (the belief that prisons are “schools of crime”) also has
theoretical support. Two theoretical rationales that can be used to explain this
result are differential association (Sutherland, 1947) and social learning theory
(Akers, 1985). These theories state that if an offender is given a longer sentence
he would end up associating with a group of fellow criminals for a longer period
of time and would be more likely to learn criminal behavior from his peers,
thereby strengthening criminal tendencies.
Logistic regressions performed on the dataset present some findings that
contrast with the prior research by Gendreau et al. (1999). More specifically,
these results indicate that those who serve longer terms in prison have a
significantly lower prevalence of rearrest for any offense (O.R.=0.993, p<.001) as
well as a significantly lower prevalence of rearrest for a property offense
(O.R.=0.995, p<.001), rearrest for a drug offense (O.R.=0.991, p<.001) and
rearrest for a public order offense (O.R.=0.996, p<.001). While time served is also
related to a lower prevalence of rearrest for a violent offense, this result is not
statistically significant (O.R.=0.999, n.s.).
When the other eight individual level characteristics are included in the
models, those who serve longer terms in prison continue to exhibit a significantly
lower prevalence of rearrest for any offense (O.R.=0.998, p<.01) as well as a
significantly a lower prevalence of rearrest for a property offense (O.R.=0.998,
p<.05) and rearrest for a drug offense (O.R.=0.996, p<.001). Interestingly, when
the eight other characteristics are added to the model, the result related to a lower
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prevalence of rearrest for a violent offense becomes statistically significant
(O.R.=0.998, p<.05) while the result related to a lower prevalence of rearrest for a
public order offense becomes non-significant (O.R.=0.999, n.s.).

3.9: Type of Admission
Recent research has found that the type of admission to prison is related to
the risk that an individual will reoffend. Specifically, Rosenfeld et al. (2005)
found that individuals who had entered prison as the result of parole violation
were more likely to be rearrested than those who entered as the result of a new
court commitment. They pointed out that this finding was somewhat interesting in
that it persisted even controlling for age and prior arrests.
Recent research has found partial support that parole failure may be
related to recidivism via the theory of low self-control as postulated by
Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990). Langton (2006) followed 4,116 juvenile
offenders paroled by the California Youth Authority in 1964 and 1965 and found
that low self-control was significantly and positively related to parole failure
controlling for both static (e.g., offender’s age at time of sentencing, race, offense
type) and dynamic factors (e.g., alcohol use, drug use, delinquent associates). This
finding provides evidence that offenders who have previously failed parole would
be more likely to either fail again or commit a new crime because of their overall
lower levels of self-control.
In the present analysis, those who entered prison on a parole revocation
had a three-year prevalence of rearrest (76.07%) that was 11.78 percentage points
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higher than those who entered prison as a new court commitment (64.28%).
Logistic regressions performed on the dataset reveal that this finding is significant
both alone (O.R.=1.691, p<.001) and when the other eight individual level
characteristics are included in the model (O.R.=1.457, p<.001). The models
further reveal that, when admission type is entered into the model by itself, those
who entered prison on a parole revocation are significantly more likely than those
admitted via a new court commitment to be rearrested for a violent offense
(O.R.=1.340, p<.001), for a property offense (O.R.=1.478, p<.001) and for a drug
offense (O.R.=1.483, p<.001), but not for a public order offense (O.R.=1.051,
n.s.). When the other eight individual level characteristics are included in the
models, the findings remain the same: those admitted via parole violation remain
more likely to be rearrested for a violent offense (O.R.=1.306, p<.001), for a
property offense (O.R.=1.213, p<.001) or for a drug offense (O.R.=1.253,
p<.001), but not for a public order offense (O.R.=1.091, n.s.).

3.10: Type of Release
The few studies that have looked into whether type of release from prison
is significantly related to recidivism have produced mixed findings. Solomon,
Kachnowski and Bhati (2005) conducted an analysis of the Prisoners Released in
1994 dataset and found no differences in the two-year prevalence of rearrest of
those released unconditionally and those released via mandatory supervised
release. Additionally, although those released via discretionary parole had
prevalence of rearrest four percentage points lower than the other types of
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offenders, the authors deemed that this was not a very significant finding and
wrote, “while post prison supervision may have modest effects on recidivism in
some cases, it does not appear to improve prevalence of rearrest for the largest
subsets of released prisoners.” (p. 15)
These findings stand in contrast to a book chapter written by Rosenfeld et
al. (2005). While their findings were similar to Solomon et al.’s (2005) in that
they did not find statistically significant lower prevalence of rearrest when
comparing those released via mandatory supervised release and those released
unconditionally, their findings regarding those released on discretionary parole
were markedly different. They wrote: “Discretionary parole release has a
consistent and strong effect on the incidence of rearrest in our sample, especially
for violent and property offenses. Prisoners released on discretionary parole
accumulate 36% fewer arrests for violent crime than those released
unconditionally with no supervision in the community (the contrast category)”
(pp. 95-96).
Few other studies have looked at type of release. Schlager and Robins
(2008) published the only other study located for use in this dissertation. They
utilized a random sample of 500 inmates taken from the 14,780 offenders released
from prison in New Jersey in the 2001 calendar year. They compared the
recidivism rates of those released by discretionary parole versus those released
unconditionally. Their findings were in line with those of Rosenfeld et al. (2005).
“Overall, offenders who maxed out were rearrested and reconvicted at statistically
significant rates greater than parolees. Seventy percent of max outs were
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rearrested, and 44% of max outs were reconvicted compared with 60% of
parolees who were rearrested and 34% who were reconvicted up to 4 years after
release” (p. 242).
In the present analysis, those released via discretionary parole had a threeyear prevalence of rearrest (59.65%) that is at least ten percentage points less than
those who were released via mandatory supervised release (70.14%) and
expiration of sentence (71.11%). Logistic regressions performed on the dataset
reveal that offenders released via mandatory supervised release have higher
recidivism rates than those released via discretionary parole and that this finding
is significant both alone (O.R.=1.589, p<.001) and when the other eight individual
level characteristics are included in the model (O.R.=1.364, p<.001). Those
released via mandatory supervised release further are significantly more likely to
be rearrested for a violent offense (O.R.=1.391, p<.001), for a property offense
(O.R.=1.295, p<.001), for a drug offense (O.R.=1.518, p<.001) and for a public
order offense (O.R.=1.306, p<.001). When the eight other individual level factors
are added to the models, those released via mandatory supervised release remain
significantly more likely to be rearrested for a violent offense (O.R.=1.313,
p<.001), for a drug offense (O.R.=1.314, p<.001) and for a public order offense
(O.R.=1.162, p<.01). The difference in the likelihood of being rearrested for a
property offense, however, becomes non-significant when other factors are added
to the model (O.R.=1.078. n.s.).
Similar significant findings result when comparing those released via
expiration of sentence with those released via discretionary parole. This finding is
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significant both alone (O.R.=1.665, p<.001) and when the eight individual level
characteristics are included in the model (O.R.=1.527, p<.001). Those released
via expiration of sentence are also significantly more likely to be rearrested for a
violent offense (O.R.=2.037, p<.001), for a property offense (O.R.=1.463,
p<.001), for a drug offense (O.R.=1.380, p<.001) and for a public order offense
(O.R.=1.875, p<.001). When the eight other individual level factors are added to
the models, those released via expiration of sentence remain significantly more
likely to be rearrested for a violent offense (O.R.=1.937, p<.001), for a property
offense (O.R.=1.346, p<.001), for a drug offense (O.R.=1.282, p<.01) and for a
public order offense (O.R.=1.777, p<.01).
It is also worth noting that the odds ratio is quite a bit higher for those
released via expiration of sentence for both violent rearrests and public order
rearrests than for those released via discretionary parole. A possible explanation
for this finding is that those who have problems with either violence or obeying
the rules of public order were made to serve their entire sentence as a result of
institutional behavior involving these types of misconduct. As a result, since
offenders who are prone to these types of behavioral problems are more likely to
serve their full prison sentences, without parole or supervised release, such
offenders are also more likely to be rearrested for these types of offenses.

3.11: Relationships among the Individual Predictors
Tables 2a and 2b provide a correlation matrix of the individual level
variables. Based on Cohen’s (1988) interpretation of effect sizes, this matrix
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reveals that the only variables that have a strong relationship between each other
are age at first arrest and age at release with an effect size of .527. While Cohen
determined that a correlation of at least .300 but less than .500 was required to
have a moderate relationship, and while no other relationships reach this
threshold, it is nevertheless noteworthy to point out that there are four additional
correlations greater than .250. The correlation between age at first arrest and
number of prior arrests is -.264; the correlation between age at release and number
of prior arrests is .256; the correlation between serving time for a violent offense
and time served is .277; and the correlation between being admitted for a parole
violation and being released via mandatory supervised release is .283.
Although there were an additional 27 comparisons with small
relationships (that is, a correlation of at least .100 but no greater than .250), it is
important to take into consideration that there were a total of 202 comparisons in
the correlations. This means that only approximately 0.5 percent of the
comparisons had a strong relationship, only approximately 2.0 percent had close
to a moderate relationship and only approximately 13.5 percent had a small
relationship. What this says is that not only does there exist no association
between predictors in approximately 84 percent of comparisons, but there further
only exists a moderate to strong relationship in 2.5 percent of comparisons. These
results indicate that the independent effects of the predictors entered into the
model are not unduly influenced by correlations with other variables.
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3.12: Discussion
While the preceding sections helped highlight the findings of prior
research in relation to the nine individual-level recidivism predictors to be
included in the upcoming chapters, the preliminary logistic regressions revealed
some interesting findings and how they relate to rearrest risks for specific
offenses. One finding of interest concerns offense specialization. In all but one of
the comparisons, an offender released from prison for a specific offense category
was statistically more likely to be rearrested for the same type of crime when
compared to other offense categories. Another notable finding is how several of
the factors had a noticeably different impact on rearrest for a violent offense as
opposed to overall risk for rearrest for any offense. The odds ratios were
noticeably different in relation to gender, age at first arrest, number of prior
arrests, and release via expiration of sentence for those rearrested for a violent
rearrest compared to those rearrested for any offense. These findings suggest that
the predictors for violent offending may be somewhat different than the predictors
of non-violent offending. Specifically, gender is a more influential predictor of
violent recidivism than non-violent recidivism, people who enter the adult
criminal justice system at a younger age are at an increased risk of violent
recidivism, and offenders who max-out their sentences are at an increased risk of
violent recidivism. The findings also suggest that having a lengthy criminal record
does not increase the risk of future violent offending. These findings are
important from a policy perspective as they suggest that males who enter the adult
criminal justice at a young age and who have behavior problems while
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incarcerated, and therefore serve their entire sentence in prison, are at an
increased risk of violent recidivism. As such, it would appear that society would
benefit if such offenders were more closely monitored upon their release (i.e.,
intensive parole supervision). Officials also should consider providing such
inmates more intensive end-of-sentence programming to reduce their risk of
violent recidivism.
Overall, the findings indicate that the nine individual-level predictors help
to explain variation in recidivism. But how useful are they in explaining
differences in rearrest rates across the states? In other words, does one state have
a higher recidivism rate than another solely because it has a more “recidivism
prone” population of released prisoners? And are the nine individual-level
predictors equally effective at predicting differences in rearrests for specific forms
of crime – violent, property, drug and public order offenses – or are the predictors
better able to explain variations in certain types of offending compared to others?
These questions are explored in more detail in the next chapter. The forms
of recidivism to be addressed are rearrest for any offense, rearrest for a violent
offense, rearrest for a property offense, rearrest for a drug offense and rearrest for
a public order offense other than a parole violation (additional forms of recidivism
will be examined in Chapter 5). The findings presented in the next chapter show
that the nine individual-level predictors help explain some of the variation across
states for rearrest for any offense, rearrest for a property offense, rearrest for a
drug offense and rearrest for a public order offense. The findings regarding
rearrest for violent offending, however, are mixed.
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Table 1: Logistic Regression Models for All Individual Level Characteristics
Any Offense

Violent

Property

Drug

Public Order

Odds Ratio
Std. Err.
1.601***
0.121

Odds Ratio
Std. Err.
2.170***
0.237

Odds Ratio
Std. Err.
1.189*
0.100

Odds Ratio
Std. Err.
1.196*
0.100

Odds Ratio
Std. Err.
1.290**
0.109

Age at First Arrest

1.006
0.005

0.965***
0.007

1.003
0.006

1.000
0.006

0.991
0.006

Black

1.657***
0.070

1.678***
0.082

1.346***
0.06

1.364***
0.062

1.008
0.044

Other Race

0.672*
0.134

1.293
0.268

0.801
0.158

0.586*
0.138

0.970
0.188

Age at Release

0.938***
0.003

0.957***
0.004

0.961***
0.004

0.964***
0.004

0.950***
0.004

Prior Arrests

1.086**
0.006

1.028***
0.004

1.058***
0.004

1.051***
0.004

1.041***
0.003

Violent Offense

0.710***
0.038

Omitted

0.460***
0.024

0.459***
0.026

0.750***
0.057

Property Offense

Omitted

0.658***
0.038

Omitted

0.481***
0.027

0.720***
0.054

Drug Offense

0.751***
0.042

0.543***
0.034

0.366***
0.02

Omitted

0.736***
0.057

Public Order Offense

0.762***
0.057

0.636***
0.055

0.396***
0.031

0.441***
0.037

Omitted

Other Offense

0.690***
0.176

0.568
0.186

0.549*
0.158

0.662
0.163

0.483*
0.148

Time Served

0.998**
0.001

0.998*
0.001

0.998*
0.001

0.996***
0.001

0.999
0.001

Parole Violation

1.457***
0.083

1.306***
0.076

1.213***
0.066

1.253***
0.069

1.091
0.06

Probation Violation

1.386**
0.147

1.443**
0.154

1.673***
0.167

1.096
0.122

2.307***
0.22

Other Admission
Type

0.810
0.124

0.741
0.139

0.940
0.147

0.694
0.134

0.806
0.136

Unknown Admission
Type

0.509***
0.067

0.451
0.067

0.559***
0.073

0.554***
0.082

0.240***
0.034

Mandatory Supervised
Release

1.364***
0.063

1.313***
0.072

1.078
0.052

1.314***
0.067

1.162**
0.06

Expiration of Sentence

1.528***
0.12

1.937***
0.162

1.346***
0.105

1.282**
0.105

1.777***
0.137

Other Release Type

1.497***
1.497

1.353***
0.095

0.924
0.059

0.900
0.06

2.214***
0.133

Observations

32,732

32,732

32.732

32,732

32.732

Pseudo R2

0.1100

0.0692

0.0863

0.0745

0.0553

Log Pseudolikelihood

-146985.23

-127522

-150385.06

-149246.06

-146070.57

Gender

Model Statistics

* p<.05 , ** p <.01, *** p<.001
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1
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

1
-.097**
.011**
-.011**
0
-.037**
-.007**
.072**
-.018**
-.067**
.039**
-.013**
.076**
-.009**
.030**
-.056**
-0.004
-.060**
-.025**
.018**
.019**
-.007**

Table
2
-.097**
1
.079**
-.078**
-.006**
.527**
-.264**
-0.003
-.079**
.043**
.053**
.023**
-.030**
.015**
-.037**
.020**
.009**
.020**
-.013**
.022**
-.019**
-0.003

2A: Correlation Matrix of Individual Level Characteristics (Part 1)
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
.011**
-.011**
0 -.037**
-.007**
.072**
-.018**
.079**
-.078**
-.006** .527** -.264**
-0.003
-.079**
1 -.980** -.102**
.048**
-.053**
-.026**
.087**
-.980**
1 -.099** -.042**
.057**
.022**
-.088**
-.102** -.099**
1 -.027**
-.018**
.018**
.005*
.048**
-.042**
-.027**
1
.256**
-.010**
-.025**
-.053**
.057**
-.018** .256**
1 -.118**
.132**
-.026**
.022**
.018** -.010** -.118**
1 -.384**
.087**
-.088**
.005* -.025**
.132** -.384**
1
-.121**
.127**
-.032**
-.004*
-.016** -.370** -.494**
.065**
-.069**
.020**
.057**
-.028** -.176** -.235**
.050**
-.049**
-.005**
.008**
.022** -.073** -.097**
-.069**
.072**
-.014** .134**
-.046**
.277**
-.084**
-.027**
.033**
-.033** -.059** -.120**
.075** -.101**
.017**
-.020**
.013**
.083**
.186**
-.047**
.073**
-.024**
.015**
.046** -.064** -.101**
-.051**
.045**
.015**
-.023**
.042**
.009**
-.014**
-.019**
-.012**
-.051**
.044**
.035** -.069** -.109**
-.055**
.049**
-.112**
.118**
-.030** -.014** -.118**
.017**
-.040**
.138** -.146**
.037**
.028**
.103**
-.026**
.034**
-.043**
.047**
-.021**
.012**
0.003
.034**
-0.003
-.031**
.032**
-0.001 -.032**
-0.001
-.007**
.004*

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

– GENDER
- AGE AT FIRST ARREST
- RACE – WHITE
- RACE – BLACK
- RACE – OTHER
- AGE AT RELEASE
- PRIOR ARRESTS

8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15

10
-.067**
.043**
-.121**
.127**
-.032**
-.004*
-.016**
-.370**
-.494**
1
-.226**
-.094**
-.098**
.050**
-.028**
-.030**
-.035**
-.028**
.024**
-.027**
-.008**
.014**

11
.039**
.053**
.065**
-.069**
.020**
.057**
-.028**
-.176**
-.235**
-.226**
1
-.045**
-.079**
-.007**
-.019**
.059**
.107**
.053**
.024**
-.014**
-.019**
0.003

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

- VIOLENT OFFENSE
– PROPERTY OFFENSE
– DRUG OFFENSE
– PUBLIC ORDER OFFENSE
- OFFENSE - OTHER
- TIME SERVED
- NEW COURT COMMITMENT
- PAROLE VIOLATION

16
17
18
19
20

- PROBATION VIOLATION
- OTHER ADMISSION TYPE
– UNKNOWN ADMISSION TYPE
- DISCRETIONARY PAROLE
- MANDATORY SUPERVISED RELEASED
21 - EXPIRATION OF SENTENCE
22 – OTHER RELEASE TYPE
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1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

12
-.013**
.023**
.050**
-.049**
-.005**
.008**
.022**
-.073**
-.097**
-.094**
-.045**
1
-.046**
-.036**
.026**
-.026**
-.012**
-.023**
-.047**
.083**
-.022**
-.046**

Table
13
.076**
-.030**
-.069**
.072**
-.014**
.134**
-.046**
.277**
-.084**
-.098**
-.079**
-.046**
1
.149**
-.109**
-.075**
.023**
-.082**
.214**
-.205**
.080**
-.028**

2B: Correlation Matrix of Individual Level Characteristics (Part 2)
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
-.009**
.030**
-.056**
-0.004
-.060**
-.025**
.018**
.015**
-.037**
.020**
.009**
.020**
-.013**
.022**
-.027**
.017**
-.024**
.015**
-.051** -.112**
.138**
.033**
-.020**
.015**
-.023**
.044**
.118** -.146**
-.033**
.013**
.046**
.042**
.035**
-.030**
.037**
-.059**
.083**
-.064**
.009**
-.069**
-.014**
.028**
-.120**
.186** -.101**
-.014** -.109** -.118**
.103**
.075**
-.047**
-.051**
-.019**
-.055**
.017**
-.026**
-.101**
.073**
.045**
-.012**
.049**
-.040**
.034**
.050**
-.028**
-.030**
-.035**
-.028**
.024**
-.027**
-.007**
-.019**
.059**
.107**
.053**
.024**
-.014**
-.036**
.026**
-.026**
-.012**
-.023**
-.047**
.083**
.149** -.109**
-.075**
.023**
-.082**
.214** -.205**
1 -.695** -.271** -.101** -.242**
.086** -.177**
-.695**
1 -.145** -.054** -.130** -.146**
.283**
-.271** -.145**
1 -.021**
.895**
.147**
-.087**
-.101** -.054** -.021**
1 -.019**
.013**
-.060**
-.242** -.130**
.895** -.019**
1
.145**
-.053**
.086** -.146**
.147**
.013**
.145**
1 -.665**
-.177**
.283**
-.087**
-.060**
-.053** -.665**
1
-.030**
-.059**
-.047**
-.007**
-.044** -.139** -.279**
.174** -.192**
-.030**
.077**
-.079** -.217** -.436**

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

– GENDER
- AGE AT FIRST ARREST
- RACE – WHITE
- RACE – BLACK
- RACE – OTHER
- AGE AT RELEASE
- PRIOR ARRESTS

8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15

21
.019**
-.019**
-.043**
.047**
-.021**
.012**
0.003
.034**
-0.003
-.008**
-.019**
-.022**
.080**
-.030**
-.059**
-.047**
-.007**
-.044**
-.139**
-.279**
1
-.091**

22
-.007**
-0.003
-.031**
.032**
-0.001
-.032**
-0.001
-.007**
.004*
.014**
0.003
-.046**
-.028**
.174**
-.192**
-.030**
.077**
-.079**
-.217**
-.436**
-.091**
1

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

- VIOLENT OFFENSE
– PROPERTY OFFENSE
– DRUG OFFENSE
– PUBLIC ORDER OFFENSE
- OFFENSE - OTHER
- TIME SERVED
- NEW COURT COMMITMENT
- PAROLE VIOLATION

16
17
18
19
20

- PROBATION VIOLATION
- OTHER ADMISSION TYPE
– UNKNOWN ADMISSION TYPE
- DISCRETIONARY PAROLE
- MANDATORY SUPERVISED RELEASED
21 - EXPIRATION OF SENTENCE
22 – OTHER RELEASE TYPE
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CHAPTER 4 - EXPLORING THE IMPACT OF INDIVIDUAL LEVEL
CHARACTERISTICS ON TYPES OF REARREST

4.1: Introduction
While Langan and Levin’s (2002) publication detailing the individual
level characteristics of offenders released from prison in 15 states in 1994
provided invaluable information about a majority of prisoners released in the
United States for that year, one thing it neglected to do was break down the
released prisoners by state of release. Table 3 on the following page shows that a
great deal of between state variation exists in the cumulative individual level
characteristics of those who were released. One characteristic that differs widely
among states that would also be expected to influence recidivism rates is the
average number of prior arrests for released prisoners, with a low of 4.59 in
Michigan and a high of 14.20 in Delaware. Given the strong relationship which
has been shown to exist between prior arrests and recidivism, states that release
prisoners with a higher average number of prior arrests would also be expected to
have higher recidivism rates. Similarly, the percentage of prisoners released via
discretionary parole runs the complete spectrum from 0 percent in California,
Delaware, Florida and Illinois to 100 percent in Michigan. Although the previous
chapter revealed that release type had a more modest impact than number of prior
arrests, the variation in the number of prisoners released via discretionary parole
would also be expected to have an influence on the recidivism rates of offenders
released from different states.
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Table 3: Indi vid ual L ev el Cha r act eristics of 1 99 4 Rel ease Coho rt b y Stat e of R ele ase
Demographic Characteristic
Mean St. Dev.
AZ
CA
DE
FL
IL
MD
MI
MN
NJ
NY
NC
OH
OR
TX
Gender
Male
91.13% 28.40% 90.93% 91.15% 92.50% 89.96% 93.49% 93.54% 92.94% 93.42% 92.21% 91.64% 87.40% 89.79% 92.73% 91.97%
Female
8.87% 28.40% 9.07%
8.85% 7.50% 10.04% 6.51% 6.46%
7.06% 6.58% 7.79% 8.36% 12.60% 10.21% 7.27%
8.03%
Average Age at First Arrest
21.60
6.45
22.33
22.06
18.10
20.94
19.59
21.71
21.08
21.75
20.81
20.74
22.16
22.19
22.37
21.89
Race
White
50.34% 50.00% 77.29% 65.33% 31.88% 42.71% 28.17% 22.31% 45.19% 60.09% 31.01% 35.73% 35.40% 46.08% 81.67% 51.68%
Black
48.64% 50.00% 17.02% 33.17% 68.13% 57.15% 71.75% 77.69% 54.17% 30.97% 68.86% 64.04% 62.86% 53.67% 15.57% 48.24%
Other
1.02% 10.10% 5.69%
1.50% 0.00% 0.14% 0.08% 0.00%
0.64% 8.94% 0.13% 0.23% 1.74% 0.24% 2.76%
0.08%
Average Age at Release
32.30
8.47
33.66
33.04
31.26
32.26
29.64
31.95
32.88
31.15
31.28
31.87
30.86
31.55
34.35
33.14
Average Prior Arrests
8.78
8.59
6.95
10.41
14.20
10.89
8.66
7.56
4.59
6.03
7.27
9.56
5.81
5.02
14.06
5.86
Current Offense
Violent
22.35% 41.70% 16.54% 20.68% 29.53% 24.32% 24.96% 27.44% 28.52% 43.58% 26.39% 26.73% 14.08% 25.55% 38.42% 19.38%
Property
33.84% 47.30% 32.64% 33.81% 13.75% 36.54% 38.55% 17.58% 37.08% 39.17% 21.12% 21.39% 42.87% 39.56% 32.06% 41.52%
Drugs
32.28% 46.80% 23.94% 32.65% 38.91% 32.35% 28.66% 23.73% 23.79% 14.59% 45.57% 45.23% 26.28% 27.86% 21.03% 30.00%
Public Order
9.71% 29.60% 26.08%
8.91% 17.81% 6.79% 7.76% 31.18% 10.48% 2.67% 5.16% 6.30% 16.41% 5.45% 7.93%
9.10%
Other
1.81% 13.30% 0.79%
3.95% 0.00% 0.00% 0.07% 0.07%
0.12% 0.00% 1.77% 0.36% 0.37% 1.58% 0.56%
0.00%
Average Time Served - Months
18.72
24.13
20.88
11.67
30.47
22.71
18.22
33.09
45.00
20.55
21.78
32.87
7.62
29.97
18.49
19.95
Type of Prison Admission*
New Court Commitment
59.10% 48.30% 32.82% 48.25% 85.16% 99.42% 80.99% 80.63% 67.57% 92.80% 67.73% 90.21% 35.50%
**
35.82% 66.55%
Parole Revocation
28.29% 45.90% 17.27% 51.75% 3.13% 0.00% 17.78% 17.19%
7.51% 7.20% 30.69% 9.32% 20.38%
**
33.48% 32.40%
Probation Revocation
10.58% 23.60% 34.54%
0.00% 11.72% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 19.57% 0.00% 1.38% 0.00% 43.47%
**
27.82%
1.05%
Other Admission Type
0.81%
9.30% 15.38%
0.00% 0.00% 0.58% 1.22% 2.18%
5.35% 0.00% 0.20% 0.47%
0.64%
**
2.87%
0.00%
Type of Prison Release
Discretionary Parole
23.53% 43.20% 35.69%
0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 42.20% 100.00% 0.12% 77.79% 71.02% 38.07% 35.01% 52.10% 43.82%
Mandatory Supervised Release 57.75% 49.95% 0.85% 100.00% 0.00% 0.71% 98.08% 49.00%
0.00% 76.66% 0.00% 11.06% 59.41% 0.00% 34.99% 33.48%
Expiration of Sentence
5.70% 22.80% 4.32%
0.00% 8.59% 20.84% 1.53% 2.44%
0.00% 0.74% 20.23% 4.45% 2.46% 39.56% 0.41%
1.97%
Other
10.29% 33.00% 59.14%
0.00% 91.41% 78.45% 0.39% 6.36%
0.00% 22.47% 1.87% 13.47% 0.06% 25.43% 12.50% 20.72%
*
Percentages of Type of Admission are calculated excluding those with unknown admission types. These cases are included in calculating percentages for other individual level characteristics.
**
Data on Admission Type was not provided for any offender released in 1994 from prison in Ohio.

VI
91.32%
8.68%
21.88
35.24%
64.52%
0.05%
32.25
6.79
21.96%
43.92%
28.90%
4.92%
0/29%
24.08
81.40%
18.60%
0.00%
0.00%
41.80%
51.45%
2.76%
3.99%
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This chapter looks at the differences in recidivism across states for several,
separate forms of rearrest. These include rates of rearrest for any offense, rearrest
for a violent offense, rearrest for a property offense, rearrest for a drug offense,
and rearrest for a public order offense (other than parole violation). In exploring
these different forms of rearrest, the chapter evaluates the extent to which
variation between states in rates of each rearrest type can be explained by
differences in the individual level characteristics of the release cohorts from each
state.
Differences between states are examined in two separate ways. The first of
these methods is often referred to as a “fixed effects” approach. It involves
estimating three models. The first is a model for each form of rearrest with state
of release entered into the model (one of the states will serve as the omitted
contrast). The second is a model for each form of rearrest with the nine individual
level characteristics added. This model is similar to that shown at the conclusion
of Chapter 3. The third is a model for each form of rearrest with both the nine
individual level characteristics and the state of release entered into the model.
After these three models are estimated, changes in the odds ratio for each of the
states is examined to evaluate the impact that the nine individual level
characteristics have on recidivism measures.
A second way to examine state differences in the effect of individual level
characteristics on recidivism is to do a state-by-state comparison. In this
approach, two sets of models are estimated for each possible state-by-state
combination. Rather than odds ratios, these models estimate regression
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coefficients. In the first model, the only variables entered into the regression
equation are the outcome variable (i.e., type of rearrest) and the contrast state. In
the second model, the nine individual level characteristics are added.
To help understand what this approach involves, an example follows,
comparing the states of Illinois and Minnesota using the recidivism measure of
rearrest for any offense. These two states were chosen because they have quite
different rearrest rates. For offenders from Illinois released in 1994, 77.80 percent
were rearrested for a new offense within three years of their release. This is
markedly higher than Minnesota where only 59.84 percent of offenders released
in 1994 were rearrested for a new offense within three years of their release.
When the nine individual level characteristics are entered into the model,
however, the difference in recidivism rates is accounted for by differences in the
characteristics of the prisoners released in the two states. Comparing rearrest rates
between Illinois and Minnesota using the states only model, the regression results
are as follows:
Table 4: Logistic Regression comparing Rearrests for Prisoners Released
from Illinois and Minnesota
REARRD
Coefficient
Std. Error
Illinois
0.8552387***
0.0815106
Model Statistics
Observations
Pseudo R2
Log Pseudolikelihood
3724
0.0128
-8968.4084
* p<.05 , ** p <.01, *** p<.001
When the rearrest rates of prisoners released from Illinois are compared
with the rearrest rates of those from Minnesota (the contrast in the model), the
coefficient is 0.855 (p<.001). This is a statistically significant finding that
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indicates that an offender released from prison in Illinois is more likely to be
rearrested within three years of release than an offender released from Minnesota.
This finding reflects the difference in the Illinois and Minnesota rearrest
percentages previously noted.
The next question is whether differences in individual level characteristics
of offenders from these two states can explain the difference in recidivism rates.
To address this question, a second logistic regression model is estimated with the
nine individual recidivism predictors added to the model. The logistic regression
for this model is shown below. The results show that when the nine individual
level characteristics are added, the coefficient for Illinois drops to 0.105 and is not
significant.
Table 5: Logistic Regression comparing Rearrests for Prisoners Released
from Illinois and Minnesota with Individual Level Characteristics Added to
the Model
REARRD
Coefficient
Std. Error
Illinois
0.1050407
0.1163472
Gender
0.1973337
0.2463144
Age of First Arrest
-0.0186078
0.0194669
Black
1.020112
0.1380382
Other Race
0.5150573
0.2262295
Age at Release
-0.0930937
0.0118599
Prior Arrests
0.1331583
0.0190814
Property Offense
-0.1390874
0.1578478
Drug Offense
-0.1708313
0.1797831
Public Order Offense
-0.2104811
0.3362968
Other Offense
-1.42732
1.032146
Time Served
-0.0056398
0.0028321
Parole Violation
0.7893901
0.2433061
Probation Violation
(omitted)
Other Admission Type
2.637833
0.5731931
Unknown Admission Type
(omitted)
Mandatory Supervised Release
4.118075
1.077437
Expiration of Sentence
5.928235
1.179949
Other Release Type
3.850888
1.098412
_cons
-1.498496
1.197659
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Observations
3724

Model Statistics
Pseudo R2
Log Pseudolikelihood
0.2143
- 7137.6965
* p<.05 , ** p <.01, *** p<.001

To help explain why this change occurred, it is useful to compare the
differences in the characteristics of prisoners released from Illinois and
Minnesota. Looking at the state comparisons in Table 3, we might expect
offenders released from Illinois to have a higher rearrest rate than offenders
released from Minnesota, given the differences in the individual recidivism
indicators between the two states. Compared with the prisoners released from
Minnesota, those released in Illinois are more likely to be black, are younger at
the age of release, and have more prior arrests – all predictors of elevated
recidivism rates. These three factors alone explain nearly half of the difference in
rearrest rates between Illinois and Minnesota (b=0.233, p<.05).
Before proceeding, it is necessary to discuss modifications that were made
to the logistic regressions to deal with the problem of multicollinearity, which
resulted because some states do not vary in their type of admission or release. For
example, in California 100 percent of the offenders were released by mandatory
supervised release, while in Michigan, 100 percent of the offenders were released
by discretionary parole. In such instances, the statistical program either dropped
one of the variables from the model or the estimation produced an unrealistically
large coefficient on one of these variables (which was defined as an odds ratio of
10 or above). In total, multicollinearity was a problem in 14 of the 210 cases. To
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deal with the problem, either admission type or release type was dropped from the
regression equation for these estimations

4.2: Exploring the Differences in Rearrest Probabilities across States
While Figure 1 in Chapter 1 showed that a wide degree of variation exists
in three-year rearrest rates for offenders released from prison in 1994, with a low
of 43.74 percent in Michigan and a high of 86.25 percent in Delaware, it is not
known to what extent variation across states in individual level characteristics of
released prisoners can account for these differences. To begin exploring this
possibility, the three regression models described in the previous section are
estimated. The results provide strong, consistent evidence that the individual level
predictors help explain some, but not all, of the variation in rearrest rates between
states. In the model without the individual level recidivism predictors, every state
has a significantly higher odds ratio of rearrest than Michigan, the contrast, with
the values ranging from a low of O.R.=1.720 (p<.001) for Texas to a high of
OR=8.068 (p<.001) for Delaware. When the nine individual level factors are
added to the model, every state continues to have a significantly higher odds ratio
of rearrest than Michigan. The magnitude of the state effect is reduced in every
case, however, in some cases substantially.

For example, the odds ratio is

reduced by 50.15 percent for Illinois, 45.38 percent for Delaware, and 41.14
percent for California. The average reduction in the magnitude of the state effects
on recidivism after the individual recidivism predictors are added to the model is
35%. In other words, state differences in the characteristics of released prisoners
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explains on average about 35% of the state differences in rates of rearrest for any
offense.
Table 6: Logistic Regression Results for Three Models for Rearrest for Any
Offense
State of
Individual Level
Combined
Release
Characteristics
Model
Model
Model
Rearrest (Any Offense)
Odds Ratio
Odds Ratio
Odds Ratio
Gender
1.601***
1.630***
Age of First Arrest
1.006
1.003
Black
1.657***
1.665***
Other Race
0.672*
0.676
Age at Release
0.938***
0.940***
Prior Arrests
1.086***
1.079***
Violent Offense
0.710***
0.683***
Drug Offense
0.751***
0.731***
Public Order Offense
0.762***
0.733***
Other Offense
0.690
0.670
Time Served
0.998**
0.997***
Parole Violation
1.457***
1.517***
Probation Violation
1,386**
1.182
Other Admission Type
0.810
0.860
Unknown Admission Type
0.509***
0.730*
Mandatory Supervised Release
1.364***
1.123
Expiration of Sentence
1.528***
1.223*
Other Release Type
1.497***
0.892
Arizona
2.141***
2.100***
California
3.121***
1.837***
Delaware
8.068***
4.407***
Florida
4.917***
3.068***
Illinois
4.507***
2.247***
Maryland
3.139***
2.108***
Minnesota
1.916***
1.560***
New Jersey
2.122***
1.310***
New York
2.730***
1.845***
North Carolina
2.007***
1.364***
Ohio
1.724***
1.399***
Oregon
3.415***
2.141***
Texas
1.720***
1.321***
Virginia
2.272***
1.518***
Model Statistics
Observations (Unweighted)
32,732
32,732
32,732
Pseudo R2
0.0203
0.1100
0.1161
Log Pseudolikelihood
-161791.42
-146985.23
-145970.99
* p<.05 , ** p <.01, *** p<.001
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These results are based on comparing each state with a single contrast,
Michigan, which has a comparatively low rate of rearrest for any offense. The
second approach relaxes this restriction by comparing each state with every other
state. The results are consistent with those from the former analysis. Without the
individual level characteristics added to the models, the regression results show
that slightly less than 20 percent of the state-by-state comparisons yield
statistically similar odds of rearrest (refer to Table A1 in Appendix B).
Specifically, of 105 state-by-state comparisons, 20 combinations (19.05
percent) produce a non-significant difference in the rearrest rates of the two states.
When the individual level characteristics are added to the models (refer to Table
A2 in Appendix B), the number of state-by-state comparisons with similar rearrest
rates increases to 50 (47.62 percent).
Not only do these results provide additional evidence regarding the impact
of differences in release cohorts on state differences in rearrest rates, this second
approach can be used to explore these effects for any state (for which the data are
available) with any other state. The effect on the coefficient size adding the
individual level characteristics varies greatly. Comparing California and North
Carolina, for example, the regression coefficient is 0.442 and significant in the
model without the individual characteristics of released prisoners. When the
individual level characteristics are added this changes only slightly to 0.447 and
remains significant. This differs sharply from the comparison of Delaware and
New York. With only the states entered into the model, the coefficient for these
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two states is 1.099. This is significant and indicates that offenders from Delaware
are more likely to be rearrested than offenders from New York. When the
individual level characteristics are added to the model, however, the coefficient
drops to a non-significant -0.122. Not only does the size of the coefficient drop by
88 percent, but the result goes from highly significant to non-significant. This tool
may prove useful to state policymakers who may want to compare recidivism in
their own state with that in only selected other states.

4.3: Exploring the Differences in Rearrest Probabilities across States by Type
of Rearrest
The previous section highlights that differences in individual level
characteristics can help to explain differences that exist in rearrest rates between
states. Such a finding is not particularly surprising given that it is largely in line
with the literature previously discussed in the introduction on the impact of
individual level covariates. An additional question that this dissertation seeks to
answer is the extent to which differences in individual level characteristics of
release cohorts can be used to explain differences in rearrest for specific types of
offenses. More specifically, can differences in the individual level predictors help
explain variations in rearrest rates between states for violent offenses, property
offenses, drug offenses and public order offenses excluding parole violations?1
Langan and Levin’s (2002) analysis of prisoners released in 1994 provides
mixed evidence on whether the type of offense for which an offender was serving

1

An analysis of parole violations is presented in Chapter 5.
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time is related to the type of offense for which the offender was rearrested after
release from prison. They found that certain categories of criminals were likely to
be rearrested for the same offense for which they had been incarcerated.
Specifically, 41.2 percent of released drug dealers, 33.9 percent of released
larcenists, and 23.4 percent of released burglars were rearrested for the same type
of offense. Other offenders, however, were unlikely to be rearrested for the same
offense – only 2.5 percent of rapists and 1.2 percent of homicide offenders were
rearrested for those offenses. These findings are similar to those reported by Beck
and Shipley (1989) in their analysis of prisoners released in 1983. In their study,
while 33.5 percent of released larcenists were rearrested for another larceny, 31.9
percent of released burglars were rearrested for another burglary and 24.8 percent
of drug dealers were rearrested for another drug offense, only 7.7 percent of
rapists were rearrested for another rape and 6.6 percent of released homicide
offenders were rearrested for another homicide offense.
State
California
New York
Oregon
Florida
Arizona
Illinois
Delaware
Virginia
Ohio
New Jersey
Michigan
Texas
Minnesota
North Carolina
Maryland

Table 7 - State by Whether Type of Rearrest is Known
# Type of Rearrest
# Type of Rearrest Not
Known
Known
179,161
18
54,234
35
10,912
20
51,495
199
9,872
55
43,199
334
2,396
28
8,556
110
15,415
280
18,862
399
4,364
141
20,733
1245
2,475
177
26,291
7365
2,374
15412

Pct. Known
99.99%
99.94%
99.81%
99.61%
99.44%
99.23%
98.84%
98.73%
98.21%
97.93%
96.87%
94.33%
93.33%
78.12%
13.35%
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Because of unclassified offense-of-rearrest data in the Prisoners Released
in 1994 dataset, a state-by-state analysis of this information was conducted.
Table 7 presents the numbers and percentages of the most serious rearrest
offenses by state. Because less than 90 percent of rearrest offenses are known in
North Carolina and Maryland, these two states were excluded from the analyses
on rearrest by type of offense.

4.4: Exploring the Differences in Violent Rearrest Probabilities across States

Unlike the figure on general rearrest rates, Figure 2 indicates less betweenstate variation in three-year violent rearrest rates for offenders released from
prison in 1994. While Michigan and Texas are on the low end of violent rearrest
rates with 13.18 percent and 14.51 percent, respectively, and while Delaware and
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Illinois are on the high end of violent rearrest rates with 35.90 percent and 34.74
percent, respectively, the remaining nine states have relatively similar rearrest
probabilities, all within about six percentage points of each other.
Table 8: Logistic Regression Results for Three Models for Rearrest for A New
Violent Offense
State of
Individual Level
Combined
Release
Characteristics
Model
Model
Model
Rearrest (Violent Offense)
Odds Ratio
Odds Ratio
Odds Ratio
Gender
2.208***
2.209***
Age of First Arrest
0.967***
0.967***
Black
1.800***
1.750***
Other Race
1.302
1.277
Age at Release
0.958***
0.960***
Prior Arrests
1.026***
1.023***
Property Offense
0.666***
0.670***
Drug Offense
0.543***
0.544***
Public Order Offense
0.726**
0.715***
Other Offense
0.538
0.562
Time Served
0.998*
0.997**
Parole Violation
1.271***
1.372***
Probation Violation
1.385**
0.905
Other Admission Type
0.799
0.647*
Unknown Admission Type
0.524**
1.048
Mandatory Supervised Release
1.350***
1.460***
Expiration of Sentence
1.864***
1.645***
Other Release Type
1.284***
1.045
Arizona
1.973***
2.350***
California
1.903***
1.095
Delaware
3.717***
2.216***
Florida
2.424***
1.777***
Illinois
3.492***
1.559**
Minnesota
2.025***
1.281
New Jersey
1.709***
1.123
New York
2.160***
1.585***
Ohio
1.787***
1.411*
Oregon
2.132***
1.720***
Texas
1.113
0.876
Virginia
2.116***
1.441**
Model Statistics
Observations (Unweighted)
29,128
29,128
29,128
Pseudo R2
0.0110
0.0683
0.0733
Log Pseudolikelihood
-123554.81
-116391.84
-115769.01
* p<.05 , ** p <.01, *** p<.001
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Using Michigan as the contrast state, the logistic regressions for the fixed
effects model provide fairly strong support that the individual level characteristics
help explain variation in violent rearrest rates between states. Without the
individual level characteristics added to the model, the only state with a violent
rearrest rate similar to Michigan is Texas (O.R.=1.113, n.s.). When the nine
individual level characteristics are added to the model, however, not only does the
difference between Michigan and Texas remain non-significant (O.R.=0.876,
n.s.), but the findings also become non-significant for California (O.R.=1.095,
n.s.), Minnesota (O.R.=1.281, n.s.) and New Jersey (O.R.=1.123, n.s.).
Additionally, there is a noticeable reduction in the size of the odds ratio (all
decreasing and becoming closer to one) in every state except for Arizona.
Although the odds ratio increases for Arizona when all the variables are used (at
which point O.R.=2.350, p<.001), this is a suppression effect which disappears
when the variable race is removed from the model (at which point O.R.=1.881,
p<.001). The average reduction in the magnitude of the state effects on violent
recidivism after the individual recidivism predictors are added to the model is
31%. In other words, state differences in the characteristics of released prisoners
explains on average about 31% of the state differences in rates of rearrest for a
new violent offense. Thus, even though violent rearrest rates are not as variable
across states as general rearrest rates, the individual recidivism predictors explain
almost as much of the variation in rearrest for violent crimes as for rearrests for
all crime types.
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The results differ, however, using the second approach of comparing stateby-state regression models. Without the individual level characteristics added, the
initial regression results show that of the 78 state-by-state comparisons, 30
combinations (38.46 percent) have statistically similar violent rearrest rates (refer
to Table B1 in Appendix B). When individual level characteristics are added to
the model (refer to Table B2 in Appendix B), only 33 combinations (42.31
percent) have statistically similar violent rearrest rates. This is only a small
increase in the proportion of state-by-state comparisons for violent rearrest rates
with the individual level characteristics added to the model. This approach
indicates that very little variation of violent rearrest between states for the 1994
cohort can be explained by the inclusion of the individual level characteristics.
The findings, then, are mixed. The results of the regression model using a
single state (Michigan) as the omitted contrast suggest that the individual
recidivism predictors explain roughly a third of the variation between states in
violent arrests. Using a state-by-state comparison approach, on the other hand,
suggests that only a small portion of variation between states can be explained by
the individual level characteristics. This leads to the question of why the two
approaches yield contrasting results and, specifically, why the individual
predictors account for so little of the variation in violent rearrests based on the
state-by-state comparisons.

71
4.4.1: Reasons Why the Individual Covariates May Not Explain Variation in
Violent Rearrest Rates across States
Based on the information presented up to this point, along with a review of
the literature on violent reoffending, there appear to be two possible explanations
for why the findings are mixed. The first is that because there is relatively little
variation in violent rearrest rates between most of the states in the 1994 cohort,
the addition of individual level characteristics does little to improve on the
explanation when used in the state-by-state model; but does help explain variation
in the fixed effects model due to the fact that the contrast state has a violent
rearrest rate that is at least 35 percent less than all but one of the remaining 12
states. The second is that adding the nine individual level characteristics to the
state-by-state model does not help explain much of the variation between states
because other individual level factors not considered in this analysis have a
stronger effect on violent recidivism than do the predictors under consideration.
There are several reasons to suspect that the lack of an effect using stateby-state models may have to do with the similarity of violent rearrest rates
between states. This is a possibility because, as stated at the beginning of this
section, for nine of the thirteen states, there is not much difference in the rates of
rearrests for violent offenses. Without much variation, two things would be likely.
First, one would expect that there would be more states with statistically similar
violent rearrest rates without any individual level characteristics in the model.
This is, in fact, the case when one compares rearrest for any offense and rearrest
for a violent offense. With rearrest for any offense, there are only 20 statistically
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similar comparisons in the states only models, compared to 30 for violent
rearrests. Second, since there is less variation in the percentages between states
for violent offenses than general offenses, one would also expect that the
inclusion of individual level characteristics would have less of an impact. And
this is what occurs. When the nine individual level factors are added to the
models, the number of statistically similar states increases by 30 for rearrest for
any offense, but only by three for violent rearrest rates.
The second possible explanation is that there are different factors related
to violent rearrests than related to general rearrests. In chapter three, it was shown
that individual level factors might affect the risk of violent offending differently
than general offending. Examining regressions for the entire 1994 cohort revealed
that gender, age at first arrest, number of prior arrests and release type had odds
ratios that were quite different for those who were rearrested for violent offenses
compared to those who were rearrested for nonviolent offenses. Along the same
lines, prior research has found that there are several individual level
characteristics linked to violent crime other than the nine used in this dissertation.
While pointing out that three childhood behavior problems – enuresis, fire
setting and cruelty to animals – had been known to be predictive of violence in
adulthood since at least 1960, Justice, Justice and Kraft (1974) further found that
childhood fighting, temper tantrums, school problems and truancy also served as
warning signs related to future violent behavior. Lefkowitz, Eron, Walder and
Huesmann (1977) similarly reported that aggressive behavior exhibited in third
grade was the best predictor of aggression at age 19. Hare (1999) reported that
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offenders who suffered from psychopathy had much higher rates of violent
offending than other offenders. Hanson and Bussière’s (1998) meta-analysis of
sex offenders also found that antisocial personality was a relatively reliable
predictor of sexual offense recidivism. Additionally, while this dissertation has
pointed out research findings indicating that the number of prior arrests was
positively correlated with rearrest rates, Shah (1978) and Hall (1982) found that
increased risk of violent recidivism was related to the number of prior acts of
violent crime, as opposed to crime in general.
These findings highlight that predictors other than the nine used in this
dissertation are related to violent recidivism. Additional evidence that these nine
individual level characteristics are far from exhaustive in predicting violent
recidivism comes from examining existing instruments used to predict violence.
The VRAG (Harris, Rice, and Quinsey, 1993), for example, was judged to be an
effective violence prediction instrument in a meta-analytic comparison of
instruments used to predict violence conducted by Campbell, French and
Gendreau (2009). That instrument includes very few of the individual level
characteristics used in the present analysis.
The fact that instruments used to predict future violence make very little
use of the nine individual level characteristics gathered from the Prisoners
Released in 1994 dataset, along with the relationship that exists between violent
behavior and childhood behavioral problems, prior aggression, psychopathy,
antisocial personality and deviant sexual arousal, are important in helping to
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understand why the nine individual level characteristics previously described may
not necessarily do a good job explaining violent rearrest rates across states.

4.5: Exploring the Differences in Property Rearrest Probabilities across
States

Figure 4.5 on property rearrest rates by state reveals a greater degree of
variation than observed for violent rearrest rates, with a low property rearrest rate
of 19.82 percent in Michigan and a high of 46.56 percent in Illinois.
Table 9: Logistic Regression Results for Three Models for Rearrest for A New
Property Offense
State of
Individual Level
Combined
Release
Characteristics
Model
Model
Model
Rearrest (Property Offense)
Odds Ratio
Odds Ratio
Odds Ratio
Gender
1.226*
1.221*
Age of First Arrest
1.006
1.006
Black
1.447***
1.377***
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Other Race
Age at Release
Prior Arrests
Violent Offense
Drug Offense
Public Order Offense
Other Offense
Time Served
Parole Violation
Probation Violation
Other Admission Type
Unknown Admission Type
Mandatory Supervised Release
Expiration of Sentence
Other Release Type
Arizona
California
Delaware
Florida
Illinois
Minnesota
New Jersey
New York
Ohio
Oregon
Texas
Virginia

0.772
0.959***
1.057***
0.467***
0.366***
0.464***
0.541*
0.999
1.182**
1.624***
0.958
0.565**
1.096
1.325*
0.891

1.895***
2.048***
2.573***
1.980***
3.515***
2.049***
1.736***
2.466***
1.783***
2.422***
1.121
1.693***
Model Statistics
Observations (Unweighted)
29,128
29,128
Pseudo R2
0.0117
0.0844
Log Pseudolikelihood
-145575.28
-134869.11
* p<.05 , ** p <.01, *** p<.001

0.758
0.962***
1.054***
0.450***
0.351***
0.445***
0.547*
0.998*
1.288***
1.329*
0.876
1.057
1.231*
1.290**
0.892
2.028***
1.287
2.093***
1.590***
2.124***
1.720***
1.537***
2.326***
1.661***
1.607***
0.949
1.235
29,128
0.0926
-133668.18

Using Michigan as the contrast state, the logistic regressions for the fixed
effects model provide fairly strong support that the individual level characteristics
help explain variation in property rearrest rates between states. Without the
individual level characteristics added to the model, the only state with a property
rearrest rate similar to Michigan is Texas (O.R.=1.121, n.s.). When the nine
individual level characteristics are added to the model, however, not only does the
difference between Michigan and Texas remain non-significant (O.R.=0.949,
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n.s.), but the findings also become non-significant for California (O.R.=1.287,
n.s.) and Virginia (O.R.=1.235, n.s.). Additionally, there is a noticeable reduction
in the size of the odds ratio (all decreasing and becoming closer to one) in every
state except for Arizona. While the odds ratio increases for Arizona with the full
model (from O.R.=1.895, p<.001 for the state effects model to O.R.=2.028,
p<.001 for the full model), this is a suppression effect which disappears when the
variable race is removed from the model (at which point O.R.=1.762, p<.001).
The average reduction in the magnitude of the state effects on property offense
recidivism after the individual recidivism predictors are added to the model is
20%. In other words, state differences in the characteristics of released prisoners
explains on average about 20% of the state differences in rates of rearrest for a
new property offense.
Using the second approach of comparing state-by-state regression models
provides additional support for these results. Without the individual level
characteristics added, the initial state-by-state results show that of 78 state-bystate comparisons, there are 21 combinations (26.92 percent) that have
statistically similar property rearrest rates (refer to Table C1 in Appendix B).
When individual level characteristics are added to the model (refer to Table C2 in
Appendix B), this number more than doubles. With individual level
characteristics added to the model, there are 43 combinations (55.13 percent) that
have statistically similar property rearrest rates. This second approach, thus,
provides more evidence that the variation in the prevalence of property rearrests
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between states for the 1994 cohort can be explained, in part, by differences in the
characteristics of release cohorts across the states.

4.6: Exploring the Differences in Drug Rearrest Probabilities across States

Similar to the results on overall statewide rearrest rates, Figure 4 reveals a
wide degree of variation in three-year drug rearrest rates for offenders released
from prison in 1994, with a low of 8.38 percent in Michigan and a high of 38.60
percent in New York. Part of the reason for the wide variation in rearrest rates
probably has to do with the amount of emphasis states and individual level police
departments within states placed on seeking to arrest drug users and/or sellers.
While arrests for violent and property crimes usually result after a victim reports
the crime to the police, this is not the case for drug arrests. Instead, arrests for
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drug crimes often result when police take a proactive approach towards this
crime. Such approaches are often the result of a policy decision made by state or
local police. Therefore, even though drug arrests may vary considerably across
states, the number of drug arrests which occur in a given state or municipality
likely has more to do with drug enforcement policies than with the actual use and
sale of drugs in a given area (Zimring and Hawkins, 1994).
Table 10: Logistic Regression Results for Three Models for Rearrest for A New
Drug Offense
State of
Individual Level
Combined
Release
Characteristics
Model
Model
Model
Rearrest (Property Offense)
Odds Ratio
Odds Ratio
Odds Ratio
Gender
1.225*
1.229*
Age of First Arrest
1.002
0.998
Black
1.445***
1.511***
Other Race
0.581*
0.573*
Age at Release
0.963***
0.966***
Prior Arrests
1.050***
1.043***
Violent Offense
0.458***
0.459***
Property Offense
0.488***
0.531***
Public Order Offense
0.503***
0.523***
Other Offense
0.631
0.601*
Time Served
0.996**
0.997*
Parole Violation
1.243*
1.197**
Probation Violation
1.051
1.073
Other Admission Type
0.697
0.811
Unknown Admission Type
0.330***
0.680
Mandatory Supervised Release
1.337***
1.132
Expiration of Sentence
1.243*
1.346**
Other Release Type
0.854*
0.919
Arizona
2.822***
2.840***
California
6.682***
4.080***
Delaware
2.866***
1.483*
Florida
4.645***
3.052***
Illinois
5.368***
2.886***
Minnesota
1.289*
1.142
New Jersey
6.460***
3.810***
New York
6.861***
4.336***
Ohio
2.572***
1.945***
Oregon
4.948***
3.583***
Texas
2.299***
1.795***
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Virginia

2.671***
Model Statistics
Observations (Unweighted)
29,128
29,128
Pseudo R2
0.0306
0.0745
Log Pseudolikelihood
-141388.01
-134990.05
* p<.05 , ** p <.01, *** p<.001

1.830***
29,128
0.0875
-133092.67

Using Michigan as the contrast state, the logistic regressions for the fixed
effects model provide fairly strong support that the individual level characteristics
help explain variation in drug rearrest rates between states. Without the individual
level characteristics added to the model, every state has a significantly higher
rearrest rate for drug offenses than Michigan. When the nine individual level
characteristics are added to the model, however, the difference between Michigan
and Minnesota becomes non-significant (O.R.=1.142, n.s.). Additionally, there is
a noticeable reduction in the size of the odds ratio (all decreasing and becoming
closer to one) in every state except for Arizona, where the increase is negligible.
The average reduction in the magnitude of the state effects on drug offense
recidivism after the individual recidivism predictors are added to the model is
34%. In other words, state differences in the characteristics of released prisoners
explains on average about 34% of the state differences in rates of rearrest for a
new drug offense.
Using the second approach of comparing state-by-state regression models
provides additional support for the conclusions found using the fixed effect
model. Without individual level characteristics added, the initial state-by-state
results show that of 78 state-by-state comparisons, 16 combinations (20.51
percent) have statistically similar drug rearrest rates (refer to Table D1 in
Appendix B). When individual level characteristics are added to the model (refer
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to Table D2 in Appendix B), this number increases by 81 percent. With individual
level characteristics added to the model, 29 combinations (37.18 percent) have
statistically similar drug rearrest rates. Both approaches provide evidence that a
sizable fraction of the variation in the prevalence of drug rearrests between states
for the 1994 cohort can be explained by the inclusion of individual level
characteristics.

4.7: Exploring the Differences in Public Order Rearrest Probabilities across
States2

Similar to the figures on overall statewide rearrest rates and on drug
rearrest rates, Figure 5 shows a wide degree of variation in three-year public order
rearrest rates for offenders released from prison in 1994, with a low of 12.50
2

This section excludes rearrests for parole violations.
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percent in Michigan and a high of 77.81 percent in Delaware. One reason for the
wide degree of variation is differences in state laws, with some states mandating
that certain offenses be recorded as an arrest while others issue citations, which do
not count as arrests. Beyond that, arrest rates for public order offenses are also
influenced by the amount of emphasis states and local jurisdictions place on
seeking arrests for these offenses.

Table 11: Logistic Regression Results for Three Models for Rearrest for A New
Public Order Offense
State of
Individual Level
Combined
Release
Characteristics
Model
Model
Model
Rearrest (Property Offense)
Odds Ratio
Odds Ratio
Odds Ratio
Gender
1.304**
1.336**
Age of First Arrest
0.992
0.994
Black
1.088
1.047
Other Race
0.968
0.982
Age at Release
0.947***
0.947***
Prior Arrests
1.039***
1.035***
Violent Offense
0.669***
0.673***
Property Offense
0.648***
0.653***
Drug Offense
0.647***
0.667***
Other Offense
0.411**
0.470*
Time Served
0.999
0.997**
Parole Violation
1.081
1.214*
Probation Violation
2.232***
1.114
Other Admission Type
0.822
0.647*
Unknown Admission Type
0.303***
0.958
Mandatory Supervised Release
1.174**
1.483***
Expiration of Sentence
1.728***
1.236**
Other Release Type
2.110***
0.955
Arizona
5.539***
5.260***
California
2.454***
1.215
Delaware
24.083***
17.618***
Florida
8.004***
6.543***
Illinois
4.493***
2.128***
Minnesota
2.660***
1.703***
New Jersey
2.134***
1.606***
New York
2.731***
2.079***
Ohio
1.397**
1.208
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Oregon
Texas
Virginia

6.171***
2.093***
3.571***
Model Statistics
Observations (Unweighted)
29,128
29,128
Pseudo R2
0.0387
0.0745
Log Pseudolikelihood
-135110.65
-149246.06
* p<.05 , ** p <.01, *** p<.001

4.090***
1.653***
2.570***
29,128
0.0790
-129453.57

Using Michigan as the contrast state, the logistic regressions for the fixed
effects model provide fairly strong support that the individual level characteristics
help explain variation in public order rearrest rates between states. Without the
individual level characteristics added to the model, every state has a significantly
higher rearrest rate for public order offenses than Michigan. When the individual
level characteristics are added to the model, however, the difference between
Michigan and California (O.R.=1.215, n.s.) and Michigan and Ohio (O.R.=1.208,
n.s.) become non-significant. Additionally, there is a reduction in the size of the
odds ratio (all decreasing and becoming closer to one) in every state when the
individual level factors are added to the model. The average reduction in the
magnitude of the state effects on public order offense recidivism after the
individual recidivism predictors are added to the model is 27%. In other words,
state differences in the characteristics of released prisoners explains on average
about 27% of the state differences in rates of rearrest for a new public order
offense.
Similar results are obtained using the second approach of comparing stateby-state regression models. Without the individual level characteristics added, the
initial state-by-state results show that of 78 state-by-state comparisons, there are
only 6 combinations (7.69 percent) that have statistically similar public order
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rearrest rates (refer to Table E1 in Appendix B). As was the case with drug
arrests, this largely reflects the great variation in public order arrest rates between
states. When individual level characteristics are added to the model (refer to Table
E2 in Appendix B), this number more than triples. With individual level
characteristics added to the model, 22 combinations (28.21 percent) have
statistically similar public order rearrest rates.

4.7.1: Explaining the Wide Degree of Variation in Public Order Rearrests
Across States
While it has already been stated that differences in state laws are one
reason that explains differences in public order rearrest rates, the large state
variation in public order rearrests – especially the extremely high rearrest rate in
Delaware -- makes a more detailed analysis of public order offenses helpful in
understanding these differences. Table 12 partitions the public order rearrests by
specific charge definitions and shows the percentage of released offenders from
each of the thirteen states who were arrested on each of 25 separate public order
offenses (including attempt to commit and conspiracy to commit offenses).
Examining these individual offense arrests, it becomes clear that one
reason public order rearrests were so much greater in Delaware than in any other
state is the large difference between Delaware and almost every other state for
three specific offenses. In Delaware, 48.91 percent of released offenders were
rearrested for a minor traffic violation, 34.22 percent were rearrested for a
probation violation, and 33.91 percent were rearrested for contempt of court.
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Looking at two of the charges – probation violations and minor traffic offenses –
shows how state laws differ, with some requiring an arrest for an infraction while
others do not. In Delaware, Florida and Oregon, over 14 percent of the offenders
were rearrested for a probation violation, compared with less than 1 percent
rearrested for such a charge in Arizona, California, Michigan, Minnesota, New
York and Texas (in fact no offenders were rearrested for a probation violation in
New York and only one offender--out of over 20,000 released--was rearrested for
a probation violation in Texas). These wide variations in percentages do not
indicate that probation violations are common in some states and rare in others.
Instead, they indicate that in some states probation violations are initiated with a
formal arrest while in other states this is a rare practice.
Another example involves minor traffic violation arrests in Delaware and
in California. As shown in Table 12, 48.91 percent of released offenders from
Delaware (313 out of 640 released offenders) were rearrested for a minor traffic
violation, yet only 0.21 percent of released offenders from California (220 out of
103,325 released offenders) were rearrested for a minor traffic violation. The
explanation for this huge difference comes from the different way traffic
offenders are dealt with in each state. In Delaware, it appears that all traffic
offenses are counted as arrests, while in California they are almost always dealt
with as traffic violation citations and not as arrests.
While the explanation above helps explain the wide degree of variation in
public order rearrests between states, it also points out a potential limitation of the
Prisoners Released in 1994 dataset. Although the dataset is very clear about
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Table 12 - Public Order Rearrests by Specific Charges
AZ
OBSTRUCTION-JUSTICE

CA

12.68%

9.86%

WEAPON-OFFENSE

5.63%

7.40%

PROBATION-VIOLATION

0.39%

0.11%

15.07%

0.21%

MINOR-TRAFFIC-OFFENSE
DRUNK-VAGRANT-DISORDERLY

DE

FL

11.88%

18.27%

IL
9.21%

MI
1.90%

MN
8.13%

NJ
8.86%

NY
9.66%

OH
4.79%

7.19%

6.47%

10.59%

2.02%

4.10%

7.84%

10.88%

34.22%

26.55%

1.22%

0.09%

0.56%

0.24%

0.00%

48.91%

6.71%

5.18%

6.47%

5.65%

0.76%

OR

TX

VI

TOTAL

11.43%

6.02%

4.72%

9.65%

3.75%

9.05%

3.27%

7.08%

7.18%

3.92%

14.19%

0.00%

2.49%

3.10%

4.76%

0.26%

16.95%

4.37%

0.68%

2.96%

8.92%

1.45%

8.75%

6.58%

11.64%

0.67%

0.93%

1.14%

2.89%

0.48%

2.41%

0.36%

1.67%

2.75%

17.06%

0.81%

1.56%

9.68%

5.84%

0.07%

1.55%

0.69%

0.63%

1.64%

16.51%

0.55%

0.70%

2.51%

FLIGHT-TO-AVOID

1.59%

1.73%

3.28%

0.94%

1.46%

0.87%

5.40%

0.98%

0.00%

0.51%

5.26%

4.97%

1.23%

1.68%

CONTEMPT-OF-COURT

1.31%

0.83%

33.91%

2.56%

1.27%

0.00%

0.00%

2.35%

2.32%

0.16%

3.73%

0.00%

14.39%

1.58%

IMMIGRATION-OFFENSE

0.00%

3.49%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

1.55%

INVASION-OF-PRIVACY

0.39%

0.50%

0.78%

5.84%

1.07%

0.19%

0.87%

1.78%

2.63%

0.97%

3.35%

0.22%

1.70%

1.38%

COMMERCIALIZED-VICE

1.59%

1.36%

0.94%

1.65%

2.26%

0.30%

0.31%

0.51%

1.77%

1.21%

0.63%

1.41%

0.26%

1.37%

OTHER-PUBLIC-ORDER

2.16%

1.57%

3.44%

1.16%

0.28%

0.39%

1.74%

1.01%

1.43%

0.17%

2.07%

0.18%

0.22%

1.17%

DUI

8.66%

1.05%

8.28%

1.01%

0.67%

0.36%

0.74%

0.47%

0.00%

0.26%

1.54%

0.31%

0.60%

0.94%

DWI

1.35%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

7.45%

0.00%

0.00%

0.19%

6.14%

7.79%

0.09%

0.87%

ESCAPE

1.16%

0.45%

7.34%

1.38%

0.68%

0.00%

1.24%

0.53%

0.31%

1.07%

3.82%

0.42%

1.23%

0.66%

MORALS-OFFENSE

0.33%

0.80%

0.63%

0.56%

0.23%

0.21%

0.25%

0.11%

0.59%

0.24%

0.72%

0.54%

0.40%

0.59%

FAMILY-RELATED-OFFENSE

0.81%

0.13%

1.41%

1.03%

0.00%

0.43%

0.25%

0.49%

1.72%

0.30%

0.41%

0.00%

0.33%

0.43%

RIOT

0.06%

0.06%

0.16%

0.09%

3.17%

0.00%

0.06%

0.11%

0.00%

0.00%

0.13%

0.02%

0.00%

0.25%

ATTEMPTED OFFENSE

0.06%

0.00%

0.31%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

1.78%

0.03%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

3.28%

0.16%

LIQUOR-LAW-VIOLATION

1.38%

0.10%

2.66%

0.00%

0.18%

0.16%

0.25%

0.00%

0.07%

0.00%

0.34%

0.18%

0.09%

0.13%

CONTRIBUTING-TO-DELINQUENCY

0.37%

0.10%

0.16%

0.06%

0.56%

0.00%

0.19%

0.24%

0.00%

0.01%

0.25%

0.03%

0.42%

0.13%

HABITUAL-OFFENDER

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

3.53%

0.08%

BRIBERY

0.07%

0.02%

0.00%

0.01%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.11%

0.00%

0.07%

0.13%

0.03%

0.02%

0.03%

CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT

0.00%

0.07%

0.00%

0.00%

0.04%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.03%

DUI-DRUGS

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.16%

0.00%

0.00%

0.06%

0.09%

0.00%

0.00%

0.19%

0.00%

0.00%

0.02%

44.20%

25.96%

77.50%

53.02%

39.05%

12.51%

27.56%

23.27%

28.09%

16.30%

46.62%

23.13%

33.80%

29.28%

COURT-OFFENSE

TOTAL
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collecting data related to rearrests, it does not take into account how certain
offenses (almost exclusively of a public order nature) are counted as arrests in one
state but not another. This means some caution must be used when looking at the
results between states for public order offenses. Due to differences in state laws,
one offender who commits a public order violation may be caught and arrested in
one state and end up counted as a recidivist, while another offender in another
state may commit the exact same public order violation and be caught but issued a
citation instead of an arrest and, as a result, may not be counted as a recidivist.

4.8: Discussion
Using two separate analytical approaches, the findings from the preceding
sections provide fairly strong evidence that variation in the previously described
characteristics of prison release cohorts explains roughly a fifth to a third of the
variation between states in rearrests for any offense, rearrests for property
offenses, rearrests for drug offenses and rearrests for public order offenses. The
evidence related to rearrests for violent offenses was mixed, with the state-bystate comparisons showing much weaker effects of the individual recidivism
predictors than shown by the standard regression approach using a single omitted
contrast state. The reason for the mixed findings is likely due to one of two
possibilities. The first is that there was little variation between most of the states
in the cohort, but there was nevertheless a fair amount of variation in violent
rearrest rates between the contrast state and all but one of the other states. This
combination would produce a small amount of variation explained using a state-
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by-state comparison, yet would not produce a small variation using a single
omitted contrast state. The second possibility is that other individual level factors
not considered in this analysis have a stronger effect on violent recidivism than do
the predictors under consideration. In the next chapter, three additional forms of
recidivism are explored: reconviction, reimprisonment and parole violations.
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CHAPTER 5 - EXPLORING THE IMPACT OF INDIVIDUAL LEVEL
CHARACTERISTICS ON RECONVICTION, RECONFINEMENT AND
PAROLE VIOLATIONS

5.1: Introduction
While the prior chapter showed that the nine individual level
characteristics help to explain the variation between states for rearrest for any
offense, rearrest for a property offense, rearrest for a drug offense and rearrest for
a public order offense, this fact does not mean that the characteristics will also be
good predictors of variations between states for reconviction probabilities,
reconfinement probabilities or parole violations. One reason for this is that not all
of the individual level characteristics are likely to influence reconviction or
reimprisonment probability. For example, the specific type of admission to prison
for the last offense by itself probably matters little to a court in deciding whether
to convict a defendant. Similarly, the amount of time served on the last sentence
should not matter in determining whether to drop the charges or proceed for a
prosecutor and whether to convict or acquit for a judge or jury. Beyond this, a
second reason why individual level characteristics may have different influences
depending on the measure of recidivism is because prior research has shown that
the theoretical reasons that help explain why the variables have an impact are
different for different measures of recidivism. One example of an individual level
characteristic that would possibly increase the likelihood of reconviction and
reimprisonment, but would do so for different reasons than for rearrests, is the

89
number of prior arrests. In chapter three, the number of prior arrests was shown to
be strongly associated with increased odds of rearrest based on differential
association and social learning theory. These theories do not, however, explain
why these offenders are more likely to be reconvicted or reimprisoned. Instead,
the reason why the number of prior arrests would lead to an increased conviction
rate is because prosecutors would be more willing to devote time and resources
towards a defendant with a lengthy criminal record (Kingsnorth, MacIntosh, and
Sutherland, 2002). Judges, similarly, would be more willing to imprison those
with more prior arrests because they are viewed as more blameworthy and more
of a threat to society. The rationale behind why judges are more likely to imprison
offenders with lengthy arrest records is based on the focal concerns theory
(Steffensmeier, Ulmer, and Kramer, 1998). According to this perspective, there
are three concerns that judges take into consideration when sentencing defendants
– blameworthiness and degree of harm caused, protection of the community, and
practical constraints and consequences.
Although the study was published before Steffensmier et al.’s (1998)
work, a good example of how judges’ decision making is influenced by focal
concerns and a further example of why one group of offenders is more likely to be
sentenced leniently than another comes from a study published by Steffensmeier,
Kramer and Streifal (1993). They analyzed over 60,000 cases from Pennsylvania
that occurred between 1985 and 1987 and found that female defendants were
about 12 percent less likely to be imprisoned than similarly situated male
defendants. They further explored cases involving “judicial departures” – where
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judges sentenced defendants to a lesser term than was prescribed statutorily – and
noted that female defendants were more likely than male defendants to receive a
judicial departure (29% of female defendants vs. 15% of male defendants). In
these cases, judges were required to provide a written explanation outlining the
reasons for their departure. Reading through these reasons, the authors concluded
that there were five primary reasons judges commonly gave and that these reasons
were in line with the focal concerns that female defendants were less of a threat
and had more ties to or responsibilities in the community. The five primary
justifications given for sentencing both male and female defendants leniently (p.
433) were:
1. defendant has a nonviolent prior record (e.g., a high prior
record score that consists solely of property offending),
2. defendant has mental or health problems (e.g., jailing would
overburden the jail staff and would harm rather help the
defendant),
3. defendant is caring for dependents or is pregnant (e.g., jailing
would not protect the community in the long term and would
be inhumane, risky, and possibly costly),
4. defendant played a minor role in the crime or was only an
accomplice, and
5. defendant showed remorse (e.g., “felt bad about what he/she
had done”).
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A second example of focal concerns influencing sentencing decisions
comes from comparing the sentences received by young black defendants
compared to similarly situated white defendants. Spohn and Holleran (2000)
studied sentencing patterns of defendants from three jurisdictions – Chicago,
Miami and Kansas City – and found evidence of a “penalty price” paid at
sentencing for young male defendants who were either black or Hispanic. Viewed
by judges as more culpable than their white counterparts, such defendants were
sentenced more harshly. This sentencing disparity was even more amplified for
young, male minority defendants who were unemployed. This finding is in line
with Steffensmeier and Demuth’s (2000) observation that, faced with incomplete
information on criminal defendants, judges often revert to sentencing based on the
stereotypical viewpoints they held that black offenders were more culpable than
white offenders.
Thus, research has found that males and blacks are sentenced more harshly
than females and whites because of focal concerns. An additional theoretical
perspective that predicts females will be sentenced more leniently than male
defendants is the chivalry/paternalism hypothesis, which suggests “women are
awarded leniency in sentencing as a result of their inherent biological weaknesses
and consequently, their need to be coddled both as offenders and as victims”
(Franklin and Fearn, 2008, p. 279). Similarly, another theoretical rationale used to
explain why blacks are more likely to be incarcerated than whites is the racial
threat hypothesis (Blalock, 1967). This theory states that blacks are more likely to
be imprisoned because they have been stereotyped in many segments of America
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as being a more dangerous or threatening form of criminal than white offenders.
Crawford, Chiricos and Kleck (1998) wrote that trends in sentencing African
Americans were becoming more punitive over time because African American
criminal defendants were being seen more and more in terms of being a crime
specific “racial threat” to the white status quo.
What is noteworthy about the focal concerns, chivalry/paternalism, and
racial threat perspectives is that while they help explain research which has found
that white and female defendants are less likely to be imprisoned than black and
male defendants, (Rodriguez, Curry, and Lee, 2006; Daly, 1994; Crawford et al.,
1998; Mitchell, 2005; Steffensmeier et al., 1993), these are not the same
theoretical perspectives which predict that males and blacks will be more likely to
be rearrested. Instead, differential association has been offered as an explanation
for why men offend more than women and blacks are thought to be involved in
crime more than whites because of social disorganization theory. Specifically,
prior research has found that black offenders often live in or return to
communities which contain factors such as residential instability, racial-ethnic
heterogeneity, family disruption, resource deprivation and racial inequality
(Harer, 1994; Anderson, 1999; Kubrin and Stewart, 2006; Reisig, Bales, Hay, and
Wang, 2007; Mears, Wang, Hay, and Bales, 2008). These factors inhibit the
development of protective, prosocial networks and, in turn, increase the risk of
offending for persons who live in these neighborhoods.
Thus before proceeding on to the analyses, it is important to understand
that the nine individual level factors may not have the same effect on different
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measures of recidivism. One reason for this is that some of the factors that have
been found to have an influence on likelihood of rearrest may have no influence
on the probability of reconviction or reimprisonment. A second reason is that
while some of the factors may influence all forms of recidivism, the basis for their
influence may be qualitatively different depending on the type of recidivism
under consideration.

5.2: Exploring the Differences in Reconviction Probabilities across States

Figure 6 provides the reconviction proportions for those released offenders
who are rearrested within three years of their release. This figure shows a
moderate amount of variation, with a low of 55.99 percent of rearrested offenders
being reconvicted in Texas and a high of 85.17 percent of rearrested offenders
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being reconvicted in New York. It should be noted that these percentages were
based on a sample that was limited exclusively to those released offenders who
had been rearrested for a new crime. As previously explained, this was done to
prevent bias that would result because some individual level characteristics are
associated with increased probability of arrest. Also, because data on reconviction
were not provided for offenders released in Ohio, that state was dropped from the
model.
Table 13: Logistic Regression Results for Three Models of Reconviction for a New
Offense (for Rearrested Offenders)
State of
Individual Level
Combined
Release
Characteristics
Model
Model
Model
Rearrest (Property Offense)
Odds Ratio
Odds Ratio
Odds Ratio
Gender
1.073
1.047
Age of First Arrest
1.001
0.999
Black
1.061
1.054
Other Race
0.778
0.714
Age at Release
0.988**
0.989*
Prior Arrests
1.020***
1.016***
Violent Offense
0.750***
0.700***
Drug Offense
0.937
0.870*
Public Order Offense
0.848
0.789*
Other Offense
0.724
0.681
Time Served
0.998
0.996***
Parole Violation
1.130*
1.129
Probation Violation
1.038
1.125
Other Admission Type
0.851
0.799
Unknown Admission Type
1.162
0.732
Mandatory Supervised Release
0.797***
1.105
Expiration of Sentence
0.929
1.859***
Other Release Type
0.637***
1.466**
Arizona
1.128
1.033
California
1.789***
1.678***
Delaware
4.346***
3.310***
Florida
1.024
0.737*
Illinois
1.155
1.089
Maryland
2.100***
2.423***
Michigan
2.197***
3.121***
Minnesota
1.858***
1.923***
New Jersey
1.673***
1.658***
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New York
North Carolina
Oregon
Virginia

4.479***
2.670***
3.220***
1.641***
Model Statistics
Observations (Unweighted)
18,521
18,521
2
Pseudo R
0.0273
0.0121
Log Pseudolikelihood
-102998.38
-104612.78
* p<.05 , ** p <.01, *** p<.001

4.884***
2.855***
3.168***
1.703***
18,521
0.0390
-101761.05

Because Texas had the lowest probability of reconviction, it was used as
the contrast state for the fixed effects model. The logistic regressions for these
models indicate that the individual level characteristics explain little of the
variation in reconviction probabilities between states. Without the individual level
characteristics added to the model, the three states that have similar reconviction
proportions to Texas are Arizona (O.R.=1.128, n.s), Florida (O.R.=1.024, n.s) and
Illinois (O.R.=1.155, n.s). When the nine individual level characteristics are added
to the model, although Arizona (O.R.=1.033, n.s.) and Illinois (O.R.=1.089, n.s.)
continue to have statistically similar reconviction proportions as Texas, the
difference between Florida and Texas becomes significant (O.R.=0.737, p<.05).
Further, while there are no changes in the significance levels of the ten remaining
states, a decrease in the size of the odds ratio occurs in only four of these states
(California, Delaware, New Jersey and Oregon). The change from non-significant
to significant in Florida and the increase in the size of the odds ratio for Maryland,
Michigan, Minnesota, New York, North Carolina and Virginia are all suppression
effects that disappear when particular variables are dropped from the models. The
decrease in the size of the odds ratio for these states without all the variables in
the model is not large in any case. In summary, the average reduction in the
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magnitude of the state effects on reconviction probabilities after the individual
recidivism predictors are added to the model is negligible.
Using the second approach of comparing state-by-state regression models
produces some support for the proposition that variations in individual level
characteristics can help explain differences in reconviction proportion across
states. Without individual level characteristics added, the initial state-by-state
results show that of 91 state-by-state comparisons, 19 combinations (20.88
percent) have statistically similar reconviction probabilities for offenders who
were rearrested within three years of their release from prison (refer to Table F1
in Appendix B). When individual level characteristics are added to the model
(refer to Table F2 in Appendix B), 29 combinations (31.89 percent) have
statistically similar reconviction probabilities. This increase of 53 percent thus
provides some evidence that the variation in the proportion of rearrested offenders
between states can be explained by individual level characteristics.
When each of the individual level characteristics is added separately to the
state-by-state regressions, release type is found to be the variable with the greatest
effect, as the number of states with statistically similar reconviction probabilities
increases from 19 to 25 when this variable is added. Looking at the odds ratios for
the release type variables in the individual level characteristics model and the
combined model, it can be seen why release type has the greatest impact in a
state-by-state comparison. In the individual level characteristics model,
mandatory supervised released, expiration of sentence and other release type all
have an odds ratio lower than one when compared to those released via
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discretionary parole, a difference which is statistically significant for mandatory
supervised release and other release type. When state of release is added to the
model, however, it becomes very clear that it was the specific release
characteristics of individual states that drove these low odd ratios as all three
release types increase to above one and as those released via expiration of
sentence and other release type become significantly more likely to be
reconvicted than those released via discretionary parole. Although type of release
from prison is considered an “individual” characteristic in this analysis, it is quite
different of course than characteristics such as sex, age, or race. Type of release
is largely a matter of state policy, which explains why the inclusion of the state
effects in the analysis has such an important effect on the results.
The findings, then, are mixed. The results of the regression model using a
single state (Texas) as the omitted contrast suggest that the individual level
characteristics are not useful in explaining variation between states in
reconviction probabilities of rearrested offenders. Using a state-by-state
comparison approach, on the other hand, provides some evidence that the
variation in reconviction can be explained by individual level characteristics. This
leads to the question of why the two approaches yield contrasting results and,
specifically, why the individual predictors account for virtually none of the
variation in reconviction proportions based on the fixed effects model.
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5.2.1: Reasons Why the Individual Covariates May Not Explain Variation in
Reconviction Probabilities across States
One very important reason why individual level factors may not affect the
likelihood of a conviction stems from the nature of the American judicial system
and the legal concept of reasonable doubt. In America, justice is supposed to be
blind and the decision to seek a conviction along with having a judge or jury find
a defendant guilty is supposed to result from the strength of the evidence and the
State’s ability to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. To the extent that this
is actually true, it is not supposed to matter if a former prisoner is male or female,
black or white, 20 or 40, or a former property offender or a former drug offender
in determining whether an offender will be reconvicted. What is supposed to
matter, instead, is whether the evidence can prove guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt.
A second reason why the individual level factors may not have an impact
is because they may not be the right factors to look at. One factor that might
explain some of the variation between states is the desire prosecutors in some
states have for high conviction rates. Since over 95 percent of chief prosecutors in
office in 1994 were elected locally (DeFrances, Smith, and van der Does, 1996),
some might have been influenced to select the most winnable cases, especially if
their term of office was short or political competition was high (Rasmussen,
Raghav, and Ramseyer, 2009). While such a strategy would undoubtedly increase
conviction rates, it would also result in a lower arrest-conviction ratio, since
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weaker cases would not even be prosecuted. Under this scenario, one factor that
would have more of an influence would be political motivation.
In addition to political motivation, research has also found that the amount
of monetary resources a prosecutor’s office has influences the number of cases it
will prosecute. More resources would result in a higher arrest-conviction ratio,
since an increase in the percentage of cases prosecuted should result in an
increase in the number of convictions that result (even if the conviction rate
declines). Support for this hypothesis comes from two papers. Rasmussen et al.
(2009) examined data from over 2,000 county prosecutors’ offices using the 2001
National Prosecutor’s Survey administered by the Bureau of Justice Statistics.
They found “that higher budgets are associated with both higher amounts of
prosecution and higher conviction rates conditioning on the amount of
prosecution” (p. 26). A second report by Blaine, Entwistle, Nystrom and Weaver
(2010) looked at prosecution spending for individual counties within Oregon.
They found “a strong positive correlation between the amount of money spent
prosecuting a crime versus the number of overall convictions” (p. 8).
The fact that criminal justice convictions are supposed to be based on the
strength of the evidence along with the likelihood that prosecutorial decisions
may be influenced by both politics and financial considerations provide fairly
good explanations as to why the nine individual level factors would not be useful
in explaining between state variations in reconviction probabilities. These
reasons, however, do not explain why there was an increase in the number of
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states with similar reconviction probabilities in the state-by-state model when
individual level characteristics were included.
Part of the reason for this increase may be that prosecutors have discretion
in determining which cases to prosecute and individual level factors may
influence these decisions. The one individual level factor that will almost
certainly have an impact on a prosecutor’s decision is a defendant’s prior record,
as almost any prosecutor would choose to prosecute a defendant with 20 prior
arrests as opposed to one with just two. Further, although justice is supposed to be
blind, in some states or jurisdictions, prosecutors may be influenced to proceed
with cases and juries may be swayed to convict based partly on an offender’s age,
gender and/or race. Thus, if individual level factors did, in fact, have an influence
on the decision to prosecute and/or convict in some jurisdictions, this may explain
why these factors influenced reconviction probabilities in certain state-by-state
comparisons, even though this effect was not seen in the fixed effects model.

5.2.2: Individual Level Factors Related to Increased Probability of Reconviction
The results from the individual level characteristics model and combined
model reveal that among offenders released from prison who are rearrested for a
new crime, that those who are younger at the age of release are more likely to be
reconvicted, those who have more prior arrests are more likely to be reconvicted,
and those who are released for a violent offense are less likely to be reconvicted
than property offenders. While not significant in the combined model, in the
individual level characteristics model, those who entered prison via parole
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violation are more likely to be reconvicted than those who entered prison via a
new court conviction. Additionally, while not significant in the individual level
characteristics model, in the combined model those who served less time were
more likely to be reconvicted and both those who had been released for a drug
offense and those who had been released for a public order offense were less
likely to be reconvicted than those released for a property offense.
The reason why those who have more arrests are more likely to be
convicted goes back to the idea that prosecutors would be more willing to devote
time and resources towards a defendant with a lengthy criminal record
(Kingsnorth et al., 2002). Regarding the finding that older offenders are less likely
to be reconvicted, one possible explanation is that, as offenders age, they become
better at the crimes they do commit. Evidence for this comes partly from research
that points out that older people who remain criminally active are more likely to
start specializing in one specific crime (Farrington, 1986; Blumstein, Cohen, Das
and Moitra, 1988). The reason they specialize is they begin to realize what crimes
they are good at and, as a result, know how to commit these crimes without
leaving enough evidence to lead to a conviction.
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5.3: Exploring the Differences in Reimprisonment Probabilities across States

Figure 7 provides the reimprisonment probabilities for those released
offenders who are reconvicted of an offense resulting from an arrest that occurred
within three years of their release. This figure shows a wide degree of variation in
reimprisonment rates, with a low of 20.09 percent of reconvicted offenders being
reimprisoned in Delaware and a high of 71.87 percent of reconvicted offenders
being reimprisoned in North Carolina. One notable observation that can be made
looking at Figure 7 is that, although Delaware has the highest proportion of
released offenders who are rearrested and the second highest reconviction rate of
rearrested offenders, it has the lowest rate of giving reconvicted prisoners new
prison sentences. While this fact is at least partly due to the high number of
rearrests for minor public order offenses in Delaware, this observation also
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highlights that different state court systems deal with convicted offenders in
different manners.
Before the regression models were estimated for this section, the sample
was modified to only include a sample of released offenders who had been
reconvicted of a new crime. As previously explained, this was done to prevent
bias that would result because some individual level characteristics are associated
with increased probability of arrest. Also, because data on reimprisonment were
not provided for offenders released in Ohio or Virginia, these states were dropped
from the model.
Table 14: Logistic Regression Results for Three Models for Reimprisonment for a
New Offense (for Reconvicted Offenders)
State of
Individual Level
Combined
Release
Characteristics
Model
Model
Model
Rearrest (Property Offense)
Odds Ratio
Odds Ratio
Odds Ratio
Gender
1.673***
1.672***
Age of First Arrest
1.018*
1.021**
Black
1.258***
1.132
Other Race
0.524*
0.488*
Age at Release
0.980***
0.980***
Prior Arrests
1.004
1.009
Violent Offense
0.757***
0.771**
Drug Offense
0.831*
0.880
Public Order Offense
0.800*
0.791*
Other Offense
0.643
0.675
Time Served
1.002
1.006***
Parole Violation
1.072
1.024
Probation Violation
0.612***
0.791
Other Admission Type
1.321
1.278
Unknown Admission Type
2.713***
1.055
Mandatory Supervised Release
1.405***
1.000
Expiration of Sentence
1.099
1.130
Other Release Type
1.126
1.631***
Arizona
1.622***
1.347
California
2.336***
2.404***
Delaware
0.481***
0.284***
Florida
1.842***
1.150
Illinois
4.407***
4.050***
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Maryland
Michigan
Minnesota
New Jersey
New York
North Carolina
Texas

2.610***
1.406**
3.008***
2.975***
1.600***
4.890***
1.704***
Model Statistics
Observations (Unweighted)
11,405
11,405
Pseudo R2
0.0154
0.0335
Log Pseudolikelihood
-102998.38
-104612.78
* p<.05 , ** p <.01, *** p<.001

2.317***
1.253
2.907***
2.744***
1.317*
5.274***
1.449*
11,405
0.0390
-101761.05

While this study has generally opted to use the state with the lowest rate or
proportion of offenders who recidivate as the contrast state in the regression
analyses, in this case a decision was made to use the state with the second lowest
proportion of reimprisoned offenders as the contrast state. The reason for this had
to do with the difficulty of explaining the findings that occurred when models
were estimated using Delaware as the contrast state. When the individual level
characteristics were added to the state of release model, the odds ratio increased
for every state in the model. While the exact reasons for this are not totally clear,
with this finding, along with the fact that Delaware had the highest rearrest rate
and the second highest reconviction proportion yet a much lower reimprisonment
proportion than any other state, it seemed likely that Delaware’s sentencing laws
relating to incarceration were not comparable to other states and that it would be
inappropriate, for this reason, to use Delaware as the contrast state. As a result,
Oregon was chosen as the contrast state as it had the second lowest proportion of
reconvicted offenders who were resentenced to prison.
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Using Oregon as the contrast state, the logistic regressions for the fixed
effect models provide fairly strong support that the individual level characteristics
help explain variation in reimprisonment probabilities between states for
reconvicted offenders. Without the individual level characteristics added to the
model, there are no states with reimprisonment proportions similar to Oregon.
When the nine individual level characteristics are added to the model, however,
the findings become non-significant comparing Oregon and Arizona (O.R.=1.347,
n.s), Florida (O.R.=1.150, n.s.) and Michigan (O.R.=1.253, n.s.). Additionally,
using all individual level characteristics in the model brings the odds ratio closer
to one for Illinois, Maryland, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York and Texas. The
odds ratio also becomes closer to one for California and North Carolina when the
variable prior arrests is dropped from the model and the odds ratio for Delaware
becomes closer to one when the model is run with the variable offense type as the
only individual level characteristic in the model. The average reduction in the
magnitude of the state effects on reimprisonment probabilities after the individual
level characteristics are added to the model is 9%. In other words, state
differences in the characteristics of released prisoners explain on average 9% of
the state differences in the reimprisonment rates of reconvicted offenders.
Using the second approach of comparing state-by-state regression models
provides additional support for the conclusions found using the fixed effect
models. Without individual level characteristics added, the initial state-by-state
results show that of 78 state-by-state comparisons, 14 combinations (17.95
percent) have statistically similar reimprisonment probabilities for offenders who
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were reconvicted within three years of their release from prison (refer to Table G1
in Appendix B). When individual level characteristics are added to the model
(refer to Table G2 in Appendix B), 27 combinations (34.62 percent) have
statistically similar reimprisonment probabilities for offenders who were
reconvicted within three years of their release from prison. Using this second
approach thus provides more evidence that the variation in the reimprisonment
probabilities between states can be explained, at least in part, by the inclusion of
individual level characteristics.

5.3.1: Individual Level Factors Related to Increased Probability of
Reimprisonment
The results from the individual level characteristics model and combined
model reveal that, among offenders released from prison who are reconvicted of a
new crime, males are more likely to be resentenced to prison than females, that
those who were first arrested or who were released at a younger age are more
likely to be resentenced to prison than those first arrested or released at an older
age, that ethnic minorities are less likely to be resentenced to prison than whites,
and that those released from prison for a property offense are more likely to be
resentenced to prison than those released for a violent offense or a public order
offense. While the results were not significant in the full model, in the individual
level characteristics models, blacks were more likely to be resentenced to prison
than whites, those released for a property offense were more likely to resentenced
to prison than those released for a drug offense, those released for a probation
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violation were less likely to be resentenced to prison than those sentenced to
prison as a new court commitment and those released via mandatory supervised
release were more likely to be resentenced to prison than those released via
discretionary parole. Finally, although the results were not significant in the
individual level characteristics model, using the full model, those who had served
a longer prison term were more likely to be resentenced to prison as were those
who had been released via other release type.
Many of the theoretical reasons for these sentencing patterns go back to
the focal concerns theory discussed at the beginning of the chapter. While
research has already been discussed about why females and whites are less likely
to be resentenced to prison than males and blacks (Steffensmeier, et al., 1993;
Spohn and Holleran, 2000; Steffensmeier and Demuth, 2000), research has also
found that older offenders are treated more leniently than younger offenders
because judges view them as less of a threat. Steffensmeier, Kramer and Ulmer
(1995), for example, hypothesized that older offenders would be sentenced more
leniently due to the fact that 1) doing time is harder for older offenders, 2) it costs
more to incarcerate older offenders, 3) older offenders are seen as less
blameworthy and 4) older offenders are seen as less dangerous. This theory could
also apply to those with longer arrest records (Kingsnorth et al., 2002).
Table 15: Release Type and Most Serious Reconviction Type
Type of Offender
Proportion
Proportion
Proportion Whose
Whose
Most Whose
Most Most
Serious
Serious
Serious
Reconviction is for a
Reconviction is Reconviction is Violent, Property or
for a Violent for a Violent or Drug
Trafficking
Offense
Property Offense Offense
Violent Offender
17.97%
39.57%
45.20%
Property Offender
7.40%
45.22%
49.80%
Drug Offender
6.95%
19.61%
34.09%

108
Public Order Offender

8.78%

26.97%

33.22%

While prior research does not predict that those who were released from
prison for a property offense would be more likely to be resentenced to prison if
reconvicted than those released for a violent, drug or public order offense, a closer
analysis of the reconviction charges of released offenders from the 1994 dataset
may help provide clarification. Table 15 displays the most serious charge of
reconviction for violent offenders, property offenders, drug offenders and public
order offenders based solely on those who are reconvicted of a new offense.
While the table does indeed show that violent offenders are more likely to be
reconvicted for a violent offense than any other offense type, the table also shows
that persons released from prison for a property offense had the highest proportion
of reconvictions for a violent or property offense as well as the highest proportion
of reconvictions for a violent, property or drug trafficking offense. The higher
proportion of released property offenders reconvicted on new violent, property or
drug trafficking offenses could explain why they are more likely to be resentenced
to prison for their reconvictions. Judges, it would seem, would be most influenced
by the current conviction when deciding to resentence an offender to prison. The
fact that property offenders, as a group, have both the highest rate of being
reconvicted for either a violent or property offense as well the highest rate of
being reconvicted for a violent, property or drug trafficking offense could explain
why they are more likely to be resentenced to prison. This finding would also
help explain why property offenders are more likely to be reconvicted than other
types of offenders. In line with this, Kingsnorth et al. (2002) noted that one of the
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factors that most influenced prosecutors’ decisions whether to proceed or drop a
case was the seriousness of the offense.

5.3.2: Discussing an Unexpected Non-Finding
While the preceding section provided fairly consistent evidence that
variations in the individual level characteristics were useful in explaining some of
the between state variation in reimprisonment probabilities for reconvicted
offenders, one finding in particular merits further exploration: prior arrests. In the
individual level characteristics model, the number of prior arrests an offender has
is not related to imprisonment probability and this variable only becomes
marginally significant (p<.10) when state of release is added. This finding appears
quite unexpected given the literature that finds prior arrest record positively
related to imprisonment (Clarke and Koch, 1976; Vigorita, 2001). Regarding this
unexpected non-finding, estimating a new logistic regression model for
reimprisonment probability including the entire population of rearrested
defendants (as opposed to just those who have been reconvicted) helps provide a
highly plausible explanation.
Table 16: Logistic Regression Model for Reimprisonment Probability of Rearrested
Offenders using All Nine Individual Level Characteristics
Variable
Odds Ratio
Std. Err.
Gender
0.6489519***
0.1052541
Age of First Arrest
1.0133490*
0.0064385
Black
1.2098880***
0.0515438
Other Race
0.5732732*
0.2570719
Age at Release
0.9791914***
0.0047756
Prior Arrests
1.0129670**
0.0037080
Violent Offense
0.7096509***
0.0628794
Drug Offense
0.8301898**
0.0631884
Public Order Offense
0.7771931**
0.0900310
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Other Offense
Time Served
Parole Violation
Probation Violation
Other Admission Type
Unknown Admission Type
Mandatory Supervised Release
Expiration of Sentence
Other Release Type

0.6110805
0.9997242
1.0824950
0.6730711**
1.1030460
2.168336***
1.0400430
1.0288640
0.6489519***

0.3238287
0.0010622
0.0598605
0.1257715
0.1884507
0.1610055
0.0562749
0.1004250
0.0760803

* p<.05 , ** p <.01, *** p<.001
Table 16 shows that people who are rearrested and have more prior arrests
are more likely to be reimprisoned. Previously, it was shown that people with
more arrests were more likely to be reconvicted. This sets up a hypothesis that
would explain the non-finding. Under this hypothesis, prosecutors are more
willing to pursue legally weak cases against defendants with lengthy records, and
settle for a plea that does not involve a new prison term. In similarly situated
cases involving defendants without lengthy arrest records, prosecutors would be
more likely to drop the charges. Because some of the cases against defendants
with lengthy records are legally weak, prosecutors may be more willing to plea
bargain some of the weaker non-violent cases, offering probation or a short jail
term in exchange for a guilty plea, as opposed to dropping the charges or going to
trial and risking acquittal. Under this scenario, offenders with lengthy criminal
records who commit crimes which would have been dropped had the defendant
not had a lengthy criminal record end up being offered plea bargains which don’t
involve a new prison sentence. While this hypothesis cannot be tested with the
current dataset, it nevertheless is quite plausible and would explain why prior
arrest record is not a significant predictor of reimprisonment for those reconvicted
of a new crime.
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5.4: Exploring the Differences in Parole Violation Rearrests and
Reimprisonment on Parole Revocations across States
Analyzing the differences that exist across states for both parole violation
arrests and for reimprisonment for parole violations is not quite as straightforward
as the rearrest, reconviction and reimprisonment analyses. While data are
available from 13 states regarding rearrests that take place for parole violations,
looking at these data alone can be misleading because of wide variations in state
law. Oregon Statute 144.350, for example, reads:
(1)(a)

The

Department

of

Corrections

or

other

supervisory authority may order the arrest and detention of any
person then under the supervision, custody or control of the
department or other supervisory authority upon being informed and
having reasonable grounds to believe that such person has:
(A)

Violated

the

conditions

of

parole,

post-prison

supervision, probation, conditional pardon or other conditional
release from custody;
This statute explains that the procedure for dealing with parole violators in
the state of Oregon involves issuing a warrant for the offender’s arrest.
Presumably as a result of the wording of this statute, 1,127 of the 3,192 offenders
released from prison in Oregon in 1994 were rearrested on charges of violating
parole. Most states, however, do not mandate that parole violators be arrested for
technical violations of parole. This can clearly be seen in looking at Table 17,
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which shows that the percentage of offenders rearrested on charges of violating
parole ranges from less than one tenth of one percent in Michigan and New York
to over 35 percent in Oregon. The rarity of arrests for parole violations in all but a
few states also makes a state-by-state analysis of rearrests for parole violations an
unwise proposition. While such an analysis could be conducted, the results would
not be meaningful given the rarity of the event in many states.
State
Oregon
Florida
Ohio
Illinois
Delaware
Minnesota
Virginia
Arizona
Texas
California
New Jersey
Michigan
New York

Table 17: Offenders Rearrested for Parole Violations by State
Offenders Released Rearrest for Parole Violation
Percent Rearrested
3192
1127
35.29%
21035
2086
9.92%
11497
627
5.45%
14890
262
1.76%
640
8
1.25%
1611
13
0.81%
5464
41
0.75%
5416
21
0.38%
20507
45
0.22%
103325
145
0.14%
12275
14
0.11%
6696
5
0.08%
25709
6
0.02%

To adequately explore this issue, arrests for parole violations will have to
be analyzed alongside data on technical violations for parole resulting in
reimprisonment. Although data on technical violations are only available for nine
of the 15 states in the sample, Table 18 provides the number of offenders who
were sent back to prison on technical violations. The percentages from this table
are very different from the percentages in Table 16. California, for example,
revoked the parole of 38.65 percent of offenders even though only 0.14 percent of
offenders were rearrested for a parole violation offense. Due to these differences,
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both technical violations of parole and parole violations that resulted in new
arrests were analyzed.
Table 18: Offenders Returned to Prison for Parole Violations by State
Returned to Prison
Percent Returned to
for Technical
Prison for Technical
State
Offenders Released Violation
Violation
California
103325
39933
38.65%
New York
25709
7693
29.92%
Oregon
3192
860
26.94%
Florida
21035
5427
25.80%
Michigan
6696
1299
19.40%
North Carolina
22208
3199
14.40%
Minnesota
1611
177
10.99%
Texas
20507
2113
10.30%
Illinois
14890
929
6.24%

To explore the extent to which between-state variation in parole violation
rearrests and reimprisonment on parole revocations across states can be explained
by differences in individual level risk factors across states, two separate sets of
analysis were run. Both of these were limited to the nine states where information
on revocations for technical parole violations exists. The first of these analyses
involved estimating models that combine parole violation rearrests and technical
violations of parole resulting in revocation. The second of these analyses involved
estimating models that combined parole violation rearrests resulting in
reincarceration and technical violations of parole resulting in reimprisonment.
Though similar in many respects, these two sets of analyses provide a more in
depth understanding of how parole violation arrest and parole revocation rates
vary across states and the influence that individual level risk factors have on each
of them.
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5.4.1: Offenders Rearrested for Parole Violations or Reimprisoned for
Technical Violations
Table 19: Offenders Rearrested for Parole Violations or Reimprisoned for Technical
Violations by State
Rearrested for
Parole Violation or
Percent Rearrested for
Returned to Prison
Parole Violation or
for Technical
Returned to Prison for
State
Offenders Released Violation
Technical Violation
Oregon
3192
1357
42.51%
California
103325
40004
38.72%
New York
25709
7698
29.94%
Florida
21035
6180
29.38%
Michigan
6696
1303
19.46%
North Carolina
22208
3292
14.82%
Minnesota
1611
187
11.61%
Texas
20507
2147
10.47%
Illinois
14890
1143
7.68%

Table 19 displays the number of offenders from Oregon, California, New
York, Florida, Michigan, North Carolina, Minnesota, Texas and Illinois who were
either rearrested on a parole violation charge or who were returned to prison for a
technical violation. Not included are offenders who were charged with a technical
violation of parole but not returned to prison. Table 19 highlights a wide degree of
variation in combined rates for parole violation rearrests and technical violations
resulting in a return to prison with a low of 7.68 percent of offenders in Illinois
and a high of 42.51 percent in Oregon.
To explore whether individual level characteristics have an influence on
variation in rearrests for parole violations and reimprisonments for technical
violations between states, estimates were obtained from the three models used in
the fixed effects model approach described in previous sections. Because Illinois
had the lowest rate of offenders with parole violations used in the analysis, it was
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chosen as the contrast state. The logistic regressions for the fixed effect models do
not provide much evidence in support of the hypothesis that the individual level
characteristics help explain variation in parole violations between states.
Table 20: Logistic Regression Results for Three Models for Rearrests for Parole
Violations and Reimprisonment for Technical Violations
State of
Individual Level
Combined
Release
Characteristics
Model
Model
Model
Rearrest (Property Offense)
Odds Ratio
Odds Ratio
Odds Ratio
Gender
1.183
1.205
Age of First Arrest
1.002
0.992
Black
1.030
1.286***
Other Race
1.414
1.349
Age at Release
0.998
1.002
Prior Arrests
1.023***
1.013**
Violent Offense
1.192**
1.048
Drug Offense
0.993
0.857*
Public Order Offense
1.106
1.065
Other Offense
1.965*
1.435
Time Served
1.003*
1.003*
Parole Violation
1.242***
1.108
Probation Violation
1.219
0.504***
Other Admission Type
0.417***
0.533**
Unknown Admission Type
0.508***
2.234***
Mandatory Supervised Release
1.690***
1.555***
Expiration of Sentence
0.521***
0.973
Other Release Type
2.067***
5.361***
California
7.596***
8.204***
Florida
5.003***
1.971***
Michigan
2.906***
4.636***
Minnesota
1.579***
1.204
New York
5.139***
7.640***
North Carolina
2.092***
2.602***
Oregon
8.889***
12.064***
Texas
1.406*
1.767***
Model Statistics
Observations (Unweighted)
23,269
23,269
23,269
2
Pseudo R
0.0613
0.0310
0.0788
Log Pseudolikelihood
-123677.75
-127662.42
-121367.45
* p<.05 , ** p <.01, *** p<.001
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With the fixed effects model, there are no states that are statistically nonsignificant compared to Illinois. When all nine individual level characteristics are
added to the model, Minnesota (O.R.=1.204, n.s.) becomes statistically nonsignificant and there is a very large decrease in the size of the odds ratio for
Florida (which goes from O.R.=5.003, p<.001 in the fixed effects model to
O.R.=1.971, p<.001 in the full model). Aside from these two states, however, the
odds ratio increases in size for all of the remaining states. Thus, the evidence that
individual level characteristics can be used to explain variations between states in
the number of offenders rearrested for parole violations or reimprisoned for
technical violations is relatively weak using this approach.
Conversely, using the second approach of comparing state-by-state
regression models produces some support for the proposition that variations in
individual level characteristics can help explain how parole violation arrest and
parole revocation rates vary across states. Without individual level characteristics
added, the initial state-by-state results show that of 36 state-by-state
comparisons3, only two combinations (5.55 percent) have statistically similar
parole revocation and parole rearrest rates (refer to Table H1 in Appendix B).
When individual level characteristics are added to the model (refer to Table H2 in
Appendix B), this number increases to 25 percent. With individual level
characteristics added to the model, nine combinations have statistically similar
parole revocation rates. This increase is more than fourfold and thus provides
evidence that the variation in the revocations for technical violations of parole and
3

Three of the 36 state-by-state comparisons were run without the variables admission type or
release type to deal with multicollinearity which resulted when technical violations and parole
violation arrests were combined.
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rearrests for parole violations can be explained, in part, by differences in
individual level characteristics.

5.4.2: Offenders Reimprisoned for Technical Violations or Parole Violation
Convictions
Table 21: Offenders Reimprisoned for Technical Violations or Parole Violation
Convictions by State
Returned to Prison
Percent Returned to
for Criminal or
Prison for Criminal or
Technical Violation
Technical Violation of
State
Offenders Released of Parole
Parole
California
103325
39976
38.69%
Oregon
3192
1172
36.71%
New York
25709
7693
29.92%
Florida
21035
6033
28.68%
Michigan
6696
1303
19.46%
North Carolina
22208
3210
14.45%
Minnesota
1611
180
11.17%
Texas
20507
2113
10.30%
Illinois
14890
1048
7.04%

While having offenders rearrested on charges of parole violations is a
relatively rare event, an analysis of those reconvicted and reimprisoned on a
parole violation criminal (as opposed to technical) charge finds that the event is
exceedingly rare as it affected only 50 of the over 250,000 offenders in the
prisoners released dataset. Further, as 27 of these 50 offenders also were sent back
to prison for a technical violation, and two of the remaining parole violators came
from Delaware (which was not one of the nine states which provided data on
technical violations), Table 21 and Table 19 are quite similar. Like Table 19,
Table 21 again shows that there exists a wide degree of variation in return to
prison for criminal or technical parole violations for offenders released from
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prison in 1994, with a low of 7.04 percent in Illinois and a high of 38.69 percent
in California.
To explore whether individual level characteristics have an influence on
variation between states, estimates were obtained from the three models used in
the fixed effects approach described in previous sections. Similar to the approach
used with rearrests for parole violations and reimprisonment for technical
violations, the logistic regressions for the fixed effect models do not provide
evidence in support of the hypothesis that the individual level characteristics help
explain variation in parole violations between states. With the fixed effects model,
there are no states that are statistically non-significant compared to Illinois. When
all nine individual level characteristics are added to the model, Minnesota
(O.R.=1.258, n.s.) becomes statistically non-significant and there is a very large
decrease in the size of the odds ratio for Florida (which goes from O.R.=5.310,
p<.001 in the fixed effects model to O.R.=2.046, p<.001 in the full model). Aside
from these two states, however, the odds ratio increases in size for all of the
remaining states. Thus, the evidence provided that individual level characteristics
can be used to explain variations between states in the proportion of offenders
reimprisoned for criminal or technical violations of parole is relatively weak, just
as it was in the previous analysis that looked at the combination of parole
violation rearrests and technical violations of parole.
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Table 22: Logistic Regression Results for Three Models for Rearrests for Parole
Violations and Reimprisonment for Technical Violations
State of
Individual Level
Combined
Release
Characteristics
Model
Model
Model
Rearrest (Property Offense)
Odds Ratio
Odds Ratio
Odds Ratio
Gender
1.176
1.200
Age of First Arrest
1.001
0.992
Black
1.031
1.287***
Other Race
1.389
1.328
Age at Release
0.999
1.003
Prior Arrests
1.023***
1.012**
Violent Offense
1.190**
1.048
Drug Offense
0.992
0.854
Public Order Offense
1.112
1.071**
Other Offense
1.984*
1.437
Time Served
1.003**
1.003***
Parole Violation
1.248***
1.110*
Probation Violation
0.946
0.493***
Other Admission Type
0.422****
0.558***
Unknown Admission Type
0.645**
2.282***
Mandatory Supervised Release
1.689***
1.503***
Expiration of Sentence
0.517***
0.966
Other Release Type
2.010***
5.291***
California
8.333***
9.024***
Florida
5.310***
2.046***
Michigan
3.191***
4.897***
Minnesota
1.661***
1.258
New York
5.638***
8.137***
North Carolina
2.231***
2.750***
Oregon
7.660***
10.046***
Texas
1.517**
1.870***
Model Statistics
Observations (Unweighted)
23,269
23,269
23,269
2
Pseudo R
0.0628
0.0310
0.0802
Log Pseudolikelihood
-122976.59
-127662.42
-120698.8
* p<.05 , ** p <.01, *** p<.001

Using the second approach of comparing state-by-state regression models
produces some support for the proposition that variations in individual level
characteristics can help explain differences in reconviction proportions across
states. Without individual level characteristics added, the initial state-by-state
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results show that of 36 state-by-state comparisons4, three combinations (8.33
percent) have statistically similar parole revocation and parole rearrests leading to
reimprisonment rates (refer to Table I1 in Appendix B). When individual level
characteristics are added to the model (refer to Table I2 in Appendix B), this
number increases to eight (22.22 percent). This more than twofold increase
provides evidence that the variation in the revocations for technical violations of
parole and rearrests for parole violations that result in reimprisonment can be
explained, in part, by differences in individual level characteristics.

5.4.3: Individual Level Factors Related to Increased Probability of Parole
Violations
Looking at the models in Tables 20 and 22, we see that there are some
common individual level characteristics associated with increased odds of
violating parole. One characteristic that is significant for parole violations in both
the individual level characteristics model and the full model is prior arrests. The
reasons why those with more prior arrests would be more likely to violate parole
goes back to the differential association and social learning theories related to the
increased probability of rearrest for offenders with more prior arrests. Although a
technical violation of parole is not the same as an arrest, it is nevertheless a
violation of rules and those who have more prior arrests would be expected, based
on these theories, to be more likely to violate parole, just as they would be more
likely to be rearrested.
4

Three of the 36 state-by-state comparisons were run without the variables admission type or
release type in the model to deal with multicollinearity which resulted when reimprisonment for
technical violations and parole violation convictions were combined.
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Both tables also show that those released via mandatory supervised release
are more likely to have their parole revoked than those released via discretionary
parole. Part of the explanation for this has to do with the parole revocation
policies in California and the fact that the state of California accounts for over 40
percent of parole violators sent back to prison (Travis and Lawrence, 2002). As
California has the second highest parole failure rate in America (Travis and
Lawrence, 2002) and as all the offenders released from California are released via
mandatory supervised release, it should come as no surprise that those released
via mandatory supervised release would be more likely to have their parole
revoked in models where state of release was not controlled for. The fact that
those released via mandatory supervised release had higher parole revocation
rates even when state of release is added to the model likely has to do with the
fact that those granted discretionary parole have been screened and represent a
lower risk as a result. Solomon et al. (2005:2) wrote:
Prisoners released to supervision via discretionary release have
been screened by a parole board or other authority to determine
“readiness” to return to the community. Parole boards, which often
face substantial pressures to reduce prison overcrowding,
determine who presents the lowest risk of reoffending and is most
prepared for release. Among other factors, parole boards consider
criminal histories, institutional conduct, and positive connections
to the community such as employment, housing arrangements, and
ties to family.
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Similarly, Rosenfeld et al. (2005) found that those released via
discretionary parole had far fewer rearrests than those released via mandatory
supervised release. While it again needs to be pointed out that violations of parole
are not necessarily the same as rearrests, they both result from failure to adhere to
laws, rules and regulations and the evidence suggests that those released via
discretionary parole are less likely to violate parole than those released via
mandatory supervised release because they have been screened by a parole board
and, thus, are better equipped to abide by the stipulations of parole.
Petersilia (2003:187-188) also argued that allowing states to maintain the
option of discretionary parole could enhance the likelihood of success after
release because it would motivate prisoners to become involved in and participate
in prison programs, writing:
We should reinstitute discretionary parole release in the 16 states
that have abolished it. Eliminating discretionary release reduces
the incentives for inmates to try to rehabilitate themselves while
incarcerated. Some inmates may recognize the intrinsic value of
improving themselves, but more inmates will participate if they
believe it will reduce their prison stay. Research suggests that,
regardless of a prisoner's initial motivation to participate in prison
programs, positive benefits accrue. So what benefits are gained by
reducing motivation and participation in prison programs?
Eliminating discretionary release works against our attempts at
rehabilitation.
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Another factor related to increased probability of parole revocation that
can be discussed in some detail is the finding that those who had entered prison
because of a parole violation are either significantly more likely or marginally
more likely to violate the conditions of their parole than those who had initially
entered prison because of a new court commitment. Both Lynch and Sabol (2001)
and Travis (2005) noted that offenders who cycle back into prison via multiple
parole violations are at higher risk of offending than other offenders. These
offenders have difficulty being successfully reintegrated back into society and
following rules associated with parole. In their study of parolees returning back to
Sacramento, Hipp and Yates (2009) speculated that the theoretical rationale
behind previous parole failures being at increased risk of future parole failures
had to do with the differential association and social learning theories, which were
previously explained regarding why higher levels of prior arrests were associated
with increased odds of recidivism.
In addition to prior arrests, release type and prior failure on parole, the
other individual level characteristic found to be associated with increased odds of
parole violations was time served, with those who had served more time in prison
more likely to be charged with a parole violation. This finding is somewhat
surprising as it is contrary to the earlier finding that those who had served longer
time were less likely to be rearrested. Future research should address why this is
the case.
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5.4.4: Exploring the Different Findings using Different Approaches
While a detailed analysis exploring the issue is beyond the scope of this
dissertation, there exists a very plausible reason why a fixed effects model would
show that individual level characteristics have virtually no ability to explain
differences in statewide parole violation rates, yet a state-by-state model would
find some effect. This has to do with variations in state laws regarding technical
parole violation policies resulting in reimprisonments. When the prisoners from
the nine states which provided data on technical violations for parole were
released, there were quite likely very different parole violation policies in place in
different states which impacted who was sent back to prison and why. Many of
these policies were statewide policies with some specifically recommending that
offenders only be sent back to prison if their parole violation involved a new
crime while others allowed technical violations for much less serious violations.
Such statewide parole policy differences could help explain why Illinois returned
only one fifth percent as many offenders back to prison for parole violation as
California. In exploring the concept of parole in America, Travis and Lawrence
(2002:19) commented on the policy differences that exist between states:
Examining the phenomenon of successful parole discharges at the
state level (as defined by BJS) shows enormous variation among
the states. The percentage of parolees successfully discharged
ranges from a low of 19 percent in Utah to a high of 83 percent in
Massachusetts . . . However, following the above discussion on the
definition of success, this variation is, to some extent, to be
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expected. It is unlikely that the parolees in Utah and California, the
two states with the lowest rates of successful completion (under 20
percent) are so inherently different from the parolees in
Massachusetts and Mississippi, the two states whose successful
completion rates exceed 80 percent. More likely, the policies and
practices of the parole agencies contribute significantly to these
differences.
Thus policy differences between states could explain why there was no
effect using a fixed effects approach. With that limitation pointed out, however,
there were likely some states that had similar parole revocation policies in place
during this period of time. For those states that had similar revocation policies in
place, individual level characteristics would be useful in explaining differences in
technical violations. This would help clarify why the inclusion of individual level
characteristics helped explain differences in parole revocation rates in some
states, but not for the entire sample.

5.5 Goodness of Fit of the Models
Although the models from the chapters 4 and 5 provide evidence that
statewide differences in individual level characteristics do help explain some of
the variation between states for five of the eight forms of recidivism, a closer look
at the model statistics reveals that there remains a large amount of unexplained
variation. The Pseudo R2 values of each of these models reveals that, in the
strongest case (that of rearrest for a new offense), there still remains over 88
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percent of variation not explained by the state of release or in combination with
the nine individual level factors. For the remaining seven measures of recidivism,
over 90 percent of the variation remains unexplained. What these results indicate
is that there are many additional individual, contextual, and policy variables that
need to be added to the model to fully account for between state variations in
recidivism rates. In addition to the findings related the Pseudo R2 values, the log
pseudolikelihood values decreases for all forms of recidivism when the individual
covariates are added, indicating improved fit for all the models. Similar to the
Pseudo R2 values, the recidivism measure with the greatest decline exhibiting the
greatest improvement in fit when the individual covariates are added to the model
is rearrest for any offense.

5.6: Discussion
Using two separate analytical approaches, the findings from the preceding
sections provide fairly strong evidence that variation in the previously described
characteristics of prison release cohorts explains roughly nine percent of the
variation between states in reimprisonment rates for reconvicted offenders. The
evidence related to reconviction probabilities and parole violations (accompanied
by either an arrest or a technical violation resulting in reimprisonment) was
mixed, with the standard regression approach using a single omitted contrast state
showing much weaker effects of the individual recidivism predictors than shown
by state-by-state comparisons. The reason for the mixed finding related to
reconviction probabilities has to do with the fact that while other factors,
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including political motivations and monetary considerations, generally have a
stronger influence on reconviction probabilities, in some states individual level
characteristics such as prior record, age, age-at-first-offense, gender and race have
an influence on both prosecutorial and jury behavior. The reason for the mixed
finding related to parole violations lies in policy differences in many states
regarding when a technical violation of parole results in reimprisonment. The
effects of the individual factors should be stronger for states with similar
revocation policies.
In addition to these findings, looking at the effects of individual level
characteristics reveals that offenders who were rearrested were more likely to be
reconvicted if they were younger when released, had more prior arrests or were
most recently released for a property offense. The factors related to these
increased odds of reconviction were likely related to prosecutors taking prior
record into account in deciding which cases to move forward with, the idea that
older offenders may be less likely to be convicted because they tend to specialize
in the offenses they commit and the fact that those released for a property charge
were more likely to be rearrested for a more serious violent, property or drug
trafficking offense than other offenders.
For those offenders who were reconvicted of a new offense, the factors
associated with being more likely to be resentenced to prison were being male,
being first arrested at a younger age, being released at a younger age and having
been released from prison for a property offense. One of the factors related to
these increased odds of reimprisonment was based on focal concerns theory:
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judges tend to see females and older offenders as less of a threat than males and
younger offenders. A second factor was based on the seriousness of the charge of
which certain offenders were reconvicted. Examining the reconviction charges
from the dataset revealed that, of offenders who were reconvicted of a new
offense, property offenders had a higher proportion who were reconvicted of a
more serious violent, property or drug trafficking charge compared to reconvicted
offenders who had been released from prison for a violent, drug or public order
offense. One noteworthy non-finding was that prior record was not significantly
related to odds of reimprisonment. While it was not possible to fully test the
theory, one hypothesis that might explain the non-finding is that prosecutors are
willing to offer plea bargains to offenders with lengthy records in weak cases
while dropping the charges in similar cases where the defendant did not have a
lengthy record.
Finally, four factors were related to increased probability of parole
revocation across all models. The first was prior arrests, with those who had more
prior arrests more likely to have their parole revoked. A second factor was prior
admission to prison via parole violation. In both of these cases, the theoretical
basis for this was differential association and social learning theory. A third
finding was that those released via mandatory supervised released were more
likely to have a parole violation than those released via discretionary parole. The
reason behind this is probably that those released via discretionary parole were
lower risk offenders specifically chosen for release because of their low risk. An
unexpected finding was that those who had served longer time in prison were
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more likely to be revoked than offenders who had served less time. This finding is
difficult to explain as it contradicts the prior finding that those who had served
longer in prison were less likely to be rearrested than those who had served less
time.
Overall, the results from these two chapters reveal that the individual level
characteristics associated with increased odds of recidivism differ based upon the
type of recidivism under consideration. While being male, black, younger at the
age of release, having more prior arrests, being released from prison for a
property offense, having previously entered prison on a parole violation and
having previously been released from prison via expiration of sentence are all
associated with increased odds of rearrest, these factors do not all relate to other
forms of recidivism. The following list outlines some of the differences in risk
factors based on the type of recidivism being measured:
1)

Gender - While males who are reconvicted are more likely to be
reimprisoned than females, they are not more likely to be reconvicted
if rearrested and are not more likely to have their parole revoked.

2)

Race – Although being black was found to be related to an increased
probability of reimprisonment in the individual level characteristics
model, it was not found to be a predictor of reconviction in either
model.

3)

Age at Release – While offenders who were younger at the age of
release were more likely to be reconvicted if rearrested and more
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likely to be reimprisoned if reconvicted, they were not more likely to
have their parole revoked.
4)

Prior Arrests – While those with more prior arrests were more likely
to be reconvicted if rearrested and were more likely to have their
parole revoked, they were not more likely to be reimprisoned if
reconvicted.

5)

Offense Type – While property offenders were more likely than other
types of offenders to be reconvicted if rearrested and to be
reimprisoned if reconvicted, they were not more like to have their
parole revoked.

6)

Admission Type – While people who had previously entered prison
on a parole violation were more likely to have their parole revoked
compared with those who previously entered on a new prison
sentence, they were not more likely to be reconvicted if rearrested or
to be reimprisoned if reconvicted.

7)

Release Type – Although people released via expiration of sentence
were found to more likely to be reconvicted if rearrested in the full
model which included state of release, there were no significant
findings either way regarding the probability of them being
reimprisoned if reconvicted of a new offense.
While the proceeding two chapters have looked at whether differences in

individual level characteristics can help explain variations in eight forms of
recidivism rates across space, the focus of chapter six will be if the explanation of
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between state variations in all but one of these forms of recidivism can be further
enhanced by the addition of three state-level (“contextual”) variables.
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CHAPTER 6 – DO CONTEXTUAL VARIABLES EXPLAIN
RECIDIVISM RATES ACROSS STATES?

6.1: Introduction
Chapters Four and Five provided evidence that, with a few exceptions,
nine individual level characteristics explain some of the differences across states
in rearrest rates for any offense, rearrest rates for property offenses, rearrest rates
for drug offenses, rearrest rates for public order offenses and new prison
sentences for reconvicted offenders. This chapter extends the analysis to
investigate whether the addition of three state-level (“contextual”) variables
accounts for additional variance in recidivism across states.

The state-level

contextual variables are: 1) drug arrests per 100,000 residents, 2) police officers
per 1,000 residents, and 3) arrest-offense ratios.
Before providing the rationale for the inclusion of these contextual
variables, it is informative to review the state averages for each of them. Table 23
shows that there is a fair amount of divergence between states for all three of the
contextual variables. The average number of drug arrests per 100,000 residents
for the years 1994 to 1997 ranges from 278.31 per 100,000 residents in Delaware
to 835.24 per 100,000 residents in New York (mean = 559.6, s.d.=182.4). The
average number of police officers for this time period ranges from 1.72 officers
per 1,000 residents in Minnesota to 3.78 per 1,000 residents in New York (mean =
2.31, s.d.= .536); and the average arrest-offense ratio for this time period5 ranges

5

The arrest-offense ratio used for Florida is the two year average for that state from 1994 and
1995. The reason is that the data were not available though Crime in the United States for those

133
from 17.86 percent in Florida to 41.94 percent in Delaware (mean = 27.3,
s.d.=6.237127). What these summary statistics do not tell is if they can explain
variation in recidivism rates beyond the variation explained by the individual
level characteristics previously examined.
Table 23 - Contextual Level Variable Averages By State
Drug Arrests per
Police per
Arrest-Offense
100,000
1,000
Ratio
Arizona
601.46
2.0249
23.50
California
843.29
2.0469
26.59
Delaware
278.31
2.0321
41.94
Florida
506.22
2.3425
17.86
Illinois
683.26
2.8910
21.49
Maryland
809.65
2.5543
31.00
Michigan
406.01
1.9937
18.28
Minnesota
316.39
1.7236
27.22
New Jersey
722.92
2.8851
26.76
New York
835.24
3.7810
25.78
North Carolina
485.33
2.2793
27.51
Ohio
505.50
2.0489
29.77
Oregon
511.81
1.7909
25.80
Texas
470.74
2.2184
30.27
Virginia
418.54
1.9777
36.11
In the multilevel analyses that follow, each of the state level variables is
added to a hierarchical linear model alongside the nine individual level
characteristics. Because of the limited degrees of freedom that exist with a sample
size of 15 states, each of the three state level variables is analyzed separately. In
each of these models, the individual level variables are entered into the model
grand mean centered, as literature emphasizes that this is the appropriate approach
for research questions which have a primary substantive focus on a level two
predictor variable (Enders and Tofighi, 2007).
years. Additionally, the Florida Department of Law Enforcement website’s (www.fdle.com)
record of arrests for 1996 and 1997 excluded juvenile arrests, making the data substantially
different than for the other states or for 1994 and 1995 for Florida.
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The multilevel analyses use the software package HLM 6.0 (Raudenbush,
Bryk, and Congdon, 2004). While the decision to conduct the multilevel analyses
using HLM was based on several advantages that this program offers over others,
it is also important to point out that there exists some disagreement among
researchers as to whether an accurate multilevel analysis can take place using
HLM with only 15 level two units. While there are 32,732 level one units
represented within these 15 states, and while Maas and Hox (2005) found that
large individual level sample sizes can partially compensate for a small number of
groups, some researchers have found that using HLM with a sample size of less
than 50 may lead to biased estimates of the second-level standard errors (Maas
and Hox, 2005; Moineddin, Matheson, and Glazier, 2007). Not all researchers
have found that a level two sample of between ten and fifteen is inappropriate,
however. Snijders and Bosker (1999, p. 44) found that multilevel modeling was
an attractive option when there were ten or more level two groups. Maas and Hox
(2004) further found that ten groups was an adequate sample size if one was only
interested in the fixed effects of the model.
Given the disagreement over what exactly constitutes an appropriate level
two sample size for multilevel modeling, the following findings should be viewed
with caution due to the small level two sample size and the possibility of biased
estimates of the second-level standard errors. It should also be noted that the
multilevel analyses that follow do not include parole violations as an outcome
measure. This is because only nine states were able to provide data on technical
violations of parole and no study has recommended conducting multilevel
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analysis with a level two sample size smaller than ten. A second note is that,
because there were only 15 level two units, a decision was made to mark findings
if they were marginally significant (p<.10).

6.2: The Effect of Statewide Drug Arrest Rates on Recidivism Rates
One undeniable fact about America’s War on Drugs during the 1980s and
1990s is that it was one of the primary reasons for the tremendous increase in
persons incarcerated in the United States. There were also changes to federal and
state laws during this time that encouraged police departments to focus more on
combating drug crimes. One such change in law was the passage of the
Comprehensive Crime Act of 1984, which, among other things, allowed police
departments to keep a portion of the proceeds of assets forfeited as a result of
certain drug enforcement activities (Benson, Rasmussen, and Sollars, 1995). For
federal cases, states were only allowed to share in a portion of the forfeited
property for relatively large seizures. States did not, however, follow a uniform
pattern in determining whether police departments profited directly from drug
seizures: some passed laws allowing the police to retain a large portion of the
seized property, while others dictated that the proceeds from the seized property
go to a non-law enforcement agency or to the general fund. Where the money
went had an effect on how aggressively states pursued drug crimes. Benson
(2009) pointed out that “drug arrests per 100,000 population in states with
significant limits on police retention of seizure proceeds averaged 363 during
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1989, while states where police kept proceeds averaged 606 drug arrests per
100,000” (p. 52).
The conventional wisdom among many in law enforcement is that drug
use causes crime and that stringent enforcement of drug laws is an effective tool
to combat property and violent crimes. This line of thought is quite reasonable as
the relationship between drug and alcohol use and criminal conduct seems fairly
straightforward. Several Bureau of Justice Statistics publications have found that
over half of the inmates in the correctional system have a history of drug use
(Beck, 2000; Hughes, Wilson, and Beck, 2001; Mumola 1999). A 1999 Bureau of
Justice Statistics publication found that in 1997, nearly 1 in 6 admitted to having
committed the current offense to obtain money for drugs (Mumola, 1999). This
finding was echoed by a 2001 publication that found that among prisoners
expected to be released to the community by yearend 1999, 21 percent stated they
had committed the offense to obtain money for drugs (Hughes et al., 2001). Such
findings have led many to believe that increasingly targeting drug offenders
would reduce both property and violent offending rates. Although there has been
some research indicating that increasing the number of drug offenders in prison
may lower property and violent crimes through incapacitation (Blumstein and
Rosenfeld 1998; Kuziemko and Levitt, 2004), a substantial number of research
studies have concluded that America’s War on Drugs may have actually led to a
decrease in the likelihood of arrest for property offenses and an increase in the
levels of violent offending.
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Benson et al. (1992) examined data from 67 counties in Florida for 1986
and 1987 to see if there was a relationship between drug arrests and property
crime. They found that as the number of drug arrests increased, there was a rise in
the number of property crimes reported. Two years later, Sollars, Benson and
Rasmussen (1994) looked at data from 296 jurisdictions in Florida in 1987. Their
findings echoed those from the earlier study. A ten percent increase in the number
of drug arrests decreased the probability of arrest for a property offense, which, in
turn, raised the property crime rate by an estimated 1.09 percent. Outside of the
United States, Mendes (2000) examined a possible drug-property crime
connection in 274 Portuguese municipalities in 1996. The study found that for a
ten percent increase in the number of drug arrests, the probability of arrest for
property crimes declined by about one percent. These studies indicate that there is
a tradeoff in heightened enforcement of drug laws. Because law enforcement
resources are relatively scarce, as more money is spent to combat drug crimes,
less money is available to respond to property crimes. The results from these three
studies highlight that when less money is available to combat non-drug crimes,
property crime rates may increase.
A likely explanation for the findings that increased drug enforcement leads
to an increase in property crimes lies in the fact that the majority of drug
offenders are not property offenders (Benson et al., 1992; Sollars et al., 1994).
Although numerous reports have indicated that a large portion of people in prison
have used drugs, what this line of logic fails to take into account is that the vast
majority of people who use drugs do not end up in prison, even if they are
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arrested. Benson et al. (1992) stated, “the fact that most property criminals use
drugs does not prove that most drug users commit property crimes” (p. 680). A
report by Trager and Clark (1989, as cited by Benson et al., 1992) notes that most
drug offenders are not also property offenders:
The history of persons having at least one misdemeanor or felony
drug arrest in Florida during 1987 indicates that many have few
previous recorded arrests for property crimes (Trager and Clark,
1989). Of the 45,906 people arrested for drug possession, over
80% had never been arrested for burglary and over 90% had never
been arrested for other property crimes. Of those arrested for sales,
only slightly more than 25% had prior burglary arrests, and again
over 90% had no previous arrest for other property crimes (p. 681).
A second explanation put forth by Benson et al. (1992) is that because an
increased drug enforcement policy will result in a lower probability of arrest for
property offenses, some offenders will switch from committing drug crimes to
property crimes. Under this scenario, the motivation for crime is an economic one
and when the likelihood of getting arrested for one type of offense increases, an
offender, being a rational being (Cornish and Clarke, 1986), would switch to a
less risky form of criminal behavior. Thus, as the chance of being arrested for
selling heroin increases because of more active enforcement, an offender may
choose to switch to the less risky crime of daytime burglary.
As was the case with increased drug enforcement leading to higher levels
of property offenses, there have also been several studies which have found that
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increased drug enforcement is related to increased levels of violent crime. The
evidence that increased drug enforcement leads to higher rates of violent
offending is not consistent with the crime switching hypothesis seen in the
relationship between property and drug crimes, though there is some support for
the notion that diverting law enforcement resources away from non-drug activity
may lead to higher levels of violent offending.
Brumm and Cloninger (1995) looked at the relationship between drug
enforcement activities and homicide rates in 57 cities in 1985. One of the
hypotheses that they tested was the resource saturation hypothesis, which is
“consistent with the view that increased drug enforcement activities divert scarce
policing resources from controlling other offenses, thereby reducing the risk of
punishment for committing those offenses” (p. 512). They found that homicide
rates increased, on average, by 0.17 percent for every one percent increase in drug
enforcement activities. A few years later, Miron (1999) studied homicide trends in
the United States from 1900 to 1990 in relation to historical prohibition efforts
against both alcohol and drugs in the United States. He found that the highest
levels of homicide in America in the 20th century occurred from 1920 to 1933,
when America was prohibiting alcohol, and from 1970 to 1990, after America
began its War on Drugs. He stated: “the results show the expenditure for
enforcement of alcohol and drug prohibition have been positively associated with
the homicide rate in the U.S., consistent with the view that increased prohibition
enforcement encourages the substitution of violent for non-violent disputeresolution mechanisms” (p. 80). More recently, Shepard and Blackley (2005)
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estimated a set of models using data for 62 counties in New York State for 19962000 to determine the relationship between drug arrest rates and both violent and
non-violent crimes. They found that drug arrests did not have a significant
negative relationship with crime. Instead, they found that increases in arrests for
hard drugs were associated with higher rates of all crimes, except assault, and
increases in arrests for marijuana were associated with more larcenies.
While these studies provide evidence about the effect of increased drug
enforcement on property and violent offending, they do not provide evidence of
the effect that increased drug enforcement has on rearrest rates of those recently
released from prison. Some information on this subject can be gleaned from
Langan and Levin’s (2002) report on the recidivism rates of drug offenders
released from prison in 1994. They found that, for those released from prison for a
drug related offense in 1994, 41.2 percent were rearrested for a similar offense
within three years of their release. This offense specialization was higher than for
any other category of offender released in 1994. It is also 60.2 percent higher than
the number of drug offenders released from prison in 1983 who were rearrested
for a similar offense within three years of their release (Beck and Shipley, 1989).
This information confirms that drug offenders were more likely to be rearrested
for a new drug offense in 1994 than in 1983, although it still does not indicate if
differences in state-level drug arrest rates could help explain variations in rearrest
rates between states when the nine individual level characteristics previously
discussed are controlled. The following multilevel modeling results address this
shortcoming.
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Table 24 lists the beta, standard error and odds ratio for the level two
effect of drug arrests added to hierarchical linear models controlling for the nine
individual level factors of gender, age of first arrest, age at release, number of
prior arrests, time served, race, offense type, admission type and release type.
This table includes results for the outcome of rearrest for any offense for a 15
state sample; for rearrest for a violent offense, rearrest for a property offense,
rearrest for a drug offense and rearrest for a public order offense for a 13 state
sample; for reconviction for rearrested offenders for a 14 state sample; and for
reimprisonment for reconvicted offenders for a 13 state sample. Each of these
seven multilevel models is included in its entirety in Appendix C. For ease of
interpretation, the findings related to the addition of the contextual variable are
listed in a single table.
Table 24 - Multilevel Regressions for Seven Outcomes on Individual Level
Characteristics and State Level Drug Arrests per 100,000
Final estimation of fixed effects (Unit specified model):
Drug Arrests per 100,000
Any Rearrest
Rearrest for a Violent Offense
Rearrest for a Property Offense
Rearrest for a Drug Offense
Rearrest for a Public Order Offense
Reconviction
Reimprisonment

b
0.000311
0.000146
0.000812
0.002088***
-0.001033
0.000760
-0.000112

S.E.
0.000497
0.000417
0.000458
0.000365
0.000942
0.000841
0.000845

Exp(b)
1.000311
1.000146
1.000813
1.002090
0.998968
1.000760
0.999888

* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01
The results in Table 24 indicate that the state level characteristic of drug
arrests per 100,000 is not useful in helping explain variation in various forms of
recidivism between states when the nine individual level characteristics are
controlled. While state level drug arrests per 100,000 is found to be a significant
predictor of rearrest for a drug offense, controlling for the nine individual level
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factors, this significant finding is neither unexpected nor does it add to the
explanation of why drug rearrest rates vary across states. If the likelihood of
arrest for a drug offense were increased for people in the general population of a
state, the same increased likelihood would apply to formerly incarcerated
offenders. Beyond this, however, Rosenfeld et al. (2005) found that prisoners
released from 13 states in 1994 were 23 times more likely to be arrested for a drug
related offense between 1994 and 1997 than those from the general population.
Thus, those states that heavily targeted drug offenders would, by default, have a
higher proportion of released offenders rearrested for a new drug offense and this
finding would result in a statistically significant impact, even when individual
level characteristics are controlled.

6.3: The Effect of Statewide Police Per 1,000 Residents on Recidivism Rates
Although to date there does not appear to be any research which explores
the effect of police per 1,000 residents on recidivism rates, a great deal of prior
research has looked at the effect of police levels on crime rates and can serve as a
proxy for how different police levels across states may affect the levels of various
forms of recidivism after controlling for individual level factors. The review of
studies will be limited to those published in the last 15 years because, as Marvell
and Moody (1996) found, many early studies may have suffered from the
specification problems of simultaneity and omitted variable bias, which they
believed was responsible for many studies finding that increasing police size did
not have an impact on crime rates. To correct for these specification problems,
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Marvell and Moody (1996) used lags between police levels and crime rates and
also tested for casual direction with the Granger test. They further sought to
“mitigate omitted-variable bias by entering variables that are proxies for the
unknown factors and unusable variables” (p. 612). Employing these techniques,
they found “Higher police levels reduce most types of crime, particularly at the
city level” (p. 640).
Kovandzic and Sloan (2002) used the same techniques to test the effect of
increased police levels on crime rates at the county level for fifty-seven counties
from the state of Florida for the years between 1980 and 1998. Their analysis
revealed “strong evidence that increased police levels lead to lower crime rates”
(p. 72). They found evidence that increased police levels had significant impacts
on the rates of robbery and burglary and further estimated that “a 10 percent
increase in police levels lowered crime rates by 1.4 percent over time” (p. 73).
Research on whether police levels impact crime rates has not been limited
solely to the United States and has not only been analyzed using official police
data. Vollard and Koning (2009) used data obtained from the Dutch Victimization
Survey (PMB) for the years 1996 to 2004 to estimate the impact that police force
size had on victimization rates and on levels of victim precaution measures such
as avoiding unsafe places and leaving valuables at home to avoid theft. The study
found that increasing police size had a significant, negative impact on several
forms of crime, including bicycle theft, theft from cars, littering, harassment,
youth nuisance, public intoxication and drug nuisance. Negative, but not
significant, effects were found for both assault and robbery. Increasing police size
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also resulted in a significant decrease in victim precaution measures. The authors
summarized the impact of increased police levels by stating, “Our estimates imply
that the 30 percent increase in police per capita in the Netherlands over the period
1996-2004 resulted in a decrease in crime and disorder by some 10 percent” (p.
340).
More recent research by Worrall and Kovandzic (2010) utilized an
alternative instrumental variables approach to explore the prospect of a
simultaneous relationship between policing and crime. Looking at data from
yearly observations of 5199 cities between 1990 and 2001, the authors calculated
a series of fixed effect models using the Generalized Method of Moments
estimator. They found that higher police levels were associated with lower levels
of homicide, robbery, assault, and burglary, particularly in cities with populations
in excess of 100,000.
These findings offer evidence for an inverse relationship between police
levels and crime rates. Under the deterrence theory (Beccaria, 1963 [1764];
Bentham, 1967 [1789]) such findings suggest that increased police presence could
also lead to lower recidivism rates. If released offenders act as rational beings
(Cornish and Clarke, 1986) and realize that they are more likely to be caught
because there are more police on the street, they might decrease their involvement
in crime, resulting in lower levels of reoffending.
There is an additional effect of increasing police levels, however, that
must be addressed before anticipating the effect that increased police levels would
have on rearrest rates. While deterrence theory would anticipate that more police
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would reduce the offending levels of those recently released from prison, this
does not mean that rearrest rates will go down, because some studies have found
that increasing police levels also increases the probability of arrest (Wilson and
Boland, 1978; Mosher, 2001). The end result is that, even if increased police
presence leads to lower reoffense rates by those released from prison, their overall
rearrest rates may nevertheless increase if a greater proportion of those who
reoffend are arrested. On this basis, two competing hypotheses exist:
1) Increased police levels will reduce the level of offending of those
released from prison through deterrence with the end result being
lower rearrest rates.
2) Increased police levels will increase the arrest probability of those
released from prison with the end result being higher rearrest rates.

Table 25 - Multilevel Regressions for Seven Outcomes on Individual Level
Characteristics and State Level Police Per 1,000 Residents
Final estimation of fixed effects: (Unit specified model):
Police per 1,000 Residents
Any Rearrest
Rearrest for a Violent Offense
Rearrest for a Property Offense
Rearrest for a Drug Offense
Rearrest for a Public Order Offense
Reconviction
Reimprisonment

b
0.053538
0.139806
0.341012***
0.309174*
0.073105
0.450621*
-0.145565

S.E.
0.145160
0.101452
0.091807
0.168984
0.264072
0.216014
0.236350

Exp(b)
1.054998
1.150050
1.406370
1.362300
1.075843
1.569287
0.864534

* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01
Table 25 lists the beta, standard error and odds ratio for the level two
effect of police per 1,000 residents added to hierarchical linear models controlling
for the nine individual level factors of gender, age of first arrest, age at release,
number of prior arrests, time served, race, offense type, admission type and
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release type. As before, this table includes results for the outcome of rearrest for
any offense for a 15 state sample; for rearrest for a violent offense, rearrest for a
property offense, rearrest for a drug offense and rearrest for a public order offense
for a 13 state sample; for reconviction for rearrested offenders for a 14 state
sample; and for reimprisonment for reconvicted offenders for a 13 state sample.
Each of these seven multilevel models is included in its entirety in Appendix C.
The results of Table 25 suggest that the state level of police per 1,000
residents is significantly and positively related to probability of rearrest for a
property offense and positively related, though only at a marginally significant
level, to probability of rearrest for a drug offense. Thus, even if increased police
presence does have a deterrent effect on offenders recently released from the
prison, this decrease in offending is more than offset by an increase in the
probability of arrest for both drug and property crimes.
Beyond its effect on the probability of rearrest, the results of the multilevel
regression model of the statewide level of police officers from 14 states show that
this contextual variable is marginally significant (p=.056) for the outcome of
reconviction of offenders who have been rearrested. Although the finding is only
marginally significant, it nevertheless suggests that states that employ more police
officers are also more likely to seek to convict the offenders who are rearrested.
This finding suggests that jurisdictions willing to hire more police officers may
also encourage prosecutors to seek convictions for those who are arrested. This
finding provides some support to the hypothesis raised in Chapter Five that
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contextual, as opposed to individual level, factors help explain variations in
reconviction probabilities across states.

6.4: The Effect of Statewide Arrest-Offense Ratios on Recidivism Rates
While researchers have not directly explored how statewide arrest-offense
ratios affect offender recidivism, several research studies have explored the
relationship between the certainty of arrest and crime rates. Tittle and Rowe
(1974) examined 1970 crime and arrest data gathered from the first annual report
of the Department of Law Enforcement of the State of Florida. They found that
there appeared to be a relationship whereby increasing arrest levels led to lower
crime rates, but that this relationship only existed for communities that had an
arrest-offense ratio of at least 30 percent. They referred to this percentage as a
tipping point and wrote, “Thus it appears that there is a critical level that certainty
of punishment much reach before there is a noticeable change in volume of
crime” (p. 458).
Brown (1978) explored whether Tittle and Rowe’s (1974) tipping effect
was a finding peculiar to the dataset used in the earlier study or if it would occur
in places outside of Florida. In his work, he reanalyzed the two data sets used in
the previous study along with analyzing 1971 crime and arrest rates in California
cities with populations over 25,000 and 1973 data related to crime rates and arrest
clearance rates for California counties. He was unable to identify a general tipping
effect as had been found in the previous study, but his closer reexamination of the
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Florida dataset data revealed evidence that the tipping point that had occurred in
Florida was found only in smaller Florida cities and counties.
A year later, Greenberg, Kessler and Logan (1979) used a longitudinal
model approach to see if arrest rates for a 98-city sample for the years 1964 to
1970 had an effect on crime rates. They developed models that included lags of
one, two and three years, because “theoretical considerations suggest that lagged
casual effects may exist” (p. 846). They found that increasing arrest rates (i.e., the
certainty of arrest) had no appreciable affect on crime rates. While the authors
stated that the findings from Tittle and Rowe (1974) and Brown (1978) provided
evidence in support of the deterrence doctrine, the authors were clear that their
findings did not. They speculated that the reasons for this had to do with the
analytic method used and that “the correlations interpreted in these studies
[conducted by other researchers] as evidence of crime deterrence may in fact have
been spurious” (pp. 649-650).
Three years after that, Greenburg and Kessler (1982) expanded on the
earlier research by adding 12 socioeconomic control variables into the 98-city
sample model. Estimating models with both instantaneous and lagged effects
(using separate one, two and three year lagged models), they found little evidence
supporting a crime-prevention effect. Although they were able to find one model
for both murder and aggravated assault that was statistically significant, the other
models on these crimes were not significant, leading them to conclude that
evidence for the existence of a crime prevention effect for either crime was not
persuasive. Similarly, while their models did find a slight effect for burglary, “the
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evidence for a crime prevention effect here is ambiguous, and the effect is small
in any event” (p. 781). Aside from these three findings, the authors found no other
models for other Index I crimes with statistically significant results. Based on
these findings, the authors wrote, “Our analysis finds no consistent evidence for
the proposition that higher arrest clearance rates result in substantially lower
index crime rates” (p. 784).
Chamlin (1988) explored whether a lagged relationship between arrest
rates and crime rates did exist, but could only be seen through something other
than a yearly lag. He did this by utilizing an autoregressive integrated moving
average (ARIMA) approach to see if he could find evidence of an arrest-crime
relationship in Oklahoma City and Tulsa, Oklahoma for the crimes of robbery,
burglary, grand larceny and auto theft using a monthly (as opposed to yearly) lag.
Although he found evidence that robbery arrests had a negative effect with a one
month lag on robbery offenses for both Oklahoma City and Tulsa, he found no
lagged relationship between arrest rates and crime rates for overall crime or for
burglary, larceny or auto theft.
Three years later, Chamlin (1991) used the ARIMA approach to explore
whether there was evidence in support of a tipping effect (Tittle and Rowe, 1974)
and if this effect depended on the size of the city under observation (Brown,
1978). He conducted his analysis using monthly data obtained from the FBI for
the period between January 1967 and December 1980. He examined four offense
categories (robbery, burglary, grand larceny and auto theft) for seven
Pennsylvania cities that had a 1970 population that ranged between 5,990 and
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2,002,512. His analysis revealed that only five of the 28 arrest-crime relationships
were statistically significant (which revealed little support for an overall tipping
effect) but that there was some evidence of a deterrent effect in the smallest city
for the crimes of robbery and auto theft when the mean clearance rate equaled or
exceeded 40 percent.
The six research studies reviewed provide mixed evidence of a
relationship between arrest certainty and crime rates. None indicates whether a
relationship exists between arrest certainty and recidivism. To explore this
relationship, multilevel regressions were estimated for each of the seven
recidivism measures, controlling for the nine individual level risk factors. Each of
these seven multilevel models is included in its entirety in Appendix C. For
clarification, the arrest-offense ratio is defined as the number of arrests for Index
Crimes (which include the crimes of murder, rape, robbery, aggravated assault,
burglary, larceny, motor vehicle theft, and arson) divided by the number of these
crimes reported to the police.
Table 26 - Multilevel Regressions for Seven Outcomes on Individual Level
Characteristics and Statewide Arrest-Offense Ratios
Final estimation of fixed effects (Unit specified model).
Arrest-Offense Ratio
Any Rearrest
Rearrest for a Violent Offense
Rearrest for a Property Offense
Rearrest for a Drug Offense
Rearrest for a Public Order Offense
Reconviction
Reimprisonment

b
-0.024463
-0.014311
-0.010984
-0.017078
-0.029950
0.023951
-0.003458

S.E.
0.073690
0.015594
0.018681
0.025529
0.034942
0.032943
0.034677

Exp(b)
0.975834
0.985791
0.989076
0.983067
0.970494
1.024240
0.996548

* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01
The results offer no evidence that the arrest-offense ratio helps to explain
variation in any form of recidivism between states, when individual level factors
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are controlled. There are several possible explanations for this non-finding. One
explanation is that a relationship does, in fact, exist between recidivism and the
arrest-offense ratio but that it only exists in states where arrest certainty is above a
certain level (the tipping effect) and the analysis run was unable to pick this effect
up. A second possibility is that the non-finding is based on the low level-two
sample and that if a larger number of level two units had been used, a relationship
would have been found. A third possibility is that the non-finding is correct and
that between state variation in arrest certainty has no bearing on recidivism rates
when individual level characteristics are controlled.

6.5: Discussion
This chapter has explored whether the inclusion of three separate
contextual variables helps to explain the variation between states in various forms
of recidivism with nine individual level characteristics controlled. The results of
these multivariate analyses reveal that the state-level variables of statewide drug
arrest rates and arrest-offense ratio do not help to explain variation in recidivism
rates. Although the multivariate analysis revealed a statistically significant finding
for the outcome measure of drug arrest rates when the state level contextual
variable of statewide drug arrests was added to the model, this finding is
substantively meaningless. What the finding basically says is that in states where
people are more likely to be arrested for drug offenses, people released from
prison are more likely to be arrested for drug offenses.
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The state-level variable of police per 1,000 residents revealed one
statistically significant finding and two marginally significant findings. In states
with more police per 1,000 residents, released offenders were significantly more
likely to be rearrested for a property offense, their likelihood of being rearrested
for a drug offense was marginally greater and the likelihood of an offender who
had been rearrested being reconvicted is also marginally greater. The finding of a
contextual variable being related to probability of reconviction is noteworthy in
light of the earlier finding that variations in individual level characteristics did not
help explain variation between states in probability of reconviction. Future
research should explore the effect of additional contextual variables on this
measure of recidivism. While the proceeding three chapters have looked at
whether individual level or contextual characteristics can help explain variations
in recidivism rates across space, the focus of chapter seven is on how useful
individual level characteristics are at explaining changes in rearrest rates over
time.
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CHAPTER 7 - EXPLORING THE IMPACT OF INDIVIDUAL LEVEL
CHARACTERISTICS ON REARREST RATES OVER TIME

7.1: Introduction
While the results from chapter four have shown that variations in
individual level characteristics help explain differences in rearrest rates across
space, they do not tell if changes in the individual characteristics of released
prisoners also help to explain changes in recidivism rates over time. To more fully
explore this, two separate logistic regressions models were run, using a combined
dataset that included offenders released from the same 11 states in 1983 and 1994.
Although the Prisoners Released in 1994 dataset included inmates from four
additional states (Arizona, Delaware, Maryland and Virginia) that were not
included in the 1983 dataset, these inmates were not included in the combined
dataset as offender information was not available for offenders from those states
released in 1983. In total, the sample consisted of 42,301 weighted cases that
represented 342,602 offenders.
In the dataset, year of release is coded as a dichotomous variable, with a
value of zero meaning the offender was released in 1983 and a value of one
meaning the offender was released in 1994. In line with the “fixed effects” models
used in chapters four and five, these models again estimate the odds ratio (with
1994 as the contrast state). In the first logistic regression model, the only variables
entered into the regression equation are the outcome variable (i.e., rearrest) and
the year of release. This tells if and to what extent there is a difference in rearrest
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rates over time. In the second logistic regression model, the nine previously
described individual level characteristics are added to the model.
Table 27 outlines the results of a logistic regression model based on year
of release. These results show that those released in 1994 were significantly more
likely to be rearrested than those released in 1983. This is not surprising, given
that the proportion of offenders rearrested was over four percentage points higher
for the 1994 cohort than for the 1983 cohort.
Table 27: Logistic Regression Results for Rearrest for Any Offense
Comparing Offenders Released in 1983 and 1994
REARRD
Odds Ratio
Std. Error
1.271295***
.0357694
Released in 1994
Model Statistics
Observations
Pseudo R2
Log Pseudolikelihood
42301
0.0021
-218762.08
* p<.05 , ** p <.01, *** p<.001
When each of the nine individual level characteristics is added to the
model, most of the individual level characteristics remain significant in the
predicted direction. Females are less likely to be rearrested than males
(O.R.=1.592, p<.001); blacks are more likely to be rearrested than whites
(O.R.=1.601, p<.001); those released at a younger age are more likely to be
rearrested than those released at an older age (O.R.=0.936, p<.001); those with
more prior arrests are more likely to be rearrested than those with fewer prior
arrests (O.R.=1.092, p<.001); property offenders are more likely to be rearrested
than violent offenders (O.R.=0.759, p<.001), drug offenders (O.R.=0.752,
p<.001) and public order offenders (O.R.=0.749, p<.001); inmates who served
less time in prison during their last incarceration are more likely to be rearrested
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than those who served more time in prison (O.R.=0.998, p<.001); those admitted
via parole violation are more likely to be rearrested than those admitted via new
court sentence (O.R.=1.526, p<.001); and those released via discretionary parole
are less likely to be rearrested than those released via mandatory supervised
release (O.R.=1.353, p<.001) or expiration of sentence (O.R.=1.499, p<.001). In
addition to these findings, the model reveals that those of other races are less
likely to be rearrested than whites (O.R.=0.697, p<.05); that there is no significant
difference in the prevalence of rearrest of property offenders and those offenders
released for an offense classified as other (O.R.=0.737, n.s); that those who
entered prison on a probation violation have a lower prevalence of rearrest than
those released on a new court commitment (O.R.=0.780, p<.01); and that those
released via other release types (beyond discretionary parole, mandatory
supervised release and expiration of sentence) are more likely to be rearrested
compared to those released via discretionary parole (O.R.=1.263, p<.05). Finally,
with the individual level characteristics in the model, age of first arrest is not a
significant predictor of rearrest (O.R.=1.005, n.s.). This model is displayed in
Table 28.
Table 28: Logistic Regression Results for Rearrest for Any Offense
Comparing Offenders Released in 1983 and 1994 with Individual Level
Characteristics Added to the Model
REARRD
Odds Ratio
Std. Error
Released in 1994
Gender
Age of First Arrest
Black
Other Race
Age at Release
Prior Arrests
Violent Offense

1.439505***

0.0493237

1.592985***
1.004918
1.601155***
0.6968868*
0.9356963***
1.091794***
0.7591705***

0.1015887
0.0044235
0.0540726
0.1201743
0.0029949
0.0050182
0.0298471
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Drug Offense
Public Order Offense
Other Offense
Time Served
Parole Violation
Probation Violation
Other Admission Type
Unknown Admission Type
Mandatory Supervised Release
Expiration of Sentence
Other Release Type

Observations
42301

0.7516201***
0.0362762
0.749285***
0.0492074
0.7375587
0.1664747
0.9981553**
0.0006829
1.5257***
0.0793994
0.7804044**
0.056075
1.263271*
0.1410873
1.057993
0.0447077
1.353116***
0.0509955
1.49922***
0.0748854
1.424681***
0.0779771
Model Statistics
Pseudo R2
Log Pseudolikelihood
0.1132
-194405.63
* p<.05 , ** p <.01, *** p<.001

Most importantly, however, is that with individual level characteristics
included in the model, the odds ratio for the release year variable increases by
13.23 percent. This indicates that changes in individual level characteristics
cannot be used to explain the increase in rearrest rates that occurred between the
1983 and 1994 cohorts. If they did explain differences in prevalence of rearrest
over time, then the odds ratio for the year variable would have decreased. What
the increase indicates, instead, is that there are factors other than individual level
characteristics responsible for the increase in prevalence of rearrest between 1983
and 1994.
Table 29: Logistic Regression Results for Rearrest for Any Offense
Comparing Offenders Released in 1983 and 1994 with Individual Level
Characteristics and State of Release Added to the Model
REARRD
Odds Ratio
Std. Error
Released in 1994
California
Florida
Illinois
Michigan
Minnesota

1.471607***
1.206444*
1.723475***
1.389428***
0.7613157***
1.10703

0.0512288
0.0992839
0.1330589
0.1178957
0.0510884
0.0891658
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New York
North Carolina
Ohio
Oregon
Texas
Gender
Age of First Arrest
Black
Other Race
Age at Release
Prior Arrests
Property Offense
Drug Offense
Public Order Offense
Other Offense
Time Served
Parole Violation
Probation Violation
Other Admission Type
Unknown Admission Type
Mandatory Supervised Release
Expiration of Sentence
Other Release Type

Observations
42301

1.136958
0.988149
0.6418645***
1.652417***
0.7161433***
1.580552***
1.001957
1.62208***
0.6674645*
0.9380546***
1.082739***
0.7094233***
0.7258174***
0.7353339***
0.6872783
0.998389*
1.594247***
0.8310647*
1.446371**
1.410627***
1.148271*
1.278675***
1.152716*

0.0866285
0.0712122
0.0493907
0.1251161
0.0544163
0.1018312
0.0044159
0.0569342
0.1162995
0.0030096
0.0049907
0.0286814
0.035602
0.0489907
0.1561032
0.0006979
0.0851933
0.0648874
0.1731308
0.0774637
0.0638529
0.0715531
0.0730878

Model Statistics
Pseudo R2
Log Pseudolikelihood
0.1213
-192636.37
* p<.05 , ** p <.01, *** p<.001

When states are added to the model which includes individual level
characteristics (as displayed in Table 29), most of the findings remain unchanged.
Age of first arrest and serving time for another offense remain non-significant.
One notable finding, however, is that the odds ratios for mandatory supervised
release, expiration of sentence and other release type each drop by at least 14
percent when the state variables are added. This change indicates that a nontrivial
amount of the difference in rearrest rates based on release type is the result of
distinctive release patterns used by different states.
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Similar to the models on rearrest rates over time, the Pseudo R2 value from
the logistic regression model with year of release and the nine individual level
characteristics in the model indicate that there still remains over 88 percent of
variation not explained by the state of release or the nine individual level factors.
When state of release is added to the model, the Pseudo R2 value increases by less
than one percent (from 0.1132 to 0.1213). This indicates, again, that many
additional individual, contextual and policy variables need to be added to the
model to fully account for differences between time periods in rearrest rates. The
log pseudolikelihood value indicates improved fit when individual level
characteristics are added to the model and further improvement when state of
release is added.

7.2: Using Predicted Probability Models to Clarify the Findings
Before proceeding on to possible explanations of why the models
produced the findings that they did, it will first be informative to graphically
display the differences between the actual changes in rearrest rates over time and
the expected rearrest rates over time based on the predicted probabilities from the
regression models. For the following graphical displays of rearrest rates for 1983
and 1994, information is displayed for 42,301 cases representing 99,681 offenders
released from 11 states in 1983 and for 242,921 offenders released from the same
11 states in 1994. On the following page, Figure 8 displays the actual rearrest
rates of prisoners released from 11 states in 1983 and 1994 while Figure 9
displays the predicted 1983 prisoners based on the coefficients from 1983 and
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1994. The graphs clearly show that the rearrest rates would have been predicted to
decrease had the individual level characteristics had the anticipated effect.
Although the percentages in the figure do not include all inmates from
both datasets, Figure 8 nevertheless displays findings very similar to those from
Langan and Levin (2002) and from Beck and Shipley (1989). What the figure
shows is that offenders released in 1994 were 7.25 percent more likely to be
rearrested than offenders released in 1983. The logistic regression model shown in
Table 27, however, reveals that this was not what was expected based on the
changing demographics of the offenders released from prison in each respective
year. According to this model, rearrest rates should have gone down, not up, if the
only factors that influenced rearrest rates were the nine individual level factors.
This is shown in Figure 9, which displays the anticipated rates using two
predicted probability models. The first model answers the question: Using
predicted probabilities, what would have been the anticipated rearrest rates of
prisoners released in 1983 using the 1983 sample and 1983 coefficients? This is
an important question to answer as it tells what the expected rearrest rates for
1983 should have been based on the nine individual level characteristics of
offenders released that year. It is also important because it gives a base percentage
to compare the 1994 cohort to. The second model answers the question: What
would the anticipated rearrest rates in 1994 have been if the 1994 coefficients
were used but the sample of released prisoners were identical to that in 1983?
This question is relevant because it helps us understand what the predicted
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rearrest rates for 1994 would have been if the only variables which influenced the
rearrest rates were the nine individual level characteristics.
While Figure 8 shows that rearrest rates went up over time, the results
displayed in Figure 9 show that, based on the predicted probabilities of changing
demographics between the 1983 and 1994 cohort, rearrest rates should have gone
down if the only factors that influenced variation in rearrest rates were changes in
demographic characteristics of the release cohorts. These findings indicate that
the nine individual level factors previously discussed do not explain the increase
over time in the rearrest rates of released prisoners.
This leads to the question: Since variations in individual level factors do
not do a good job at explaining changes in rearrest rates over time, what other
factors might be used to explain the variation? While the discussion that follows
is necessarily speculative, evidence will be presented suggesting that three factors
which may help to explain variations in rearrest rates over time include: 1)
America’s War on Drugs, 2) Increased Numbers of Police Officers and 3)
Changing Police Procedures.

7.3: America’s War on Drug
The single factor which likely had the greatest impact on why prevalence
of rearrest went up involves the changing political climate in America and the
increased focus on combating drug crime. One clear example of why this factor
had an impact on prevalence of rearrest comes from the reports written by Beck
and Shipley (1989) and Langan and Levin (2002). These reports highlight that the
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percentage of offenders released from prison for drug offenses more than tripled
from just 9.28 percent of releases in 1983 to over 33.12 percent of releases in
1994. A further analysis of these two datasets reveals that the proportion of
inmates released from prison in 1983 rearrested only on drug related charges,
increased by over 170 percent between 1983 and 1994. While only 3.51 percent
of releases in 1983 were rearrested solely on drug related charges within three
years of their release from prison, this percentage increased to 9.55 percent of
releases in 1994. It should be noted that, alone, the increase in the number
arrested solely on drug related charges explains the increase in prevalence of
rearrest between 1983 and 1994.
The United States prison population’s steady increase in size began in
1974, a few years after the punitive shifts began in America following the
Republican Party adopting a tough on crime platform in the late 1960s (Tonry,
1999) and the publication of a widely influential piece by Martinson (1974) that
“nothing works” in rehabilitating criminal offenders. But many of the enhanced
sentencing strategies aimed at drug offenders weren’t implemented until the rise
of drug related crime began in the mid 1980s. In line with the increasing public
concern that coincided with this crime increase, the federal government passed
two laws – the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 and the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of
1988 – both containing new mandatory minimum sentences for specific drug
offenses.
Although these federal laws did not directly affect state court cases, the
“tough on drug crime” trend nevertheless followed in state criminal filings.
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Roberts (1993) wrote, “In New York State, for example, drug felony filings
increased by 288% between 1985 and 1989; the rate of felony drug convictions
increased by 21.6% in the first quarter of 1989; and the number of prison inmates
serving sentences for drug-related offenses increased by over 300% between 1986
and 1990” (footnote 53, page 1957). The massive increase in drug incarceration
rates was not unique to New York, however. Zimring and Hawkins (1994)
reported: “Between 1980 and 1990 the annual total of males in prison for drug
offenses in California grew fifteenfold from approximately 1,500 to 22,600” (p.
88). They further suggested that the actual cause of the tremendous increase in
drug arrests and drug incarceration rates had more to do with changes in drug
enforcement policies than with an actual increase in drug use, as national surveys
conducted throughout the 1980s showed a fairly persistent decline in illegal drug
use during that decade.

7.4: Increased Numbers of Police Officers
A second factor which likely contributed to the increase in prevalence of
rearrest for offenders released from prison in 1994 compared to those released in
1983 was the increase in the number of full time police officers patrolling
American cities during this time period. This number was undoubtedly affected
by the passage of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act (VCCA),
which was signed into law in September 1994. One of the components of VCCA
established the Community Oriented Police Services (COPS) office and
authorized the distribution of grants to local police. The bulk of these grants were
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designated for the Universal Hiring Program, which provided grants to local
police agencies to pay 75% of the cost of new police hires. The grants provided
for the hiring of additional police officers beginning in 1995 and as of the end of
the 2008 Fiscal Year, the COPS Office had provided funding for approximately
117,000 additional officers.

Figure 10 highlights that the number of law enforcement officers increased
between October, 1982 and October, 1993 by 8.27 percent, as the average number
of police officers per 1,000 residents increased from 2.020 per 1,000 to 2.202 per
1,000. This averages out to an annual increase of 0.75 percent per year between
October 1982 and October 1993. The chart also shows that the rate of law
enforcement officers per 1,000 residents increased at a substantially higher rate
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than in previous years in the year following the passage of VCCA. From 1994 to
1995, the ratio of police per 1,000 residents increased by 3.84 percent. This
increase is over five times the average increase that occurred between 1982 and
1993.
As previously stated, findings by Zhao, Schneider and Thurman (2003)
indicated that more police were related to more arrests for violent crimes, drug
offenses and social disorder offenses. Additionally, although the multilevel
analyses conducted in chapter six did not find a significant relationship between
police per 1,000 residents and rearrest rates across states, there was a marginally
significant relationship between police per 1,000 residents and rearrest for drug
offenses. It is reasonable to assume that the growth in the number of police
officers contributed to the very large increase in the percentage of released
prisoners rearrested for a drug related offense between 1983 and 1994

7.5: Changing Police Procedures
In addition to the increase in the number of law enforcement officers on
the street, another possible reason for the increase in prevalence of rearrest has to
do with changes in police procedures which occurred between 1983 and 1994.
These changes involved a shift away from a reactive response to a proactive one.
One such change involved increased use of what is commonly referred to
as community policing. According to a United States Department of Justice
(2009b) report, “Community policing is a philosophy that

promotes

organizational strategies, which support the systematic use of partnerships and
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problem-solving techniques, to proactively address the immediate conditions that
give rise to public safety issues such as crime, social disorder, and fear of crime”
(p. 3). Even though community policing techniques probably did not become
widespread until the passage of VCCA in 1994, Eck and Maguire (2006) report
that the implementation of this form of policing began in the early 1980s.
A second change in policing involved a combination of aggressive
policing strategies known as “order maintenance” or “zero-tolerance” policing.
This strategy was widely influenced by the work of Wilson and Kelling (1982)
which described the “Broken Windows” thesis. Under this thesis, community
level disorder and crime are closely related because disorder (“broken windows”)
is a signal to the community that nobody cares. Under this strategy, the police
attempt to control crime through strict enforcement of minor, public order
offenses (Eck and Maguire, 2006). The most well known example of “zerotolerance” policing was that implemented by former Police Commissioner
William Bratton in New York City in 1993.
Regardless of whether community policing or zero-tolerance policing has
any effect on crime rates, both could be expected to result in an increase in arrests
for drug offenses and public order offenses. With community policing, this is
because the police are on the street and are more likely to observe first hand what
some people refer to as “victimless crimes” (such as public drunkenness,
prostitution and drug sales), which would be unlikely to be reported to police if
they utilized a reactive approach. With zero-tolerance policing, this is because the
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police are instructed to not be tolerant of minor offenses, which would have been
overlooked in the past.
Some evidence in support of this hypothesis comes from looking at the
change in the percentage of prisoners, by offense type, released from the 11 states
for 1983 compared to 1994. While there was an increase from 1983 to 1994 in the
numbers for all types of offenders released from prison, the percent increase was
not uniform. Instead the percent increase was much greater for drug offenders and
public-order offenders than for violent offenders and property offenders.
Specifically, although the release of violent offenders increased by 51 percent and
property offenders by 67 percent, the increase for public order offenders was 256
percent and the increase for drug offenders was 752 percent. The dramatic
increase in the percentage of offenders who were released after serving time for
drug related offenses could be explained by the national campaign against drug
offenses that ensued in the mid 1980s. Similarly the large increase of offenders
released from prison for public order offenses compared to violent and property
offenses can be explained by changes to more proactive policing strategies. This
change in strategy could also explain why prevalence of rearrest went up for the
1994 cohort. Since police took a more proactive approach in the 1990s than they
did in the 1980s, arrests for public order and drug offenses would increase even if
actual rates of offending did not.
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7.6: Discussion
Although this chapter is limited in scope, the findings presented indicate
that changes in the composite individual level characteristics of offenders released
from prison in 11 states in 1983 and 1994 do not explain changes in rearrest rates
over time. This finding stands in contrast to this dissertation’s analyses regarding
variation in rearrest rates across space for the 1994 cohort. The findings from
those analyses revealed that changes in individual level characteristics help to
explain variation in rearrest rates across states.
While multivariate analyses were not conducted to test these hypotheses,
three possible explanations were given of why rearrest rates may have gone up in
1994, despite a predicted probability model anticipating that they would go down.
The first of these was that the increase in rearrest rates was due to the increased
emphasis placed on arresting drug offenders which occurred in the late 1980s and
early 1990s. The second of these was that the increase in rearrest rates was due to
the increase in the average number of police officers per capita which were
employed across the United States. The third of these was that changes in police
procedures, more specifically a shift away from a reactive response to a proactive
one, were responsible for the increases in rearrest rates. While a multivariate test
of each of these explanations is beyond the scope of this dissertation, future
research should investigate the extent to which each helps to account for the
increase in rearrests of released prisoners between the mid-1980s and mid-1990s.
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CHAPTER 8 – CONTRIBUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS: POLICY
IMPLICATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

8.1: Introduction
The results of the analyses presented in this study help provide a more
detailed understanding of the individual and contextual factors related to specific
forms of recidivism across both space and time. The major findings are reviewed
below.
The study examined eight separate forms of recidivism across space and
ran two sets of analyses to test whether variations in nine separate individual level
characteristics could help explain variation between states in recidivism rates,
using offenders from the Prisoners Released in 1994 dataset as the source. These
eight types of recidivism are: 1) rearrest for a new offense, 2) rearrest for a new
violent offense, 3) rearrest for a new property offense, 3) rearrest for a new drug
offense, 5) rearrest for a new public order offense, 6) reconviction, 7)
reimprisonment, and 8) parole violations.
Estimating separate models for each form of recidivism, one which
involved an omitted state model and the second which involved a state-by-state
comparison model, revealed that the variations in the individual level
characteristics explain some of the between state variation for five of the eight
forms of recidivism. The omitted state model revealed that variations in individual
level characteristics helped explain on average about 35% of the state differences
in rates of rearrest for any offense, 20% of the state differences in rates of rearrest

170
for a new property offense, 34% of the state differences in rates of rearrest for a
new drug offense, 27% of the state differences in rates of rearrest for a new public
order offense and 9% percent of the state differences in reimprisonment
probabilities of reconvicted offenders.
The results for the models involving rearrest for a violent offense,
reconviction for rearrested offenders and parole violations were mixed. In each of
the cases, one of the models revealed that the individual level characteristics
helped to explain variation between states in recidivism rates, while the other
revealed no such effect. For rates of rearrest for a new violent offense, while the
omitted state model revealed that differences in the characteristics of released
prisoners explained on average about 31% of the state differences in rates of
rearrest for a new violent offense, the state-by-state comparison revealed a very
small increase in the number of states with similar violent rearrest rates when the
individual level characteristics were added to the model. For reconvictions of
rearrested offenders and for parole violation, while a state-by-state comparison
revealed a sizeable increase in the number of states with similar reconviction
probabilities and parole violations when individual level characteristics were
added, the omitted state model revealed that differences in the characteristics of
released prisoners explained on average almost none of the variation in state
differences.
Several possible explanations were given that might explain the mixed
findings for three of the forms of recidivism. For rearrest for a violent offense,
one possible explanation is that the omitted state model did not pick up a
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difference because of the similarity in violent rearrest rates across states. A
second explanation pointed out that prior research has shown that factors other
than the nine individual level factors being tested are associated with violent
offending – including childhood behavioral problems, prior aggression,
psychopathy, antisocial personality and deviant sexual arousal – and that it was
quite possible that these other factors had a stronger effect than the nine
investigated in this dissertation. For reconviction probability, evidence was
presented that the nine individual level characteristics might not be useful
predictors of recidivism rates because prior research (Rasmussen et al., 2009;
Blaine et al., 2010) had found that contextual, as opposed to individual level,
factors determined the conviction rate of a given jurisdiction. Evidence was
presented from former studies that political motivation and monetary resources
were two contextual level factors that influenced conviction rates. Evidence was
also presented from the multilevel analysis conducted in Chapter 6 that the
contextual factor of police per 1,000 residents may have had some influence on
conviction probabilities between states. For parole violation differences, evidence
was presented that it was likely that different statewide parole policies had a
greater impact on explaining variations in parole revocation rates than individual
level characteristics.
In addition to using these nine individual level characteristics to see to
what extent they were useful in helping explain various forms of recidivism
across space, two additional sets of analysis were conducted. The first was a
multilevel analysis which looked at whether, with the nine individual level
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characteristics controlled, the state level factors of drug arrests per 100,000
residents, police per 1,000 residents, and the arrest-offense ratio help to explain
between state variation for seven of the eight forms of recidivism previously
described (parole violations were not analyzed due to only having data available
from nine states). While there was no relationship found between the contextual
variables of drug arrests per 100,0006 or arrest-offense ratio and any form of
recidivism, the number of police officers per 1,000 residents was found to be
significantly related (p<.01) to the probability of rearrest for a property offense
and marginally related (p<.10) to the probability of rearrest for a drug offense and
the probability of reconviction for rearrested offenders.
Besides looking at the effect of contextual variables, a separate analysis
was conducted to see if changes in the composition of individual level
characteristics could help explain the increase in rearrest rates which occurred in
11 states comparing offenders released in 1983 with offenders released in 1994.
The analysis revealed that the changes in individual level characteristics do not
explain increases in rearrest rates over time. Using predicted probability models,
it was found that, while rearrest rates had increased by 7.25 percentage points
between 1983 and 1994, had the nine individual level characteristics produced the
anticipated effect based on the predicted probability models, rearrest rates should
have decreased by 3.13 percentage points. Evidence was given for three possible
explanations: 1) America’s War on Drugs, 2) Increased Number of Police
Officers and 3) Changing Police Procedures.
6

Although there was a finding that as drug arrests per 100,000 inmates increased in a state, more
offenders were rearrested for a drug offense, as described in Chapter 6, this finding is
substantively meaningless.
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8.2. The Impact of Individual Level Factors on Different Forms of
Recidivism
While the primary goal of this dissertation was to examine the extent to
which nine individual level factors explain eight forms of recidivism across space
and one form of recidivism over time, a second finding was that some of the
individual level characteristics by themselves help to explain increased risk for
specific forms of recidivism while others do not. This finding has tremendous
importance from both social and correctional policy perspectives. Perhaps the
most important point to take away from this finding is that one size does not fit all
in looking at different types of offenders and different forms of recidivism.
Instead, each individual form of recidivism needs to be evaluated and dealt with
separately.
When we look at offense rearrest and compare significant predictors
across the nature of the rearrest, we see general stability in the characteristics
associated with increased odds of rearrest, regardless of the offense. For rearrest
for a violent offense, property offense, drug offense, and public order offense,
common risk factors include: 1) being male, 2) being younger at age of release, 3)
having more prior arrests, 4) having served less time in prison, 5) having entered
prison on a parole violation, 6) and having been released from prison via
expiration of sentence. Another notable result is evidence of specialization for
every type of offense, with violent offenders being most likely to be rearrested for
a violent offense, property offenders being the most likely type to be rearrested
for a property offense, drug offenders being the most likely type to be rearrested
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for a drug offense, and public order offenders being the most likely type to be
rearrested for a public order offense. This finding provides evidence that
offenders would benefit if correctional officials developed programming designed
specifically for the offense for which an inmate was currently incarcerated. In this
regard, one question policy makers and corrections officials should ask is this:
While there are prison based programs specifically designed for violent offenders
which have been shown to reduce recidivism rates (Dowden and Andrews, 2000)
along with similarly effective programs specifically designed for drug offenders
(Knight, Simpson, and Hiller, 2004; Burdon, Messina, and Prendergast, 2004),
would it not also make sense to design programs specifically for property
offenders, especially given the finding that they have higher overall rates than any
other type of offender?
Although there are many similarities among the offenders who were
rearrested, regardless of the offense they were rearrested for, there were also a
few differences. One notable difference with both treatment and social policy
implications is that those who are first arrested at an earlier age are more likely to
be rearrested for a violent offense (O.R.=0.967, p<.001). Given that violent
offenses are the most serious type of offense, this finding points towards the need
to develop early intervention programming specifically targeting those who begin
engaging in serious criminal behavior at a young age. Prior literature has shown
that children with serious behavioral problems often do not receive appropriate
mental health treatment (Burns, Phillips, Wagner, Barth, Kolko, Campbell, and
Landsverk, 2004). Instead, treatment is not provided, if it is provided at all, until a
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child has reached adolescence (Oliver, 2007). This is unfortunate because by then
the problem is likely much more difficult to treat.
There is also quite a bit of variation in the extent to which individual level
characteristics are risk factors for specific types of recidivism. These variations
should lead to questions about how police, prosecutors, judges and probation and
parole officials handle offenders with specific characteristics. For example, why is
that males are more likely than females to be rearrested for a new offense and to
be reimprisoned if reconvicted, but not more likely to have their parole revoked?
Alternatively, why does serving a longer amount of time in prison significantly
decrease the odds of rearrest and the probability of reconviction for rearrested
offenders, but significantly increase the odds of parole revocation and the
probability of reimprisonment for reconvicted offenders? These questions, and
others like them, cannot be answered with data available from the datasets used
for this dissertation, but they are nevertheless questions which future research
should address.

8.3: Policy Implications
The findings from this dissertation provide evidence for four specific
policy recommendations. The first is that to effectively lower recidivism rates,
treatment services need to be based on offender need and risk level. The second is
that certain contextual factors affect recidivism rates above and beyond individual
level characteristics and these contextual factors need to be taken into account in
deciding how to respond to crime. The third is that discretionary parole should be
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brought back in states that have abandoned it. The fourth is that states should
consider offering offense-specific treatment programs to those offenders who
have a criminal record associated with offense specialization.

8.3.1: Treatment Services Need to Be Based on Offender Need and Risk Level
The findings from this dissertation that differences between states in
individual level characteristics can explain between 20 and 30 percent of the
variation in rearrest rates for both overall arrests and arrests for specific types of
offenses make it very clear that lawmakers and policymakers must be attentive to
the specific risk factors that inmates in their jurisdictions face in deciding what
programs to develop and how to appropriately implement them. In many states,
inmates who get treatment end up involved in a relatively ineffective form of
treatment in the form of a short-term program, designed not because studies have
shown it was most effective, but instead because it is all the Department of
Corrections can afford to offer (Harrison, 2001; Petersilia, 2001). Other states use
a poorly designed, one-size-fits-all approach, which may be appropriate for some
inmates but not others (Matthews, Hubbard, and Latessa, 2001; Latessa, Cullen,
and Gendreau, 2002). While well-intentioned, such approaches can actually be
detrimental to some offenders as research has found that placing low risk
offenders in an inappropriate treatment setting, designed for moderate and high
risk offenders, can actually increase their risk of reoffending (Lowenkamp and
Latessa, 2005). Still other inmates find themselves receiving no treatment at all
(Mumola, 1999; Harrison, 2001; Matthews et al., 2001; Burdon et al., 2004).
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Several studies (Andrews, Bonta, and Hoge, 1990; Andrews and Dowden,
1999; Lowenkamp, Latessa, and Holsinger, 2006) have found that offenders
receive the most benefit if the level of services they receive is congruent with
their level of risk. Lawmakers and corrections officials need to be attentive to the
specific risk factors faced by those in prison if they are to design programs that
effectively reduce recidivism rates. It would be a mistake, for example, to have
Delaware adopt the reentry procedures used in Michigan, because the
backgrounds of offenders from these two states are vastly different. The most
noticeable difference between the two groups of offenders is that offenders
released from Delaware have, on average, over three times as many prior arrests
as those released from Michigan. Therefore, the majority of programming
designed for inmates being released from prison in Delaware should be tailored to
meet the needs of high risk offenders while the majority of programming for
inmates being released from prison in Michigan should be tailored to meet the
needs of low risk offenders (in both states, however, the programming should be
tailored to address the treatment issues associated with specific offense types –
such as sex offender treatment, drug counseling and anger management).
Programming in each respective state should be tailored to reflect the different
levels of risk. Parole and correctional officials in Delaware should design longer,
more intensive reentry programs to meet the needs of their returning high risk
offender population.
The weaker findings related to predicting violent recidivism highlight that
the individual level factors analyzed in this study are most certainly not the only
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risk factors that need to be looked at in determining the programs that need to be
developed to enhance the chance of success. They also highlight that different
types of offenders have different treatment needs and that what is appropriate for
one class of offender may not be appropriate for a separate class of offender.

8.3.2: Certain Contextual Variables Affect Recidivism Rates Above and Beyond
Individual Level Characteristics
The results from Chapters 6 and 7 provide some evidence that certain
changes in policy have an effect on the rates of various forms of recidivism. In
Chapter 6, while the contextual factors of drug arrests per 100,000 and arrestoffense ratio were not found to be related to significant increases or decreases in
the probability of any type of recidivism, evidence was produced that, with the
nine individual level characteristics controlled, the rate of police per 1,000
residents was significantly and positively related to probability of rearrest for a
property offense and positively related, though only at a marginally significant
level, to probability of rearrest for a drug offense. This model further provided
evidence that police per 1,000 residents was positively related, though only at a
marginal level, to reconviction rates. The finding related to reconviction rates
provides additional evidence to that from previous studies (Rasmussen et al.,
2009; Blaine et al., 2010) that differences in conviction rates between
jurisdictions are largely the result of policy-driven contextual factors.
The results from the analysis in chapter 7 are a bit of a surprise in that it
showed that changes in criminal justice policies can lead to an increase in rearrest
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rates even when models based on individual level characteristics indicate that the
rearrest rates should have gone down. While there is certainly the likelihood that
other individual level characteristics besides the nine used in the model had some
influence in recidivism rates, in the case of recidivism over time, changes in law,
policy and practice that occurred between the mid 1980’s and mid 1990’s across
the United States apparently had a stronger influence on rearrest rates than the
individual level characteristics used in the model.
The evidence presented suggested that three contextual changes that
caused rearrest rates to go up between the mid 1980’s and mid 1990’s were
America’s increased emphasis on drug crimes, a larger number of police on the
street, and a change to a more proactive style of policing. This is an important
finding from both a political and an economic perspective because increased
arrest rates also increase the costs for jailing, feeding, and prosecuting more
defendants. Potential extra costs thus need to be taken into account when
implementing new criminal justice policies. While the motive behind such
changes may be to help make cities safer for the residents who live in them,
policy makers need to be sure they also take into consideration potential extra
costs such policy changes may require.

8.3.3: States Should Implement Discretionary Parole
Earlier in the dissertation, Petersilia (2003) was quoted as arguing that
allowing states to maintain the option of discretionary parole could enhance the
likelihood of success after release. Rosenfeld et al.’s (2005) study provided

180
support for this claim by showing that those released via discretionary parole had
markedly lower rearrest rates than those released via mandatory supervised
release or expiration of sentence. The results from this dissertation provide further
support that those released via discretionary parole do better than those released
via mandatory supervised released or expiration of sentence. This study finds that
those released via discretionary parole have lower rearrest rates for violent
offenses, property offenses, drug offenses and public order offenses than those
released via either mandatory supervised release or expiration of sentence.
Additional evidence was produced in Chapter 5 showing that those released via
discretionary parole had significantly lower rates of being sent back to prison for
a parole violation than those released via mandatory supervised release, even
when state of release was controlled (O.R.=1.503, p<.001). This new finding, that
release via discretionary parole is related to significantly lower probability of
parole revocation, provides evidence as to why states that have abolished this
option should seriously consider bringing it back.
One reason why discretionary parole should be brought back is it gives
greater discretion back to corrections officials’ over when to release inmates,
particularly when they have completed programming and no longer represent a
high risk to society. This would help to free up scarce prison space for the most
dangerous offenders. In addition to this, bringing back discretionary parole will
serve as an incentive to many inmates to become involved in prison based
therapeutic programming, education, self-help groups and other activities which
will benefit them when they are released from prison. Numerous published reports
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have found that inmates involved in prison based drug treatment (Knight et al.,
2004; Prendergast, Hall, Wexler, Melnick and Cao, 2004; Burdon et al., 2004),
cognitive-behavioral

treatment

programming

(Lipsey,

Chapman

and

Landenberger, 2001; Pearson, Lipton, Cleland and Yee, 2002) and educational
programming (Wilson, Gallagher and MacKenzie, 2000; Brewster and Sharp,
2002) have lower recidivism rates than those who are not involved in such
programming. Thus, bringing back discretionary parole will increase the chances
that inmates will become involved in prison based programming and this will
likely result in lower recidivism rates.
One specific area that policymakers need to factor in if they switch back to
a system that allows discretionary parole, however, deals with sentence length. In
a Bureau of Justice Statistics Report, Hughes et al. (2001) found that those
released via discretionary parole served on average more time in prison than those
released by mandatory supervised release. This may because the sentence length
given to those in states with parole was longer than those in states without parole,
with the understanding that low risk offenders and offenders who do well in
prison would be released by parole earlier while high risk offenders would not.
Because determinate and indeterminate sentencing schemes do not necessarily
operate under the same principals, some adjustments may have to be made to
sentencing policies in states which switch to an indeterminate sentencing scheme
to ensure the switch doesn’t result in large variations related to the amount of time
most inmates serve as a result of when they were sentenced. While longer
sentences are certainly more appropriate for some inmates, judges and parole
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boards will need to take the new policies into account in sentencing and releasing
offenders.
Another area policymakers will need to take into account if they switch to
discretionary parole deals with how its existence may cause certain groups of
offenders to be unfairly discriminated against. This is particularly true for those
serving time for particularly violent crimes or for crimes of a sexual nature.
Bringing back discretionary parole may cause additional harm to these offenders
if parole boards bow to political pressure and refuse to parole these offenders
because they would look soft on crime if they did, even when, in actuality, the
inmates represent low risks to public safety. Parole statistics from the State of
Missouri (Missouri Department of Corrections, 2010) highlight that violent
offenders convicted of a class A or class B felony and sexual offenders convicted
of any felony served a much longer percentage of their prison sentences than
other types of offenders. While the average amount of time served in 2010 was
48.3 percent of their sentence for the entire 5,287 release cohort, the 612
offenders released for a class A or B violent felony served 68.0 percent of their
sentence, the 226 offenders released for a class C or D sex offense served 69.4
percent of their sentence and the 211 offenders released for a class A or B sex
offense served 72.1 percent of their sentence. Requiring violent and sexual
offenders to serve a noticeably greater portion of their sentence by repeatedly
denying them parole, due to the nature of their crime, can have negative
consequences. Going to parole hearings and being repeatedly denied can cause
additional stress. Repeated denial can also make these offenders less likely to
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become involved in treatment if they come to believe that it doesn’t matter if they
try to better themselves. This is a potential drawback for certain violent and
sexual offenders who might fare better emotionally under a determinate
sentencing scheme. For this reason, if discretionary parole exists in a state, parole
boards need to be very careful in how they deal with these classes of offenders
and need to ensure that their decisions are based on what is in the best interest of
society and the offender’s readiness to be released and not on political
considerations.

Section 8.3.4: States Should Provide Offense Specific Treatment for Certain
Repeat Offenders
One finding from this study with policy implications is that offenders
convicted of one specific type of offense (violent, property, drug or public order)
are more likely than any other type of offender to be rearrested for the same type
of offense in the future. This finding provides evidence of offense specialization
and corrections officials should consider offering offense-specific programming
for offenders with a history of committing the same type of offense on multiple
occasions. Such program would be tailored specifically to the offense and would,
for example, teach property offenders how to find a job and earn a decent living,
violent offenders how to resolve disputes in non-violent manners, and drug
offenders of alternative ways to deal with stress.
Because of budgetary constraints, some of the programming might have to
be limited to chronic offenders who commit repeat property, drug or public order
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offenses (i.e., requiring treatment for those with three or more similar
convictions). However, officials might consider requiring non-violent offenders
who have been convicted of the same offense two or more times in the past to
complete a specialized treatment program as part of their prison sentence. The
same could hold true for violent offenders who have one prior conviction. Due to
prison overcrowding and other prison issues, states probably shouldn’t mandate
that an offender must complete treatment to be paroled, but it would seem quite
feasible for parole boards to give weight to completion of this programming in
making a release decision. Similarly, in states with determinate sentencing
schemes, one possible solution would be to allow offenders who complete such a
treatment program to have their release date moved up by three or more months.

8.4: Study Limitations
There are several limitations to this study that need to be acknowledged.
One limitation that may have influenced the findings is the small number of states
available for use in the multilevel analysis. As stated in Chapter 6, one problem
with having only 15 states to use as level 2 units in the multilevel analysis is that
it may bias estimates of the second-level standard errors. This means that the
results from the multilevel analysis need to be viewed with caution. An additional
limitation is that having so few level two units prevented hierarchal linear models
with multiple level two units from being estimated. This prevented running tests
to see if the level of police per 1,000 continued to have an impact on property
crime rates when additional contextual variables were added to the model. In line
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with this limitation, it would be beneficial for researchers if the Bureau of Justice
Statistics included information on the specific county to which the prisoners were
released in future multi-state data sets of prisoners released during a specific year
as this would provide much greater statistical power and allow much more
detailed multi-level models to be estimated.
A second limitation that may have influenced the findings deals with the
different ways different states handled public order offenses. Although the Bureau
of Justice Statistics was very clear that they were examining the arrest histories of
inmates released from 15 states in 1994, the fact that some states arrested
offenders who committed minor traffic violations, probation violations and
possibly other relatively minor public order offenses while others issued traffic
tickets, sought probation violations without arrest or issued citations in lieu of an
arrest may have had an influence on the findings. The problem inherent in having
one state issue an arrest while a second does not for the same action which is a
violation of law in both states is that there is no way of knowing if or how the
missing data influenced the degree to which states varied in terms of rearrest for
any offense or rearrest for a public order offense.
A third limitation is the limited number of individual level characteristics
available for inclusion in analysis. Part of this problem resulted from certain
variables having to be excluded due to problems with missing data in the Bureau
of Justice Statistics datasets. Although prior research has found that suffering
from a chemical dependency increases an offender’s odds of recidivism (Harer,
1994; Gendreau et al., 1996; Mills, Kroner, and Hemmati, 2003), this individual
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level risk factor could not be included in either the analysis across space or the
analysis over time. Although data on this variable were collected for some of the
offenders in the Prisoners Released in 1994 dataset, the total number of cases
coded as missing was over 70 percent. As a result, the variable could not be used
in the models that explored various forms of recidivism over space. While a
definite benefit involved in this study was the large number of offenders who
were able to be included in the analysis (along with the fact that there were
offenders released from 15 states from the 1994 cohort and from 11 states from
the 1983 cohort), problems with missing data left several possible individual level
characteristics unusable and this potentially limits the usefulness of the findings.
A fourth limitation of this research was that it did not include an analysis
of the effect of either state level parole policies or individual level types of
supervision for offenders. Runda, Rhine, and Wetter (1994, as cited by Peterselia,
1999) report that 90 percent of states use a classification system to assign parolees
to specific levels of supervision. Having information on the level of supervision
an inmate was under once released may help further explain some of the
differences between states for various measures of recidivism. Additionally,
examining the specific parole policies, particularly as they relate to arresting and
prosecuting parolees who commit a criminal offense, may further help explain
some of the variation across states for multiple forms of recidivism. These
differences in policies may well explain differences in recidivism beyond just
parole revocations if some states use technical violations in lieu of arrest for all
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but serious criminal offenses while others have a policy to rearrest any offender
who has committed a new crime.
A fifth limitation of this study was that it failed to take into account
individual level state’s prison capacity / prison overcrowding as a contextual
variable. Marvell (1995) reported that several states specifically included prison
capacity as a factor to take into consideration in setting up sentencing guidelines.
It is likewise reasonable to speculate that parole officials’, police officers’,
prosecutors’ and judges’ decisions all may be influenced by the capacity of
prisons to take in new inmates. This would be an especially important issue if a
state were under a court order to reduce its prison population. In such states,
officials may be less likely to revoke, rearrest, prosecute or imprison due to the
fact that sending an offender back to prison would require the department of
corrections to release someone else. Thus, the inclusion of this variable may
further help explain differences in recidivism rates across states.

8.5. Suggestions for Future Research
While the findings from this study provide valuable information that
differences in individual level characteristics do help explain variation between
states in overall rearrest rates, rearrest rates for property offense, rearrest rates for
drug offenses, rearrest rates for public order offenses and reimprisonment
proportions for reconvicted offenders, there remain several avenues for future
research. One avenue would be to replicate the analyses regarding variation over
space for rearrests, rearrests for specific offenses, reconvictions and
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reconfinements using the Prisoners Released in 1983 dataset. Such a study
replication using a large, multi-state sample of prisoners released during a
different period of time would be useful in determining the robustness of the
findings from this study. Such a replication would also be useful in specifically
evaluating the policy recommendations made in this study.
Another avenue for future research would involve exploring the specific
parole policies in place in California, Florida, Illinois, Michigan, Minnesota, New
York, North Carolina, Oregon and Texas that led to the revocation rates that
occurred for offenders released from each of the respective states. Travis (2005)
reported that parole violators accounted for over one third of those admitted to
prison in 1999. This staggering rate ends up costing states billions of dollars each
year. Therefore, using the Prisoners Released in 1994 dataset along with
information on specific parole policies that were in place would offer possible
solutions to develop statewide parole policies that are able to be cost effective
without compromising public safety.
A final avenue for future research would involve looking at the effect
additional contextual variables have on recidivism rates when individual level
characteristics are controlled. Such an avenue would be especially worthwhile if
future multi-state datasets provide information that result in a larger number of
level 2 units to be used. As mentioned, one possible solution to this would be to
include county of release as a variable in future data
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APPENDIX A
MATCHING PROCEDURES FOR THE MERGED DATA FILE

Appendix A describes how the arrest recidivism outcome measure and the
nine measures of the individual-level recidivism risk factors investigated in the
dissertation were generated from the Prisoners Released in 1994 dataset and the
Prisoners Released in 1983 dataset.

How Rearrest Was Measured
The variable REARRD was used as the rearrest measure for the Prisoners
Released in 1994 dataset. The REARREST variable was further created using the
following variables from the Prisoners Released in 1983 dataset. Variables v1049
(month of actual prison release date), v1050 (day of actual prison release date),
and v1051 (year of actual prison date) give information related to the exact date of
release from prison. Variables v2010 (month of arrest), v2011 (day of arrest) and
v2012 (year of arrest) provide the exact date of arrest for offenses that are "cycle
based," and variables v5012 (month of event), v5013 (day of event) and v5014
(year of event) give the exact date of arrest for offenses that are "event based".
For each offender, separate cases exist for each arrest. To determine if an inmate
who has been released from prison in 1983 should be designated as
REARRESTED, all the inmate's arrests were examined. If an arrest was recorded
as having occurred within three years of the release date, the inmate was
designated as having been rearrested.
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How Individual-Level Recidivism Risk Factors Were Be Measured
1) Gender – Offender gender was generated from variable SEX in the
Prisoners Released in 1994 dataset and from v1018 in the Prisoners Released in
1983 dataset.
2) Age at Release – Offender age at release was generated from variable
RELAGE in the Prisoners Released in 1994 dataset and from a newly created
variable from the Prisoners Released in 1983 dataset. The new variable
determines age at release by subtracting an offender’s date of birth (v1015 –
month of birth; v1016 – day of birth; v1017 – year of birth) from the date of the
offender’s release (v1049 – month of actual release; v1050 – day of actual
release; v1051 – year of actual release).
3) Race – Race was divided into four separate categories: White, Black,
Other and Unknown. The categorical variables were generated from variable
RACE4 in the Prisoners Released in 1994 dataset and v1019 in the Prisoners
Released in 1983 dataset.
4) Age at First Arrest – The age at first arrest was calculated for the
Prisoners Released in 1994 dataset by subtracting the offender’s date of birth
(MONTHOB1 – month of birth; DAYOB1 – day of birth; YEAROB1 – year of
birth) from the date of first arrest (A001MO – month of first arrest; A001DA –
day of first arrest; A001YR – year of first arrest). Age at first arrest was generated
from the Prisoners Released in 1983 dataset by subtracting an offender’s date of
birth from the offender’s date of first arrest (calculated from v2010 – month of
arrest, v2011 – day of arrest and v2012 – year of arrest, if the first arrest was a
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"cycle based" arrest, or from v5012 – month of arrest; v5013 – day of arrest and
v5014 – year of arrest, if the first arrest was an "event based" arrest).
5) Number of Prior Arrests – The number of prior arrests was generated
from variable PRIR in the Prisoners Released in 1994 dataset and was calculated
for the Prisoners Released in 1983 dataset based on the number of arrest cycles
the inmate had gone through prior to their current release from prison (not
including the arrest which led to the current imprisonment).
6) Current Offense Type – The current offense type was generated from
variable SMPOFF5 in the Prisoners Released in 1994 dataset (Violent; Property;
Drugs; Public Order; Other or Unknown). It was calculated based on the NCRP
(National Corrections Reporting Program) code for the most serious offense
gathered from variables v1030, v1033 and v1036 of the Prisoners Released in
1983 dataset.
7) Time Served – For the purpose of this dissertation, time served refers
to the amount of time served on the current incarceration based on the date the
offender was admitted to prison and the date the offender was released from
prison. For the Prisoners Released in 1994 dataset, the date of admission to
prison came from MONTHAD (Month of Admission), DAYAD (Day of
Admission) and YEARAD (Year of Admission) and the date of release from
prison came from MONTHRLS (Month of Release), DAYRLS (Day of Release)
and YEARRLS (Year of Release). For the Prisoners Released in 1983 dataset,
the date of admission to prison came from v1022 (Month of Admission), v1023
(Day of Admission) and v1024 (Year of Admission) and the date of release from
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prison came from v1049, v1050 and v1051.
8) Type of Admission – The type of admission was calculated based on
the variable ADTYP in the Prisoners Released in 1994 dataset and from v1025 in
the Prisoners Released in 1983 dataset.
9) Type of Release – The type of release was calculated based on the
variable RELTYP in the Prisoners Released in 1994 dataset and from v1053 in
the Prisoners Released in 1983 dataset.
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APPENDIX B

Regression Coefficients for
State-by-State Comparisons
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CA
FL
IL
MI
MN
NJ
NY
NC
OH
OR
TX
AZ
DE
MD
VI

CA
-------0.441
-0.363
1.140
0.490
0.387
0.134
0.442
0.594
-0.091
0.570
0.369
-0.966
-0.007
0.317

FL
------0.078
1.581
0.930
0.828
0.574
0.882
1.034
0.350
1.011
0.809
-0.525
0.433
0.758

IL

------1.503
0.853
0.750
0.497
0.805
0.957
0.272
0.933
0.732
-0.602
0.356
0.681

Table A1: Regression Coefficients for State-by-State Comparison of Rearrest Rates
MI
MN
NJ
NY
NC
OH
OR
TX
AZ

-------0.651
-------0.753
-0.103
-------1.007
-0.356
-0.253
-------0.699
-0.048
0.055
0.308
-------0.547
0.104
0.207
0.460
0.152
-------1.231
-0.581
-0.478
-0.225
-0.533
-0.685
-------0.570
0.081
0.183
0.437
0.129
-0.023
0.661
-------0.772
-0.121
-0.018
0.235
-0.073
-0.225
0.460
-0.201
-2.106
-1.455
-1.353
-1.099
-1.407
-1.559
-0.875
-1.536
-1.148
-0.497
-0.394
-0.141
-0.449
-0.601
0.084
-0.578
-0.823
-0.172
-0.070
0.184
-0.124
-0.276
0.409
-0.253
States with Similar (p>.05) Probabilities are Bolded, Underlined and in Blue

-------1.334
-0.376
-0.051

DE

------0.958
1.283

MD

------0.325

VI

-------
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CA
FL
IL
MI
MN
NJ
NY
NC
OH
OR
TX
AZ
DE
MD
VI

Table A2: Regression Coefficients for State-by-State Comparison of Rearrest Rates with Individual Level Characteristics added to Model
CA
FL
IL
MI
MN
NJ
NY
NC
OH
OR
TX
AZ
DE
MD
-------0.610
-------0.216
-0.332
------0.736
1.305
0.992
-------0.056
1.031
0.105
-0.673
------0.357
0.923
1.258
-0.492
0.494
-------0.288
-0.140
0.050
-0.679
-0.300
-0.260
------0.437
0.566
0.563
-0.656
0.264
-0.147
0.011
------0.036
0.903
0.762
-0.520
0.162
-0.258
0.173
0.059
-------0.345
0.782
-0.161
-0.803
-0.194
-0.496
-0.213
-0.364
-0.423
------0.179
1.036
0.273
-0.467
-0.018
0.049
0.216
0.073
0.012
0.510
------0.109
0.403
0.291
-0.572
-0.494
-0.222
0.131
0.040
-0.361
-0.034
-0.404
-------1.105
-0.318
1.628
-1.582
-1.229
-1.779
0.122
-0.923
-1.206
-1.188
-1.413
-0.891
-------0.358
0.492
0.051
-0.836
-0.218
-0.449
-0.293
-0.191
-0.303
0.018
-0.370
0.021
0.820
-------0.141
0.374
0.058
-0.491
-0.044
0.019
0.189
-0.058
0.163
0.365
-0.048
0.240
0.589
0.202
States with Similar (p>.05) Probabilities are Bolded, Underlined and in Blue

VI

-------

209

CA
FL
IL
MI
MN
NJ
NY
OH
OR
TX
AZ
DE
VI

CA
-------0.242
-0.607
0.643
-0.062
0.107
-0.127
0.063
-0.114
0.536
-0.036
-0.670
-0.106

FL

Table B1: Regression Coefficients for State-by-State Comparison of Violent Rearrest Rates
IL
MI
MN
NJ
NY
OH
OR
TX
AZ

-------0.365
0.885
0.180
0.349
0.115
0.305
0.128
0.778
0.206
-0.428
0.136

------1.251
------0.545
-0.705
------0.714
-0.536
0.169
------0.480
-0.770
-0.065
-0.234
------0.670
-0.580
0.125
-0.044
0.190
------0.494
-0.757
-0.051
-0.221
0.013
-0.176
------1.143
-0.107
0.598
0.429
0.663
0.473
0.650
------0.571
-0.680
0.026
-0.144
0.091
-0.099
0.077
-0.573
-0.063
-1.313
-0.608
-0.777
-0.543
-0.733
-0.556
-1.206
0.501
-0.749
-0.044
-0.213
0.021
-0.169
0.007
-0.642
States with Similar (p>.05) Probabilities are Bolded, Underlined and in Blue

-------0.633
-0.070

DE

VI

------0.564

-------

Table B2: Regression Coefficients for State-by-State Comparison of Violent Rearrest Rates with Individual Level Characteristics added to Model
CA
FL
IL
MI
MN
NJ
NY
OH
OR
TX
AZ
DE
VI
CA
------FL
-0.257
------IL
-0.301
-1.363
------MI
0.609
0.711
0.847
------MN
-0.218
0.237
0.307
-0.723
------NJ
0.329
0.784
1.505
-0.364
1.139
------NY
-0.492
0.091
0.003
-0.581
-0.371
-0.229
------OH
0.479
0.032
0.993
0.006
-0.473
-0.287
0.256
------OR
-0.361
-0.011
0.473
-0.649
0.022
-0.251
-0.114
-0.352
------TX
0.250
0.098
0.612
0.154
0.267
0.347
0.692
0.158
0.371
------AZ
1.773
-0.391
0.923
-0.861
-0.825
-0.738
-0.279
-0.670
-0.354
-0.637
------DE
-0.417
-0.136
2.107
-0.853
-0.530
-1.413
-0.252
-0.077
-0.264
-0.152
0.583
------VI
-0.278
-0.269
0.049
-0.560
-0.124
-0.152
0.122
-0.306
-0.012
-0.486
0.426
0.268
------States with Similar (p>.05) Probabilities are Bolded, Underlined and in Blue
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CA
FL
IL
MI
MN
NJ
NY
OH
OR
TX
AZ
DE
VI

CA
------0.034
-0.540
0.717
-0.001
0.165
-0.186
0.138
-0.168
0.602
0.077
-0.228
0.190

FL

Table C1: Regression Coefficients for State-by-State Comparison of Property Rearrest Rates
IL
MI
MN
NJ
NY
OH
OR
TX
AZ

-------0.574
0.683
-0.034
0.131
-0.220
0.105
-0.201
0.569
0.044
-0.262
0.156

------1.257
------0.540
-0.717
------0.705
-0.552
0.166
------0.354
-0.903
-0.185
-0.351
------0.679
-0.578
0.139
-0.027
0.324
------0.373
-0.884
-0.167
-0.333
0.018
-0.306
------1.143
-0.114
0.603
0.437
0.788
0.464
0.770
------0.618
-0.639
0.078
-0.088
0.263
-0.061
0.245
-0.525
0.312
-0.945
-0.228
-0.393
-0.042
-0.367
-0.061
-0.831
0.730
-0.527
0.191
0.025
0.376
0.052
0.358
-0.412
States with Similar (p>.05) Probabilities are Bolded, Underlined and in Blue

-------0.306
0.113

DE

VI

------0.418

-------

Table C2: Regression Coefficients for State-by-State Comparison of Property Rearrest Rates with Individual Level Characteristics added to Model
CA
FL
IL
MI
MN
NJ
NY
OH
OR
TX
AZ
DE
VI
CA
------FL
-0.062
------IL
-0.533
-1.274
------MI
0.364
0.350
0.792
------MN
-0.402
-0.254
0.005
-0.707
------NJ
-0.090
-0.223
0.692
-0.525
-0.045
------NY
-0.679
-0.864
-0.144
-0.866
-0.301
-0.337
------OH
-0.321
-0.292
0.451
-0.444
-0.263
-0.091
0.392
------OR
-0.045
-0.084
0.486
-0.496
0.326
0.118
0.133
0.220
------TX
0.310
0.042
0.611
-0.037
0.514
0.479
0.847
0.368
0.464
------AZ
-0.488
-0.179
-0.036
-0.326
-0.267
0.060
0.284
0.116
-0.155
-0.548
------DE
-0.410
0.057
0.930
-0.389
0.119
0.018
0.490
0.549
0.021
-0.011
0.222
------VI
-0.190
-0.697
0.286
-0.065
0.332
0.367
0.691
0.454
0.198
-0.192
0.335
0.047
------States with Similar (p>.05) Probabilities are Bolded, Underlined and in Blue
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CA
FL
IL
MI
MN
NJ
NY
OH
OR
TX
AZ
DE
VI

CA
------0.363
0.219
1.899
1.645
0.034
-0.026
0.955
0.300
1.067
0.862
0.846
0.917

FL

Table D1: Regression Coefficients for State-by-State Comparison of Drug Rearrest Rates
IL
MI
MN
NJ
NY
OH
OR
TX
AZ

-------0.145
1.536
1.282
-0.330
-0.390
0.591
-0.063
0.704
0.499
0.483
0.553

------1.680
------1.426
-0.254
-------0.185
-1.866
-1.612
-------0.245
-1.926
-1.672
-0.060
------0.736
-0.945
-0.691
0.921
0.981
------0.081
-1.599
-1.345
0.267
0.327
-0.654
------0.848
-0.832
-0.578
1.033
1.094
0.112
0.767
------0.643
-1.037
-0.783
0.828
0.889
-0.093
0.562
-0.205
0.627
-1.053
-0.799
0.813
0.873
-0.109
0.546
-0.221
0.698
-0.983
-0.729
0.883
0.943
-0.038
0.616
-0.150
States with Similar (p>.05) Probabilities are Bolded, Underlined and in Blue

-------0.016
0.055

DE

------0.071

VI

-------

Table D2: Regression Coefficients for State-by-State Comparison of Drug Rearrest Rates with Individual Level Characteristics added to Model
CA
FL
IL
MI
MN
NJ
NY
OH
OR
TX
AZ
DE
VI
CA
------FL
0.281
------IL
0.192
0.141
------MI
1.251
1.297
1.183
------MN
1.121
0.540
0.683
-0.385
------NJ
-0.088
0.163
-0.894
-1.428
-0.977
------NY
-0.278
-0.867
-0.420
-1.541
-1.225
-0.058
------OH
0.201
0.520
-0.316
-0.917
-0.279
0.343
0.737
------OR
0.164
-0.416
-0.538
-1.359
-1.034
0.150
-0.006
-0.593
------TX
0.828
0.437
0.260
-0.918
-0.384
0.710
0.721
-0.029
1.052
------AZ
0.811
0.054
-1.039
-0.772
-0.823
0.548
0.753
-0.310
0.192
-0.424
------DE
0.728
0.943
-0.205
-0.169
-0.054
0.801
1.583
0.455
0.821
0.067
0.508
------VI
0.461
-0.567
0.152
-0.655
-0.514
0.780
0.831
0.337
0.881
0.102
0.274
-1.131
------States with Similar (p>.05) Probabilities are Bolded, Underlined and in Blue
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CA
FL
IL
MI
MN
NJ
NY
OH
OR
TX
AZ
DE
VI

CA
-------1.182
-0.605
0.898
-0.081
0.140
-0.107
0.564
-0.922
0.159
-0.814
-2.284
-0.375

Table E1: Regression Coefficients for State-by-State Comparison of Public Order Rearrest Rates
FL
IL
MI
MN
NJ
NY
OH
OR
TX
AZ
------0.577
2.080
1.102
1.322
1.075
1.746
0.260
1.341
0.368
-1.102
0.807

------1.503
------0.524
-0.978
------0.745
-0.758
0.220
------0.498
-1.005
-0.026
-0.247
------1.168
-0.334
0.644
0.424
0.670
-------0.317
-1.820
-0.841
-1.062
-0.815
-1.486
------0.764
-0.739
0.240
0.019
0.266
-0.405
1.081
-------0.209
-1.712
-0.733
-0.954
-0.707
-1.378
0.108
-0.973
-1.679
-3.182
-2.203
-2.424
-2.177
-2.847
-1.362
-2.443
0.230
-1.273
-0.295
-0.515
-0.268
-0.939
0.547
-0.534
States with Similar (p>.05) Probabilities are Bolded, Underlined and in Blue

-------1.470
0.439

DE

------1.909

VI

-------

Table E2: Regression Coefficients for State-by-State Comparison of Public Order Rearrest Rates with Individual Level Characteristics added to
Model
CA
FL
IL
MI
MN
NJ
NY
OH
OR
TX
AZ
DE
VI
CA
------FL
-1.295
------IL
-0.558
0.428
------MI
0.621
1.822
1.142
------MN
-0.356
1.075
0.186
-0.832
------NJ
0.095
1.423
0.684
-0.634
1.044
------NY
-0.605
0.767
-0.027
-0.787
-0.310
-0.195
------OH
0.303
1.530
0.938
-0.193
0.350
0.198
0.586
------OR
-0.980
0.390
-0.485
-1.079
-0.468
-1.030
-0.800
-1.016
------TX
-0.339
0.903
0.138
-0.425
-0.057
-0.006
0.223
-0.387
0.595
------AZ
-0.032
0.096
-0.301
-1.336
-0.873
-1.046
-0.702
-1.273
-0.303
-0.849
------DE
-2.353
-0.981
-0.915
-2.918
-2.284
-3.052
-1.504
-2.540
-1.655
-2.106
-1.196
------VI
-0.884
0.534
-0.363
-0.884
-0.427
-0.413
-0.237
-0.508
0.303
-0.453
0.564
1.427
------States with Similar (p>.05) Probabilities are Bolded, Underlined and in Blue
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CA
FL
IL
MI
MN
NJ
NY
NC
OR
TX
AZ
DE
MD
VI

CA
------0.558
0.438
-0.206
-0.038
0.067
-0.918
-0.400
-0.588
0.582
0.461
-0.888
-0.160
0.086

Table F1: Regression Coefficients for State-by-State Comparison of Reconviction Probabilities for Rearrested Offenders
FL
IL
MI
MN
NJ
NY
NC
OR
TX
AZ
DE
MD
-------0.121
-0.764
-0.596
-0.492
-1.476
-0.959
-1.146
0.023
-0.097
-1.446
-0.719
-0.472

-------0.643
-0.476
-0.371
-1.355
-0.838
-1.025
0.144
0.023
-1.325
-0.598
-0.351

------0.167
------0.272
0.105
-------0.712
-0.880
-0.985
-------0.195
-0.362
-0.467
0.517
-------0.382
-0.550
-0.654
0.330
-0.187
------0.787
0.620
0.515
1.499
0.982
1.169
------0.666
0.499
0.394
1.379
0.861
1.049
-0.121
-------0.682
-0.850
-0.954
0.030
-0.487
-0.300
-1.469
-1.349
0.045
-0.122
-0.227
0.757
0.240
0.427
-0.742
-0.621
0.292
0.124
0.019
1.004
0.487
0.674
-0.495
-0.375
States with Similar (p>.05) Probabilities are Bolded, Underlined and in Blue

------0.727
0.974

------0.247

VI

-------

Table F2: Regression Coefficients for State-by-State Comparison of Reconviction Probabilities for Rearrested Offenders with Individual Level
Characteristics added to Model
CA
FL
IL
MI
MN
NJ
NY
NC
OR
TX
AZ
DE
MD
VI
CA
------FL
0.369
------IL
0.315
-0.308
------MI
-0.769
-1.013
-0.972
------MN
-0.529
-0.719
-0.807
0.324
------NJ
-0.098
-0.376
-0.439
0.469
0.864
------NY
-1.262
-2.028
-1.452
-0.406
-0.649
-1.032
------NC
-0.476
-2.030
-0.943
-0.049
-0.229
-0.647
0.280
------OR
-0.602
-1.416
-1.001
-0.068
-0.111
-0.987
0.300
0.092
------TX
0.503
0.210
0.007
0.680
0.764
0.367
1.354
1.025
1.575
------AZ
1.648
-0.429
-0.368
1.126
0.165
0.228
1.444
1.233
0.777
-0.312
------DE
-1.333
-1.484
-2.163
-0.630
-1.418
-2.111
-0.191
-0.115
-0.514
-2.346
-0.888
------MD
-0.732
-0.859
-0.834
0.459
0.085
-0.081
0.804
0.225
0.512
-0.566
-0.412
0.895
------VI
-0.371
-1.389
-0.658
0.484
0.257
0.126
1.168
0.528
0.649
-0.422
-0.430
1.667
0.100
------States with Similar (p>.05) Probabilities are Bolded, Underlined and in Blue
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CA
FL
IL
MI
MN
NJ
NY
NC
OR
TX
AZ
DE
MD

Table G1: Regression Coefficients for State-by-State Comparison of Reimprisonment Probabilities for Reconvicted Offenders
CA
FL
IL
MI
MN
NJ
NY
NC
OR
TX
AZ
DE
------0.237
-------0.635
-0.872
------0.508
0.270
1.143
-------0.253
-0.490
0.382
-0.761
-------0.242
-0.479
0.393
-0.750
0.011
------0.378
0.141
1.013
-0.130
0.631
0.620
-------0.739
-0.976
-0.104
-1.247
-0.486
-0.497
-1.117
------0.848
0.611
1.483
0.341
1.101
1.090
0.470
1.587
------0.315
0.078
0.950
-0.192
0.568
0.557
-0.063
1.054
-0.533
------0.365
0.127
1.000
-0.143
0.618
0.607
-0.013
1.104
-0.484
0.049
------1.580
1.343
2.215
1.073
1.833
1.822
1.202
2.319
0.732
1.265
1.216
-------0.111
-0.348
0.524
-0.619
0.142
0.131
-0.489
0.628
-0.959
-0.426
-0.476
-1.691
States with Similar (p>.05) Probabilities are Bolded, Underlined and in Blue

MD

-------

Table G2: Regression Coefficients for State-by-State Comparison of Reimprisonment Probabilities for Reconvicted Offenders with Individual
Level Characteristics added to Model
CA
FL
IL
MI
MN
NJ
NY
NC
OR
TX
AZ
DE
MD
CA
------FL
0.293
------IL
-0.556
-1.298
------MI
0.610
0.497
1.235
------MN
-0.456
-0.026
-0.172
-1.126
------NJ
-0.257
-0.392
0.671
-0.925
-1.879
------NY
0.453
0.043
1.002
-0.254
0.911
0.585
------NC
-0.936
-0.815
-0.355
-1.453
-0.600
-0.459
-1.131
------OR
0.957
0.570
1.202
-0.156
1.250
0.971
0.261
1.918
------TX
0.695
0.460
1.118
-0.706
0.894
0.447
-0.271
1.315
-0.424
------AZ
0.701
0.025
1.095
-0.640
-0.066
0.516
-0.067
1.110
-0.579
-0.379
------DE
1.500
1.508
2.622
0.964
1.409
3.440
1.839
2.887
0.726
0.878
1.527
------MD
-0.166
-0.481
0.357
-0.657
0.233
0.158
-0.579
0.832
-0.992
-0.310
-0.103
-2.141
------States with Similar (p>.05) Probabilities are Bolded, Underlined and in Blue
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Table H1: Regression Coefficients for State-by-State Comparison of Rates of Technical Violations of
Parole Resulting in Reimprisonment and Arrests for Parole Violations
CA
FL
IL
MI
MN
NY
NC
OH
TX
CA
------FL
0.418
------IL
2.028
1.610
------MI
.0961
-0.543
1.067
------MN
1.571
1.153
-0.457
0.610
------NY
0.391
-0.027
-1.637
-0.570
-1.180
------NC
1.289
0.872
-0.738
0.328
-0.282
0.899
------OH
-0.157
-0.575
-2.185
-1.118
-1.728
-0.548
-1.446
------TX
1.687
1.269
-0.341
0.726
0.116
1.296
0.397
1.844
------States with Similar (p>.05) Probabilities are Bolded, Underlined and in Blue
Table H2: Regression Coefficients for State-by-State Comparison of Rates of Technical Violations of
Parole Resulting in Reimprisonment and Arrests for Parole Violations with Individual Level
Characteristics added to Model
CA
FL
IL
MI
MN
NY
NC
OH
TX
CA
------FL
-0.440
------IL
2.012
2.659
------MI
0.870
0.275
1.215
------MN
1.669
1.252
-0.285
-1.179
------NY
0.470
-3.648
-1.626
-0.524
-1.032
------NC
1.134
-0.149
-0.801
0.793
-0.018
0.791
------OH
-0.186
-0.074
-2.137
-0.837
-1.649
-0.820
-2.069
------TX
1.359
0.792
-0.628
0.640
-0.339
1.179
0.249
1.375
------States with Similar (p>.05) Probabilities are Bolded, Underlined and in Blue
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Table I1: Regression Coefficients for State-by-State Comparison of Rates of Technical Violations of
Parole and Criminal Convictions of Parole Violation Resulting in Reimprisonment
CA
FL
IL
MI
MN
NY
NC
OH
TX
CA
------FL
0.594
------IL
2.247
1.653
------MI
0.962
0.370
0.962
------MN
1.630
1.036
-0.617
0.668
------NY
0.389
-0.205
-1.858
-0.573
-1.241
------NC
1.320
0.726
-0.927
0.358
-0.310
0.931
------OH
0.502
-0.092
-1.745
-0.460
-1.128
0.113
-0.818
------TX
1.702
1.108
-0.545
0.740
0.072
1.313
0.382
1.200
------States with Similar (p>.05) Probabilities are Bolded, Underlined and in Blue
Table I2: Regression Coefficients for State-by-State Comparison of Rates of Technical Violations of
Parole and Criminal Convictions of Parole Violation Resulting in Reimprisonment with Individual
Level Characteristics added to Model
CA
FL
IL
MI
MN
NY
NC
OH
TX
CA
------FL
-0.456
------IL
2.233
2.874
------MI
-1.447
0.118
-.0870
------MN
1.754
1.092
-0.404
-1.183
------NY
0.466
-3.866
-1.840
-0.530
-1.117
------NC
1.177
-0.252
-0.956
0.789
-0.002
0.814
------OH
0.518
0.653
-1.594
-0.187
-0.970
-0.117
-1.481
------TX
1.390
0.637
-0.802
0.652
-0.382
1.197
0.251
0.686
------States with Similar (p>.05) Probabilities are Bolded, Underlined and in Blue
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Table 6A - Multilevel Regressions of Rearrests on Individual Level
Characteristics and State Level Drug Arrests per 100,000
Final estimation of fixed effects: (Unit specified model):
Intercept, γ00
Individual-Level
Gender
Age of First Arrest
Age at Release
Prior Arrests
Time Served
Black
Other Race
Property Offense
Drug Offense
Public Order Offense
Other Offense
Parole Revocation
Probation Revocation
Other Admission Type
Unknown Admission Type
Mandatory Supervised Released
Expiration of Sentence
Other Release Type
State-Level
Drug Arrests per 100,000

* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01

b
0.343223

S.E.
0.325956

Exp(b)
1.409483

-0.487658***
0.003511
-0.061786***
0.075855***
-0.002878***
0.509141***
-0.391184***
0.379605***
0.066626*
0.069666
-0.020887
0.413448***
0.185581
-0.152339
-0.344545**
-0.344545**
0.223232***
-0.06385

0.043548
0.002771
0.00217
0.002548
0.000591
0.027707
0.121698
0.036661
0.035808
0.050021
0.096547
0.032869
0.152056
0.147317
0.167951
0.047613
0.069899
0.07392

0.614063
1.003517
0.940084
1.078806
0.997126
1.663861
0.676256
1.461706
1.068896
1.07215
0.97933
1.512022
1.203918
0.858698
0.708543
1.125342
1.250111
1.250111

0.000311

0.000497

1.000311
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Table 6B - Multilevel Regressions of Violent Rearrests on Individual Level
Characteristics and State Level Drug Arrests per 100,000
Final estimation of fixed effects: (Unit specified model):
Intercept, γ00
Individual-Level
Gender
Age of First Arrest
Age at Release
Prior Arrests
Time Served
Black
Other Race
Property Offense
Drug Offense
Public Order Offense
Other Offense
Parole Revocation
Probation Revocation
Other Admission Type
Unknown Admission Type
Mandatory Supervised Released
Expiration of Sentence
Other Release Type
State-Level
Drug Arrests per 100,000

* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01

b
-1.457979***

S.E.
0.278645

Exp(b)
0.232706

-0.792380***
-0.033645***
-0.040651***
0.022899***
-0.002914***
0.561588***
0.244696*
-0.400762***
-0.608528***
-0.334533***
-0.576501***
0.307753***
-0.036893
-0.434499**
-0.036575
0.372755***
0.605104***
0.264119***

0.066837
0.003945
0.002614
0.001974
0.000755
0.031476
0.140161
0.039353
0.040264
0.059785
0.116014
0.035440
0.160378
0.204893
0.267429
0.068844
0.075445
0.083750

0.452766
0.966915
0.960164
1.023163
0.997091
1.753455
1.277234
0.669810
0.544151
0.715672
0.561861
1.360365
0.963779
0.647589
0.964086
1.451728
1.831442
1.302284

0.000146

0.000417

1.000146
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Table 6C - Multilevel Regressions of Property Rearrests on Individual Level
Characteristics and State Level Drug Arrests per 100,000
Final estimation of fixed effects: (Unit specified model):
Intercept, γ00
Individual-Level
Gender
Age of First Arrest
Age at Release
Prior Arrests
Time Served
Black
Other Race
Property Offense
Drug Offense
Public Order Offense
Other Offense
Parole Revocation
Probation Revocation
Other Admission Type
Unknown Admission Type
Mandatory Supervised Released
Expiration of Sentence
Other Release Type
State-Level
Drug Arrests per 100,000

* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01

b
-1.518187***

S.E.
0.305483

Exp(b)
0.219109

-0.197114***
0.005540*
-0.038506***
0.052234***
-0.001858***
0.322055***
-0.280005**
0.800331***
-0.244618***
-0.009107
0.197726**
0.247695***
0.314289**
-0.145988
0.018913
0.226202***
0.370939***
0.120510

0.049690
0.003170
0.002354
0.001979
0.000693
0.028541
0.140781
0.037109
0.038966
0.057061
0.098328
0.032328
0.145601
0.175626
0.225739
0.063975
0.071258
0.078240

0.821097
1.005555
0.962226
1.053622
0.998143
1.379961
0.755780
2.226279
0.783003
0.990935
1.218629
1.281070
1.369285
0.864168
1.019092
1.253829
1.449094
1.128072

0.000812

0.000458

1.000813
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Table 6D - Multilevel Regressions of Drug Rearrests on Individual Level
Characteristics and State Level Drug Arrests per 100,000
Final estimation of fixed effects: (Unit specified model):
Intercept, γ00
Individual-Level
Gender
Age of First Arrest
Age at Release
Prior Arrests
Time Served
Black
Other Race
Property Offense
Drug Offense
Public Order Offense
Other Offense
Parole Revocation
Probation Revocation
Other Admission Type
Unknown Admission Type
Mandatory Supervised Released
Expiration of Sentence
Other Release Type
State-Level
Drug Arrests per 100,000

* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01

b
-2.626172***

S.E.
0.244850

Exp(b)
0.072355

-0.204735***
-0.001566
-0.034835***
0.042163***
-0.002931***
0.411015***
-0.556840***
0.145062***
0.777919***
0.130370**
0.268918***
0.179209***
0.101977
-0.205593
-0.479645*
0.108287*
0.299452***
-0.095989

0.048726
0.003134
0.002337
0.001906
0.000752
0.028616
0.158693
0.039408
0.038038
0.057915
0.096652
0.031886
0.156722
0.200600
0.291257
0.065638
0.073111
0.082103

0.814863
0.998435
0.965765
1.043065
0.997073
1.508349
0.573017
1.156111
2.176936
1.139250
1.308548
1.196271
1.107358
0.814164
0.619003
1.114367
1.349120
0.908474

0.002088***

0.000365

1.002090

222

Table 6E - Multilevel Regressions of Public Order Rearrests on Individual
Level Characteristics and State Level Drug Arrests per 100,000
Final estimation of fixed effects: (Unit specified model):
Intercept, γ00
Individual-Level
Gender
Age of First Arrest
Age at Release
Prior Arrests
Time Served
Black
Other Race
Property Offense
Drug Offense
Public Order Offense
Other Offense
Parole Revocation
Probation Revocation
Other Admission Type
Unknown Admission Type
Mandatory Supervised Released
Expiration of Sentence
Other Release Type
State-Level
Drug Arrests per 100,000

* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01

B
-0.339791

S.E.
0.626145

Exp(b)
0.711919

-0.286883***
-0.006055*
-0.054320***
0.034740***
-0.002406***
0.046413
-0.024376
-0.028356
-0.007035
0.394774***
-0.356521***
0.190726***
0.133172
-0.467820***
-0.076702
0.425357***
0.345620***
0.213642***

0.052268
0.003425
0.002459
0.001901
0.000737
0.029361
0.135019
0.038483
0.038559
0.054880
0.112737
0.033433
0.140377
0.172307
0.244847
0.064839
0.075473
0.080279

0.750600
0.993964
0.947129
1.035351
0.997597
1.047507
0.975919
0.972042
0.992990
1.484049
0.700108
1.210128
1.142446
0.626366
0.926165
1.530136
1.412866
1.238179

-0.001033

0.000942

0.998968
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Table 6F - Multilevel Regressions of Reconviction Probabilities for Rearrested
Offenders on Individual Level Characteristics and State Level Drug Arrests per
100,000
Final estimation of fixed effects: (Unit specified model):
Intercept, γ00
Individual-Level
Gender
Age of First Arrest
Age at Release
Prior Arrests
Time Served
Black
Other Race
Property Offense
Drug Offense
Public Order Offense
Other Offense
Parole Revocation
Probation Revocation
Other Admission Type
Unknown Admission Type
Mandatory Supervised Released
Expiration of Sentence
Other Release Type
State-Level
Drug Arrests per 100,000

* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01

B
0.306590

S.E.
0.564046

Exp(b)
1.358784

-0.055833
-0.000800
-0.011394***
0.016276***
-0.004148***
0.052596
-0.319940*
0.348763***
0.212847***
0.114151*
-0.037316
0.119978***
0.083021
-0.165178
-0.277428
-0.003429
0.309010***
-0.144670

0.062622
0.003872
0.002878
0.002429
0.000863
0.035386
0.170189
0.046478
0.047072
0.066167
0.124824
0.039237
0.192618
0.202570
0.221756
0.067138
0.107038
0.109621

0.945697
0.999200
0.988671
1.016409
0.995861
1.054004
0.726192
1.417313
1.237195
1.120922
0.963372
1.127472
1.086564
0.847742
0.757730
0.996577
1.362076
0.865307

0.000760

0.000841

1.000760
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Table 6G - Multilevel Regressions of Reimprisonment Probabilities for
Reconvicted Offenders on Individual Level Characteristics and State Level
Drug Arrests per 100,000
Final estimation of fixed effects: (Unit specified model):
Intercept, γ00
Individual-Level
Gender
Age of First Arrest
Age at Release
Prior Arrests
Time Served
Black
Other Race
Property Offense
Drug Offense
Public Order Offense
Other Offense
Parole Revocation
Probation Revocation
Other Admission Type
Unknown Admission Type
Mandatory Supervised Released
Expiration of Sentence
Other Release Type
State-Level
Drug Arrests per 100,000

* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01

B
0.230218

S.E.
0.576054

Exp(b)
1.258874

-0.523832***
0.020876***
-0.019826***
0.008637***
0.004851***
0.127696***
-0.702011***
0.250003***
0.126288**
0.017624
-0.141371
0.028530
-0.288199
0.270440
0.117904
-0.078161
-0.188148
-0.179221

0.074418
0.004766
0.003470
0.002631
0.001111
0.041953
0.224580
0.056466
0.057328
0.080922
0.154806
0.045979
0.236519
0.258911
0.267334
0.079387
0.118226
0.136857

0.592247
1.021096
0.980370
1.008674
1.004863
1.136207
0.495588
1.284029
1.134609
1.017780
0.868167
1.028941
0.749612
1.310541
1.125136
0.924815
0.828492
0.835921

-0.000112

0.000845

0.999888
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Table 6H - Multilevel Regressions of Rearrests on Individual Level
Characteristics and Statewide Level of Police Officers per 1,000 Residents
Final estimation of fixed effects: (Unit specified model):
Intercept, γ00
Individual-Level
Gender
Age of First Arrest
Age at Release
Prior Arrests
Time Served
Black
Other Race
Property Offense
Drug Offense
Public Order Offense
Other Offense
Parole Revocation
Probation Revocation
Other Admission Type
Unknown Admission Type
Mandatory Supervised Released
Expiration of Sentence
Other Release Type
State-Level
Police per 1,000 Residents

* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01

b
0.408421

S.E.
0.367580

Exp(b)
1.504441

-0.487645***
0.003535
-0.061797***
0.075869***
-0.002889***
0.508769***
-0.391022***
0.379352***
0.066560*
0.069749
-0.020299
0.413983***
0.185534
-0.152167
-0.345728**
0.120829**
0.221354***
-0.067349

0.043548
0.002771
0.002170
0.002547
0.000591
0.027713
0.121697
0.036657
0.035810
0.050022
0.096544
0.032871
0.152176
0.147341
0.168037
0.047661
0.069857
0.073823

0.614071
1.003541
0.940074
1.078822
0.997115
1.663243
0.676366
1.461337
1.068825
1.072239
0.979906
1.512831
1.203862
0.858845
0.707705
1.128432
1.247765
0.934869

0.053538

0.145160

1.054998
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Table 6I - Multilevel Regressions of Violent Rearrests on Individual Level
Characteristics and Statewide Level of Police Officers per 1,000 Residents
Final estimation of fixed effects: (Unit specified model):
Intercept, γ00
Individual-Level
Gender
Age of First Arrest
Age at Release
Prior Arrests
Time Served
Black
Other Race
Property Offense
Drug Offense
Public Order Offense
Other Offense
Parole Revocation
Probation Revocation
Other Admission Type
Unknown Admission Type
Mandatory Supervised Released
Expiration of Sentence
Other Release Type
State-Level
Police per 1,000 Residents

* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01

b
-1.711056***

S.E.
0.259809

Exp(b)
0.180675

-0.792006***
-0.033594***
-0.040626***
0.022916***
-0.002941***
0.559868***
0.246504*
-0.400764***
-0.609024***
-0.334968***
-0.575534***
0.308714***
-0.018011
-0.426868**
-0.054909**
0.385261***
0.613087***
0.278507***

0.066835
0.003944
0.002614
0.001973
0.000754
0.031483
0.140159
0.039340
0.040265
0.059778
0.116013
0.035407
0.160112
0.204758
0.266895
0.067875
0.074956
0.082645

0.452935
0.966964
0.960188
1.023181
0.997063
1.750441
1.279545
0.669808
0.543881
0.715361
0.562405
1.361673
0.982151
0.652550
0.946571
1.469997
1.846121
1.321156

0.139806

0.101452

1.150050
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Table 6J - Multilevel Regressions of Property Rearrests on Individual Level
Characteristics and Statewide Level of Police Officers per 1,000 Residents
Final estimation of fixed effects: (Unit specified model):
Intercept, γ00
Individual-Level
Gender
Age of First Arrest
Age at Release
Prior Arrests
Time Served
Black
Other Race
Property Offense
Drug Offense
Public Order Offense
Other Offense
Parole Revocation
Probation Revocation
Other Admission Type
Unknown Admission Type
Mandatory Supervised Released
Expiration of Sentence
Other Release Type
State-Level
Police per 1,000 Residents

* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01

b
-1.841191***

S.E.
0.235243

Exp(b)
0.158628

-0.196561***
0.005679*
-0.038559***
0.052348***
-0.001947***
0.318929***
-0.275791*
0.799288***
-0.245558***
-0.010614
0.200574**
0.250465***
0.347531**
-0.132454
-0.024673
0.262409***
0.378509***
0.131446***

0.049689
0.003170
0.002353
0.001977
0.000691
0.028522
0.140800
0.037089
0.038966
0.057045
0.098340
0.032269
0.144294
0.175274
0.224098
0.061578
0.070308
0.076009

0.821552
1.005695
0.962175
1.053742
0.998055
1.375653
0.758971
2.223957
0.782268
0.989442
1.222104
1.284622
1.415569
0.875943
0.975629
1.300059
1.460106
1.140477

0.341012***

0.091807

1.406370
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Table 6K - Multilevel Regressions of Drug Rearrests on Individual Level
Characteristics and Statewide Level of Police Officers per 1,000 Residents
Final estimation of fixed effects: (Unit specified model):
Intercept, γ00
Individual-Level
Gender
Age of First Arrest
Age at Release
Prior Arrests
Time Served
Black
Other Race
Property Offense
Drug Offense
Public Order Offense
Other Offense
Parole Revocation
Probation Revocation
Other Admission Type
Unknown Admission Type
Mandatory Supervised Released
Expiration of Sentence
Other Release Type
State-Level
Police per 1,000 Residents

* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01

b
-2.049450***

S.E.
0.433793

Exp(b)
0.128806

-0.204921***
-0.001548
-0.034843***
0.042036***
-0.003054***
0.409816***
-0.555793***
0.145115***
0.778627***
0.129681**
0.271949***
0.183994***
0.077469
-0.200755
-0.429589
0.151749**
0.265058***
-0.157843*

0.048726
0.003135
0.002338
0.001908
0.000755
0.028673
0.158717
0.039411
0.038043
0.057925
0.096649
0.031957
0.159767
0.201469
0.294572
0.069052
0.074601
0.085438

0.814712
0.998453
0.965757
1.042932
0.996951
1.506540
0.573617
1.156172
2.178478
1.138465
1.312520
1.202009
1.080548
0.818112
0.650777
1.163868
1.303506
0.853984

0.309174*

0.168984

1.362300
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Table 6L - Multilevel Regressions of Public Order Rearrests on Individual
Level Characteristics and Statewide Level of Police Officers per 1,000
Residents
Final estimation of fixed effects: (Unit specified model):
Intercept, γ00
Individual-Level
Gender
Age of First Arrest
Age at Release
Prior Arrests
Time Served
Black
Other Race
Property Offense
Drug Offense
Public Order Offense
Other Offense
Parole Revocation
Probation Revocation
Other Admission Type
Unknown Admission Type
Mandatory Supervised Released
Expiration of Sentence
Other Release Type
State-Level
Police per 1,000 Residents

* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01

B
-1.185286

S.E.
0.677762

Exp(b)
0.305659

-0.286794***
-0.006066*
-0.054292***
0.034703***
-0.002396***
0.046398
-0.024345
0.027924
0.020769
0.422849***
-0.328789***
0.190399***
0.134174
-0.467820***
-0.072029
0.422962***
0.348797***
0.217973***

0.052266
0.003425
0.002459
0.001901
0.000737
0.029365
0.135020
0.038482
0.034066
0.051339
0.110836
0.033431
0.140431
0.172363
0.244939
0.064879
0.075462
0.080251

0.750666
0.993953
0.947155
1.035312
0.997607
1.047491
0.975949
1.028318
1.020986
1.526303
0.719795
1.209732
1.143591
0.626366
0.930504
1.526476
1.417362
1.243553

0.073105

0.264072

1.075843
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Table 6M - Multilevel Regressions of Reconviction Probabilities for Rearrested
Offenders on Individual Level Characteristics and Statewide Level of Police
Officers per 1,000 Residents
Final estimation of fixed effects: (Unit specified model):
Intercept, γ00
Individual-Level
Gender
Age of First Arrest
Age at Release
Prior Arrests
Time Served
Black
Other Race
Property Offense
Drug Offense
Public Order Offense
Other Offense
Parole Revocation
Probation Revocation
Other Admission Type
Unknown Admission Type
Mandatory Supervised Released
Expiration of Sentence
Other Release Type
State-Level
Police per 1,000 Residents

* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01

B
-0.324498

S.E.
0.552864

Exp(b)
0.722890

-0.055823
-0.000731
-0.011387***
0.016289***
-0.004192***
0.050899
-0.318548*
0.348211***
0.212111***
0.114413*
-0.036094
0.122149***
0.090786
-0.161607
-0.279493
0.006680
0.305307***
-0.148446

0.062618
0.003872
0.002877
0.002428
0.000863
0.035385
0.170199
0.046469
0.047073
0.066158
0.124821
0.039230
0.192240
0.202521
0.221224
0.067057
0.106714
0.108819

0.945707
0.999269
0.988678
1.016423
0.995817
1.052217
0.727204
1.416531
1.236285
1.121215
0.964550
1.129923
1.095035
0.850776
0.756167
1.006702
1.357042
0.862047

0.450621*

0.216014

1.569287
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Table 6N - Multilevel Regressions of Reimprisonment Probabilities for
Reconvicted Offenders on Individual Level Characteristics and Statewide Level
of Police Officers per 1,000 Residents
Final estimation of fixed effects: (Unit specified model):
Intercept, γ00
Individual-Level
Gender
Age of First Arrest
Age at Release
Prior Arrests
Time Served
Black
Other Race
Property Offense
Drug Offense
Public Order Offense
Other Offense
Parole Revocation
Probation Revocation
Other Admission Type
Unknown Admission Type
Mandatory Supervised Released
Expiration of Sentence
Other Release Type
State-Level
Police per 1,000 Residents

* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01

B
0.521297

S.E.
0.608975

Exp(b)
1.684210

-0.523812***
0.020855***
-0.019838***
0.008641***
0.004874***
0.128560***
-0.702348***
0.250140***
0.126655**
0.017668
-0.141753
0.027695
-0.292684
0.269249
0.121601
-0.082303
-0.189522
-0.183027

0.074419
0.004766
0.003470
0.002630
0.001111
0.041968
0.224576
0.056459
0.057333
0.080922
0.154804
0.045990
0.236530
0.258852
0.267279
0.079529
0.118075
0.136309

0.592259
1.021074
0.980358
1.008679
1.004886
1.137190
0.495421
1.284205
1.135025
1.017825
0.867835
1.028082
0.746258
1.308982
1.129303
0.920993
0.827355
0.832746

-0.145565

0.236350

0.864534
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Table 6O - Multilevel Regressions of Rearrests on Individual Level
Characteristics and Statewide Arrest-Offense Ratios
Final estimation of fixed effects: (Unit specified model):
Intercept, γ00
Individual-Level
Gender
Age of First Arrest
Age at Release
Prior Arrests
Time Served
Black
Other Race
Property Offense
Drug Offense
Public Order Offense
Other Offense
Parole Revocation
Probation Revocation
Other Admission Type
Unknown Admission Type
Mandatory Supervised Released
Expiration of Sentence
Other Release Type
State-Level
Arrest-Offense Ratio

* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01

b
1.182165**

S.E.
0.472425

Exp(b)
3.261427

-0.487598***
0.003559
-0.061816***
0.075881***
-0.002891***
0.509112***
-0.391308***
0.379173***
0.066670*
0.070258
-0.020320
0.414070***
0.182533
-0.155509
-0.345114**
0.120994**
0.219513***
-0.071638

0.043549
0.002771
0.002170
0.002547
0.000591
0.027701
0.121690
0.036654
0.035806
0.050018
0.096541
0.032864
0.151848
0.147248
0.167736
0.047416
0.069759
0.073690

0.614100
1.003566
0.940056
1.078834
0.997113
1.663814
0.676172
1.461076
1.068942
1.072784
0.979885
1.512963
1.200254
0.855979
0.708140
1.128618
1.245471
0.930868

-0.024463

0.073690

0.975834
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Table 6P - Multilevel Regressions of Violent Rearrests on Individual Level
Characteristics and Statewide Arrest-Offense Ratios
Final estimation of fixed effects: (Unit specified model):
Intercept, γ00
Individual-Level
Gender
Age of First Arrest
Age at Release
Prior Arrests
Time Served
Black
Other Race
Property Offense
Drug Offense
Public Order Offense
Other Offense
Parole Revocation
Probation Revocation
Other Admission Type
Unknown Admission Type
Mandatory Supervised Released
Expiration of Sentence
Other Release Type
State-Level
Arrest-Offense Ratio

* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01

b
-0.982991**

S.E.
0.408147

Exp(b)
0.374190

-0.792280***
-0.033613***
-0.040640***
0.022860***
-0.002917***
0.561817***
0.243604*
-0.400567***
-0.608377***
-0.334515***
-0.575684***
0.307758***
-0.048505
-0.444475**
-0.037618
0.361330***
0.599165***
0.258346***

0.066836
0.003944
0.002614
0.001974
0.000755
0.031486
0.140161
0.039347
0.040265
0.059787
0.116014
0.035450
0.160510
0.204955
0.267615
0.068359
0.076683
0.084594

0.452811
0.966945
0.960175
1.023123
0.997087
1.753857
1.275839
0.669940
0.544234
0.715685
0.562320
1.360372
0.952653
0.641161
0.963081
1.435237
1.820598
1.294787

-0.014311

0.015594

0.985791
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Table 6Q - Multilevel Regressions of Property Rearrests on Individual Level
Characteristics and Statewide Arrest-Offense Ratios
Final estimation of fixed effects: (Unit specified model):
Intercept, γ00
Individual-Level
Gender
Age of First Arrest
Age at Release
Prior Arrests
Time Served
Black
Other Race
Property Offense
Drug Offense
Public Order Offense
Other Offense
Parole Revocation
Probation Revocation
Other Admission Type
Unknown Admission Type
Mandatory Supervised Released
Expiration of Sentence
Other Release Type
State-Level
Arrest-Offense Ratio

* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01

b
-0.703265

S.E.
0.489060

Exp(b)
0.494966

-0.197088***
0.005604
-0.038536***
0.052265***
-0.001916***
0.321380***
-0.280775**
0.799674***
-0.244312***
-0.009827
0.199405**
0.249873***
0.301927**
-0.152757
0.020237
0.236166***
0.359807***
0.103940

0.049690
0.003170
0.002354
0.001980
0.000694
0.028551
0.140790
0.037105
0.038967
0.057065
0.098333
0.032349
0.146036
0.175728
0.226194
0.064079
0.072088
0.079116

0.821119
1.005620
0.962197
1.053655
0.998086
1.379030
0.755198
2.224815
0.783244
0.990222
1.220676
1.283862
1.352462
0.858338
1.020443
1.266385
1.433053
1.109534

-0.010984

0.018681

0.989076
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Table 6R - Multilevel Regressions of Drug Rearrests on Individual Level
Characteristics and Statewide Arrest-Offense Ratios
Final estimation of fixed effects: (Unit specified model):
Intercept, γ00
Individual-Level
Gender
Age of First Arrest
Age at Release
Prior Arrests
Time Served
Black
Other Race
Property Offense
Drug Offense
Public Order Offense
Other Offense
Parole Revocation
Probation Revocation
Other Admission Type
Unknown Admission Type
Mandatory Supervised Released
Expiration of Sentence
Other Release Type
State-Level
Arrest-Offense Ratio

* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01

b
-0.836000

S.E.
0.668383

Exp(b)
0.433441

-0.204984***
-0.001582
-0.034857***
0.042007***
-0.003015***
0.411185***
-0.556519***
0.145353***
0.779069***
0.130341**
0.271286***
0.182903***
0.066267
-0.205083
-0.420531
0.137609**
0.260358***
-0.168064*

0.048727
0.003135
0.002337
0.001908
0.000755
0.028676
0.158698
0.039413
0.038044
0.057928
0.096646
0.031968
0.159902
0.201460
0.294794
0.069285
0.075222
0.086220

0.814661
0.998419
0.965744
1.042902
0.996990
1.508605
0.573201
1.156448
2.179442
1.139217
1.311650
1.200698
1.068512
0.814580
0.656698
1.147526
1.297394
0.845300

-0.017078

0.025529

0.983067
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Table 6S - Multilevel Regressions of Public Order Rearrests on Individual
Level Characteristics and Statewide Arrest-Offense Ratios
Final estimation of fixed effects: (Unit specified model):
Intercept, γ00
Individual-Level
Gender
Age of First Arrest
Age at Release
Prior Arrests
Time Served
Black
Other Race
Property Offense
Drug Offense
Public Order Offense
Other Offense
Parole Revocation
Probation Revocation
Other Admission Type
Unknown Admission Type
Mandatory Supervised Released
Expiration of Sentence
Other Release Type
State-Level
Arrest-Offense Ratio

* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01

b
-0.224166

S.E.
0.914972

Exp(b)
0.799182

-0.286842***
-0.006066*
-0.054292***
0.034697***
-0.002394***
0.046518
-0.024492
-0.027930
-0.007121
0.394996***
-0.356759***
0.190374***
0.132899
-0.469136***
-0.074979
0.420395***
0.346325***
0.215484***

0.052267
0.003425
0.002459
0.001901
0.000737
0.029362
0.135017
0.038482
0.038559
0.054880
0.112733
0.033432
0.140371
0.172335
0.244841
0.064753
0.075706
0.080425

0.750630
0.993953
0.947155
1.035306
0.997609
1.047617
0.975805
0.972456
0.992905
1.484379
0.699941
1.209701
1.142135
0.625543
0.927763
1.522563
1.413861
1.240463

-0.029950

0.034942

0.970494
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Table 6T - Multilevel Regressions of Reconviction Probabilities for Rearrested
Offenders on Individual Level Characteristics and Statewide Arrest-Offense
Ratios Final estimation of fixed effects: (Unit specified model):
Intercept, γ00
Individual-Level
Gender
Age of First Arrest
Age at Release
Prior Arrests
Time Served
Black
Other Race
Property Offense
Drug Offense
Public Order Offense
Other Offense
Parole Revocation
Probation Revocation
Other Admission Type
Unknown Admission Type
Mandatory Supervised Released
Expiration of Sentence
Other Release Type
State-Level
Arrest-Offense Ratio

* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01

B
0.177213

S.E.
0.868182

Exp(b)
1.193886

-0.055843
-0.000771
-0.011421***
0.016324***
-0.004145***
0.052305
-0.320263*
0.348281***
0.212909***
0.113756*
-0.036770
0.119885***
0.081794
-0.165598
-0.281813
-0.001452
0.310223***
-0.143832

0.062622
0.003872
0.002878
0.002429
0.000863
0.035386
0.170197
0.046473
0.047072
0.066169
0.124824
0.039242
0.192716
0.202598
0.221901
0.067139
0.107162
0.109838

0.945687
0.999229
0.988644
1.016458
0.995864
1.053697
0.725958
1.416630
1.237272
1.120479
0.963898
1.127367
1.085232
0.847387
0.754415
0.998549
1.363729
0.866033

0.023951

0.032943

1.024240
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Table 6U - Multilevel Regressions of Reimprisonment Probabilities for
Reconvicted Offenders on Individual Level Characteristics and Statewide
Arrest-Offense Ratios
Final estimation of fixed effects: (Unit specified model):
Intercept, γ00
Individual-Level
Gender
Age of First Arrest
Age at Release
Prior Arrests
Time Served
Black
Other Race
Property Offense
Drug Offense
Public Order Offense
Other Offense
Parole Revocation
Probation Revocation
Other Admission Type
Unknown Admission Type
Mandatory Supervised Released
Expiration of Sentence
Other Release Type
State-Level
Arrest-Offense Ratio

* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01

B
0.244801

S.E.
0.899047

Exp(b)
1.277367

-0.523838***
0.020870***
-0.019820***
0.008628***
0.004851***
0.127746***
-0.701858***
0.250081***
0.126267**
0.017713
-0.141461
0.028538
-0.287762
0.270581
0.118500
-0.078608
-0.188203
-0.179033

0.074418
0.004766
0.003470
0.002630
0.001111
0.041952
0.224574
0.056461
0.057329
0.080925
0.154804
0.045986
0.236495
0.258906
0.267369
0.079271
0.118387
0.137146

0.592243
1.021089
0.980375
1.008665
1.004863
1.136264
0.495664
1.284129
1.134585
1.017871
0.868089
1.028949
0.749940
1.310726
1.125807
0.924403
0.828447
0.836079

-0.003458

0.034677

0.996548

